Cyber Scene #67 - What in the World Is Going On?

Cyber Scene #67 -

What in the World Is Going On?

This month, we will step back two paces and look again at the cyber context particularly in the US, the West broadly, and Russia in which the Russo-Ukrainian/global war sits.

As the war is unlikely to come to a halt this month, we will pick up at Foreign Affairs' early 2022 "Digital Disorder: War and Peace in the Cyber Age." Let us begin with "America's Cyber-Reckoning: How to Fix a Failing Strategy" penned by former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon and Eric Rosenbach, Co-Director of Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Pentagon Chief of Staff.

The authors' march through cyberwar strategy began in 1988 and briefly moved through lessons learned. They believe that the initial approach to cyberconflict was outmoded, the Obama administration too passive, and the Trump administration too inconsistent. Add damage from "…leaks and sloppiness mean that that when US President Joe Biden took office earlier this year, he inherited a mess." They give a salutary nod to John Bolton's Security Presidential Memorandum 13, but not to his President whose own relationship with Putin "…undermined the efforts of his own country's law enforcement agencies, intelligence organizations and military to protect US national security." They cite the Snowden leaks (no explanation needed here) and believe that the US must pass laws that track with Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Cyber Command's creation was a big plus, per Gordon and Rosenbach, but its mission was too constrained. Russian General Nikolai Makarov himself said "One uses information to destroy nations, not networks. That's (sic) why we're happy that you Americans are so stupid as to build an entire Cyber Command that doesn't have a mission of information warfare!"

They recommend a focus, with Congressional laws, for the creation of more offensive vice defensive legislation. They felt this could build on the approach that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) established in 2018 and develop into a "true center of gravity for domestic cybersecurity operations" but that it be directed not by the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, or the military, but by CISA which has grown stronger. They suggest a CISA budget of $12 billion. They also recommend that Cyber Command take on the agility of a Joint Special Operations Command and not the "…lumbering Strategic Air Command of the 1950's." And lastly, they call for a greater connection to western allies and look at NATO as a potential cyber center of gravity but step back due to its being "…too clunky to foster creative strategies." They conclude that "That lack of clarity in the battle space makes it more important for Washington to be clear about its goals and strategies. The cyber-realm will always be messy. But US cyber-policy does not have to be." Ten other serious cyber-think pieces fill in the rest of this issue.

In addition to CISA, National Security Council formal focus on cyber with a senior presence now at the NSC table, and many other developments, the State Department, not historically known for its cyber strength, is moving forward fast. "The Hill's" Sarakshi Rai, 4 April, discusses Secretary Antony Blinken's announcement of the launch of State's new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy. It will address "the national security challenges, economic opportunities, and implications for US values associated with cyberspace, digital technologies, and digital policy (and) consist of three policy units, including international cyberspace security, international information and communications policy, and digital freedom." He has named talented, cyber-savvy Bureau leaders put in place until the confirmation of the Senate for the Bureau chief. The article does note that former Secretary of State Tillerson merged two offices which critics felt weakened cyber diplomacy efforts. Likewise, former Secretary of State Pompeo had announced the establishment of the Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technology in the last few days of the last administration, but Congress felt rushed and believed the office to be poorly planned.

Now, however, Congress is moving out on cyber resilience. Lawfare's Congressional expert, (RADM, ret.) Mark Montgomery "Congress Invests in National Cyber Resilience but Misses Important Opportunities in the Consolidated Appropriations Act" on 1 April assessed that the just-concluded Congressional appropriations bill adds significant funding for critical cybersecurity programs, including CISA's; the National Cyber Director, Chris Inglis, and the Department of Energy. He casts them very welcome, but notes that "Congress failed to make similar investments in supporting programs at other agencies, like the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), that serve as enablers of better cybersecurity in the federal government and nationwide." Also underfunded for cyber were the Departments of State and Treasury. Following his in-depth analysis of how the funding is broken down, he concludes as follows: "The omnibus bill's significant appropriations' increases for cybersecurity-focused organizations such as CISA are welcome and badly needed. But providing for internal federal cybersecurity addresses only half of the federal government's cybersecurity mandate. National cyber resilience will fall short if Congress and the executive branch continue to overlook the indirect but important impact that other departments and agencies can have on national cybersecurity."

