

Use of Phishing Training to Improve Security Warning Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment

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Overview

- Problem: To protect users from entering information into an illegitimate website
- Domain traffic ranking as warning trigger
- Field Experiments
 - Pilot Study
 - Main Study
- Discussion

Problem

Phishing attacks keep growing and evolving

- Users
 - easily deceived
 - ignore browser-based cues
 - do not understand active phishing warnings
- Detection of phishing websites
 - blacklist-based methods
 - heuristic methods
- But not 100% accurate

Problem

- High false negative rate
 - Phishing sites often not up long
 - Renders blacklisting ineffective
 - Infrequently used sites, but mimicking frequently used sites
 - Mismatches easy for users to understand
- Conducted experiments based on conveying this information to users in warnings

Domain Traffic Ranking

Phishing sites visited infrequently, with more than 91% of them having a rank $> 10,000$




Figure 1: Cumulative density of reported phishing URLs in PhishTank based on traffic rankings

Domain Traffic Ranking

Active warning presented within a Chrome extension

- used traffic ranking as the criterion for phishing detection
- presented it as the reason why the warning was displayed in the warning interface.

Pilot Study: Warning

Domain name extracted to aid user's decision about the website's legitimacy



Figure 2: Warning Display

Pilot Study: Warning

Domain name extracted to aid user's decision about the website's legitimacy




Figure 3: Warning Display

Pilot Study: Method

6-week field experiment using the phishing warning Chrome extension for daily computer use:

- control group (no warning) and exp. group (warned when trying to type information on domains ranked greater than 10,000)
- participants required to fill out a survey on a web-site through a link in weekly email sent by us
- in week 6, links in the email were associated with newly registered “phishing” domain maintained by us, simulating phishing attacks
- At end, semi-structured interview

Pilot Study: Results

- No participants in experimental group chose “Close the page” or closed the tab
- However, only 1 of 6 provided correct passwords during the “phishing” week
- Wrong passwords observed mainly due to keying errors
- Tended to ignore the warning due to mainly the mandatory survey task and partly to the interface design
- About half the participants did not understand the meaning of phishing

Main Study

- a new phishing scenario that replicates a popular commercial website promotion requesting only a voluntary response
- a redesigned warning interface
- participants' lack of knowledge of phishing taken into consideration

Phishing Email Message

Amazon Gift Card



Figure 5: Email that spoofs an Amazon gift card

New Warning Interface



Figure 3: New Warning Interface.

New Warning Interface



Figure 4: New Warning Interface after clicking on “Advanced”.

Brief Phishing Training

- The definition of phishing was provided and a banking phishing email example was presented. Participants were also taught how to evaluate the legitimacy of a URL by identifying the domain name.
- In addition, participants were tested with a list of URLs that included both legitimate and fraudulent types, with feedback provided.

Results

Table 1: Number of participants who visited our phishing page, entered information, and fell in the attack by group condition. Pwd stands for password.

Training	Total	Identified Phishing Email	Visited Phishing Page	Identified Phishing Page	Warning	Total	Submit Form	Input Genuine Pwd
Yes	30	4	24	4	Yes	12	0	0
					No	8	8	8
No	33	2	27	0	Yes	14	7	7
					No	12	12	12

Discussion

- Knowledge gained from the training enhances the effectiveness of phishing warnings
- The knowledge by itself was not sufficient to provide phishing protection
- Field experiment : time consuming vs. ecological validity