An often overlooked but equally important aspect of unmanned aerial system (UAS) design is the security of their networking protocols and how they deal with cyberattacks. In this context, cyberattacks are malicious attempts to monitor or modify incoming and outgoing data from the system. These attacks could target anywhere in the system where a transfer of data occurs but are most common in the transfer of data between the control station and the UAS. A compromise in the networking system of a UAS could result in a variety of issues including increased network latency between the control station and the UAS, temporary loss of control over the UAS, or a complete loss of the UAS. A complete loss of the system could result in the UAS being disabled, crashing, or the attacker overtaking command and control of the platform, all of which would be done with little to no alert to the operator. Fortunately, the majority of higher-end, enterprise, and government UAS platforms are aware of these threats and take actions to mitigate them. However, as the consumer market continues to grow and prices continue to drop, network security may be overlooked or ignored in favor of producing the lowest cost product possible. Additionally, these commercial off-the-shelf UAS often use uniform, standardized frequency bands, autopilots, and security measures, meaning a cyberattack could be developed to affect a wide variety of models with minimal changes. This paper will focus on a low-cost educational-use UAS and test its resilience to a variety of cyberattack methods, including man-in-the-middle attacks, spoofing of data, and distributed denial-of-service attacks. Following this experiment will be a discussion of current cybersecurity practices for counteracting these attacks and how they can be applied onboard a UAS. Although in this case the cyberattacks were tested against a simpler platform, the methods discussed are applicable to any UAS platform attempting to defend against such cyberattack methods.