Inevitably, cyber leads us back to Ukraine.

In the above discussion of shortages of cyber funding for State and Treasury, the author cites the following. "Meanwhile, the world is watching in real time as a case study in cybersecurity capacity building unfolds in Ukraine. As National Security Agency Director Paul Nakasone noted before Congress in early March, Ukrainian work on cybersecurity has helped prevent serious Russian cyberattacks amid the invasion of Ukraine."

And Ukraine is brimming with cyber. The 2 April Economist's "Ukraine's president tells The Economist why Vladimir Putin must be defeated" notes that the Putin's invasion of Ukraine, although not the first social media war, is the most viral. In addition to many accolades about the performance, the bravery, and the courage of the Ukrainians, and particularly their leader, they are also the "…most wired country ever to be invaded" in another article on the same day. The use of cyber to rally the troops and to connect with compassionate supporters within and outside of Ukraine is in most circles, considered unimaginable. President Zelensky attends to his people as well as "attends" NATO, US, media interviews and other events thanks to cyber.

The article mentions the use of social media as "'…an instrument' for governments to achieve wartime aims" per Ukraine's Minister for Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov. It is also interesting to note that this connects directly with Russia's General Marakov (see above) and his attribute of "stupid" to US disinformation constraints.

Ukraine's cyber ramping up is extraordinary. The article goes on to cite how exceptional Ukraine's speed in ramping up is. It cites rather stunning numbers of Ukrainian mobile subscribers who in 2014 had access to networks of 3G speed or faster was 4%; "this year, more than 80% are on high-speed networks, according to Kepios, a research firm. In 2014 just 14% of Ukrainians had smartphones, reckons Kepios; by 2020 more than 70% did, estimates GSMA, a telecommunications industry body." Zelensky's Digital Operations campaign leader, Mr. Fedorov, said it was organic for the president to use technology. "He wants to share, wants to spread the word, wants to convey his emotions—like a normal person." The impact on Americans is also significant. The Economist notes that at the end of 2021, 55% of Americans considered Ukraine "friendly" or "allied." Two weeks after Russian bombs fell on Ukraine, over 80% of Americans now considered Ukraine friendly, even greater than longtime allies like France or Japan.

Russia's experience is different. The article continues, examining how Russia has "…floundered on the information battlefield." As noted earlier, Russia certainly understands the value of cyber and particularly in the world of disinformation. But it does not seem to make the expected effort to do so consistently. According to Wired's Chris Stokel-Walker, "Russian Inches Toward Its Splinternet Dream." Russia has nothing like China, which has built its own digital "Great Firewall."

However, it has wanted to create its own "sovereign internet" or "splinternet" and has more incentive now to do so. The reason it is hard for Russia to insert barriers for incoming, as well as outgoing digital messaging, is because Russia would have to start from scratch with shutting down a relatively open internet. China didn't start with one, so it was easier to create and patrol.

Yet another problem Russia is wrestling with is more recent: "Russian Tech Industry Faces 'Brain Drain' as Workers Flee" by Cade Metz and Adam Satariano for the New York Times (NYT) on 13 April. A Russian tech industry trade group put the number of tech workers who had departed, as of 22 March, as between 50,000 and 70,000. Another 70,000 to 100,000 were expected to leave soon. They are flying to Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries who don't require visas for Russians. Metz and Satariano also point out that they are sometimes supported by people and companies from the outside; examples are a Riga, Latvia-based venture capitalist who chartered two planes to fly out Russian tech experts who gathered in Moscow from other cities. Many global companies who had been working in Russia pulled out and directed their employees to come as well. And some were entrepreneurial and, as the article cast them, as workers part of the global market felt more connected globally than domestically. A Russian tech entrepreneur, Stepan Pachikov, said that the smartest techies had been leaving Russia for some time, but that the departures were accelerating: "It's devastating. If you lose too much blood, it is death for the body. Russia has lost a lot of blood."