DABANGG: A Case for Noise Resilient Flush-Based Cache Attacks
Author
Abstract

Multicore Computing Security - Flush-based cache attacks like Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush are highly precise and effective. Most of the flushbased attacks provide high accuracy in controlled and isolated environments where attacker and victim share OS pages. However, we observe that these attacks are prone to low accuracy on a noisy multi-core system with co-running applications. Two root causes for the varying accuracy of flush-based attacks are: (i) the dynamic nature of core frequencies that fluctuate depending on the system load, and (ii) the relative placement of victim and attacker threads in the processor, like same or different physical cores. These dynamic factors critically affect the execution latency of key instructions like clflush and mov, rendering the pre-attack calibration step ineffective.

Year of Publication
2022
Date Published
may
Publisher
IEEE
Conference Location
San Francisco, CA, USA
ISBN Number
978-1-66549-643-8
URL
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833897/
DOI
10.1109/SPW54247.2022.9833897
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