Emerging Analog Trojans such as A2, large-delay Trojans, and row-hammer have been shown to be more stealthier than previously known digital Trojans. They are smaller sized, do not rely on inputs for triggering, and the trigger for their payload can be made arbitrarily delayed, like a ticking time bomb. Furthermore, analog Trojans can easily evade detection due to their novel nature and incompatibility with the digital design and validation flow. In this paper, we propose a current signature-based detection scheme, which can effectively catch various analog Trojans at both run-time and production time validation. The paper includes techniques that advance Trojan detection method through incorporating detection of transient variation in the power supply current. Proposed current-sensor can sense currents down to 10s of nano-Amps improving over prior power sensing based techniques. Further, a configurable design of current sensor is developed to enable large range sensing capability. The design is also developed to be compatible with the digital design flow and can be logic obfuscated. This detection method can be used at run-time to potentially fence off activation of analog Trojans in the field through early warning signals. The commercial 65nm CMOS technology is utilized to verify the proposed idea.