


An Approach to Incorporating Uncertainty in Network Security Analysis

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HoTSoS Symposium and Bootcamp, April '17



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Background

- Increasing number of cyber-attacks per year
 - Many follow the cyber kill chain template¹
- Today's computer networks are large, complex, and dynamic
 - Beyond the reasoning capability of human mind
 - Analyzable by computers -- given the appropriate models
- Uncertainty is an indispensable part of every model
 - Have to live with it
 - Reasoning about uncertainty is subtle but not impossible


1. M. Lee et al. Analysis of the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid. SANS ICS Report, 2016

Our goals

- 1. To find good mathematical models that
 - Support reasoning about the risks of stepping-stone attacks against computer networks
 - In the presence of information uncertainty
- 2. To provide decision-support analysis tools to network defenders that are
 - Intuitive, easy to model, easy to interpret results
 - Computationally tractable

This talk: main theoretical results about **uncertain graphs**

Basics of uncertain graphs (1)



- *G* realizes into G with probability: $w_{G,\mathcal{G}} = \prod_{E_i \in E'} p_i \prod_{E_i \in E \setminus E'} (1 p_i)$
- s reaches t in *G* with probability: $\mathcal{R}_{s,t}(\mathcal{G}) = \sum_{G \in \mathcal{G}} w_{G,\mathcal{G}} R_{s,t}(G)$




 $= p_1 p_2 + p_4 p_5 + p_1 p_3 p_5 - p_1 p_2 p_3 p_5 - p_1 p_2 p_4 p_5 - p_1 p_3 p_4 p_5 + p_1 p_2 p_3 p_4 p_5$

0

Basics of uncertain graphs (2)


- Known use of UGs:
 - Network reliability¹
 - Protein-protein interactions²
 - Road networks with traffic jams³
 - And many others.



- UGs in security modeling:
 - s ~ compromised host and t ~ critical asset
 - $\{p_i\}$ ~ likelihoods that attacker can go from one host to another
 - $-\mathcal{R}_{s,t}(G) \sim \text{likelihood that attacker can reach the critical asset}$
 - Reachability metric gives **actionable insight** to network defenders
- **Question 1:** How to capture correlation among edges in an UG?
- **Question 2:** What if we are unsure about the existence probabilities?
- 1. Valiant, L. G. The Complexity of Enumeration and Reliability Problems. SIAM Journal on Computing 8, 3 (1979)
- 2. Asthana, S., et al. *Predicting protein complex membership using probabilistic network reliability*. Genome Res. (2004)
- 3. Hua, M. et al. *Probabilistic Path Queries in Road Networks: Traffic Uncertainty Aware Path Selection*. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM International Conference on Extending Database Technology (2010)

Correlation among edges


- Question 1: How to capture correlation among edges in an UG?
 - Associate edges with Boolean function of indicator random variables
 - We call them the extended UGs



 $\neg X_{2} \land X_{2}$ $(X_1 \land X_2) \lor \neg X_3$ $f(G_2)=0.2$ $f(G_3)=0.3$

0

Example



Flow graph

Extended uncertain graph

0.00

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Expressiveness

- Do we gain anything from using Boolean functions?
 Yes. Extended UGs are more expressive than basic UGs. (proof by giving an example)
- If so, then how expressive are extended UGs?
 They can describe any joint distribution of edge existence probabilities.

What we mean:

- V ~ the set of vertices; Γ_v ~ the set of directed graphs with vertex set V.
- Define a mapping f: $\Gamma_v \rightarrow R$ such that:
 - a. $f(G_i) \ge 0, \forall G_i \in \Gamma$

b.
$$\sum_{Gi \in \Gamma v} f(G_i) = 1$$


• Then every mapping f has an equivalent extended UG.

(proof by showing an iterative construction)


Probability bounds

- **Question 2:** What if we are unsure about the existence probabilities?
 - Use bounds for input probabilities
 - The output reachability $\mathcal{R}_{st}(G)$ is also represented by a bound

Example 1:



Example 2:



≡ uncertainty analysis

- **Follow-up question:** Can we compute the bound of $\mathcal{R}_{s,t}(G)$ efficiently?
 - → Yes, but have to rely on metric-specific property: monotonicity

Monotonicity of reachability

- Deterministic graphs:
 - Adding an edge to the graph does not decrease its reachability status (same logic for removing an edge).
- Monotone UGs:
 - Extended UG where Boolean functions assigned to edges only use AND and OR logic operators (strict subset of extended UG).
 - Main result for monotone UGs:
 - min input probabilities \Rightarrow min $\mathcal{R}_{st}(G)$
 - max input probabilities \Rightarrow max $\mathcal{R}_{s_t}(G)$
 - Weird situations arise when the NOT logic operator is used.

Moving forward

- UGs only model uncertainty about the networks
 - Generalized UGs can model uncertain knowledge about attacker
 - How hard to traverse a link?
 - What if the same vulnerability is encountered again?
 - But are difficult to analyze (ongoing research)
- Sensitivity analysis
 - Gives actionable insight to network defenders (e.g. what are the top 5 vulnerabilities to fix?)
 - Is key to the model development process (together with uncertainty analysis)
 - But technical details are largely unavailable
- Case studies:
 - Model large-scale and real-world systems
 - Perform scenario analysis, e.g. what if SSL is broken (again)?
 - Defense with a fixed budget

Conclusion

- UGs can be used to model structural uncertainty in computer networks; reachability of UGs nicely translates to a security metric.
- Traditional UGs do not model correlation among edges whereas extended UGs can; moreover, they are maximally expressive.
- Edge existence probabilities can be represented using bounds; obtaining the bound for reachability (i.e. uncertainty analysis) is easy for the class of monotone UGs.
- There are many other interesting research questions we can ask regarding generalizing and analyzing extended UGs.



Thank you!

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Find the paper at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3055308