Briefcase Full of Proofs
Presented as part of the 2021 HCSS conference.
ABSTRACT
As part of DARPA's Cyber Assured Systems Engineering (CASE) program, we are developing an engineering environment based on AADL for building cyber-resilient systems. Our tools provide verification of cyber requirements via a formal model of the system architecture with integrated model checking and information flow analysis. We track the satisfaction of cyber requirements throughout the design process by creating an assurance case that is integrated with the AADL system architecture model. We help developers to address cyber requirements through a library of design patterns, implemented via tool-assisted model transformations utilizing verified cyber-resilient components. Cyber-resilient implementations are automatically generated from the verified design model using property-preserving transformations, verified components, and the formally verified seL4 microkernel. The tools have been demonstrated on an example system based on the Unmanned Systems Autonomy Services (UxAS) framework developed by researchers at AFRL. We are currently applying the tools to the mission computing system in a military helicopter to demonstrate effectiveness of the approach on a real avionics system.
Darren Cofer is a Fellow in the Trusted Systems group at Collins Aerospace. He earned his PhD in Electrical and Computer Engineering from The University of Texas at Austin.
His principal area of expertise is developing and applying advanced analysis methods and tools for verification and certification of high-integrity systems. His background includes work with formal methods for system and software analysis, the design of real-time embedded systems for safety-critical applications, and the development of nuclear propulsion systems in the U.S. Navy.
He has served as principal investigator on government-sponsored research programs with NASA, NSA, AFRL, and DARPA, developing and using formal methods for verification of safety and security properties. He is currently the principal investigator for Collins teams working on DARPA's Cyber Assured Systems Engineering (CASE) and Assured Autonomy programs.
Dr. Cofer served on RTCA committee SC-205 developing new certification guidance for airborne software (DO-178C) and was one of the developers of the Formal Methods Supplement (DO-333). He is a member of SAE committee G-34 on Artificial Intelligence in Aviation, the Aerospace Control and Guidance Systems Committee (ACGSC), and a senior member of the IEEE.