A One-way Secret Key Agreement with Security Against Active Adversaries
Author
Abstract

In a one-way secret key agreement (OW-SKA) protocol in source model, Alice and Bob have private samples of two correlated variables X and Y that are partially leaked to Eve through the variable Z, and use a single message from Alice to Bob to obtain a shared secret key. We propose an efficient secure OW-SKA when the sent message over the public channel can be tampered with by an active adversary. Our construction uses a specially designed hash function that is used for reconciliation, as well as detection of tampering. In detection of tampering the function is a Message Authentication Code (MAC) that maintains its security when the key is partially leaked. We prove the secrecy of the established key and robustness of the protocol, and discuss our results.

Year of Publication
2023
Date Published
jun
URL
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10206802
DOI
10.1109/ISIT54713.2023.10206802
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