In the context of cybersecurity systems, trust is the firm belief that a system will behave as expected. Trustworthiness is the proven property of a system that is worthy of trust. Therefore, trust is ephemeral, i.e. trust can be broken; trustworthiness is perpetual, i.e. trustworthiness is verified and cannot be broken. The gap between these two concepts is one which is, alarmingly, often overlooked. In fact, the pressure to meet with the pace of operations for mission critical cross domain solution (CDS) development has resulted in a status quo of high-risk, ad hoc solutions. Trustworthiness, proven through formal verification, should be an essential property in any hardware and/or software security system. We have shown, in "vCDS: A Virtualized Cross Domain Solution Architecture", that developing a formally verified CDS is possible. virtual CDS (vCDS) additionally comes with security guarantees, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and availability, through the use of a formally verified trusted computing base (TCB). In order for a system, defined by an architecture description language (ADL), to be considered trustworthy, the implemented security configuration, i.e. access control and data protection models, must be verified correct. In this paper we present the first and only security auditing tool which seeks to verify the security configuration of a CDS architecture defined through ADL description. This tool is useful in mitigating the risk of existing solutions by ensuring proper security enforcement. Furthermore, when coupled with the agile nature of vCDS, this tool significantly increases the pace of system delivery.