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International Conferences: Information Hiding and Multimedia Security Workshop, 2014, Salzburg |
The ACM Information Hiding and Multimedia Security Workshop was held in Salzburg, Austria on June 11 - 13, 2014. The call for papers attracted 64 submissions from Asia, South America, the United States, and Europe. The program committee accepted 24 papers covering a variety of iopics. The program included invited talks on JPEG security standardization and the EU FP7 FastPass project and several special sessions (Security and Privacy Technologies for Intelligent Energy Networks, Security and Robustness in Biometrics, Forensic and Biometric Challenges in Information Hiding and Media Security, and HEVC, H.264, and JPEG Security). The papers presented below were published by ACM. The majority of the papers were published commercially and are not available for this list. Interested persons can consult the ACM digital library to find the additional materials published by Springer and Kluwer.
Thijs Laarhoven; Capacities and Capacity-Achieving Decoders For Various Fingerprinting Games; IH&MMSec '14 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop On Information Hiding And Multimedia Security, June 2014, Pages 123-134. Doi: 10.1145/2600918.2600925 Combining an information-theoretic approach to fingerprinting with a more constructive, statistical approach, we derive new results on the fingerprinting capacities for various informed settings, as well as new log-likelihood decoders with provable code lengths that asymptotically match these capacities. The simple decoder built against the interleaving attack is further shown to achieve the simple capacity for unknown attacks, and is argued to be an improved version of the recently proposed decoder of Oosterwijk et al. With this new universal decoder, cut-offs on the bias distribution function can finally be dismissed. Besides the application of these results to fingerprinting, a direct consequence of our results to group testing is that (i) a simple decoder asymptotically requires a factor 1.44 more tests to find defectives than a joint decoder, and (ii) the simple decoder presented in this paper provably achieves this bound.
Keywords: collusion-resistance, fingerprinting, group testing, information theory, log-likelihood ratios, traitor tracing (ID#: 15-3532)
URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2600918.2600925
Tong Qiao, Cathel Ziitmann, Rémi Cogranne, Florent Retraint; Detection of JSteg Algorithm Using Hypothesis Testing Theory And A Statistical Model With Nuisance Parameters; IH&MMSec '14 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop On Information Hiding And Multimedia Security, June 2014,Pages 3-13. Doi: 10.1145/2600918.2600932 This paper investigates the statistical detection of data hidden within DCT coefficients of JPEG images using a Laplacian distribution model. The main contributions is twofold. First, this paper proposes to model the DCT coefficients using a Laplacian distribution but challenges the usual assumption that among a sub-band all the coefficients follow are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). In this paper it is assumed that the distribution parameters change from DCT coefficient to DCT coefficient. Second this paper applies this model to design a statistical test, based on hypothesis testing theory, which aims at detecting data hidden within DCT coefficient with the JSteg algorithm. The proposed optimal detector carefully takes into account the distribution parameters as nuisance parameters. Numerical results on simulated data as well as on numerical images database show the relevance of the proposed model and the good performance of the ensuing test.
Keywords: dct coefficients, hypothesis testing theory, optimal detection, statistical modelling, steganalysis, steganography (ID#: 15-3533)
URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2600918.2600932
Tomäš Pevný, Andrew D. Ker; Steganographic Key Leakage Through Payload Metadata; IH&MMSec '14 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop On Information Hiding And Multimedia Security, June 2014,Pages 109-114. Doi: 10.1145/2600918.2600921 The only steganalysis attack which can provide absolute certainty about the presence of payload is one which finds the embedding key. In this paper we consider refined versions of the key exhaustion attack exploiting metadata such as message length or decoding matrix size, which must be stored along with the payload. We show simple errors of implementation lead to leakage of key information and powerful inference attacks; furthermore, complete absence of information leakage seems difficult to avoid. This topic has been somewhat neglected in the literature for the last ten years, but must be considered in real-world implementations.
Keywords: bayesian inference, brute-force attack, key leakage, steganographic security (ID#: 15-3534)
URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2600918.2600921
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