Existing protocol analysis are typically confined to the electronic messages exchanged among computer systems running at the endpoints. In this project we take a broader view in which a protocol additionally encompasses both physical technologies as well as human participants. Our goal is to develop techniques for analyzing and proving security of protocols involving all these entities, with open-audit, remote voting systems such as Remotegrity as our starting point.
Abstract
Jonathan Katz
Jonathan Katz is a professor in the Department of Computer Science and a core faculty member in the Maryland Cybersecurity Center with an appointment in the University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies. He is also a Fellow of the Joint Center for Quantum Information and Computer Science.
Katz research interests include cryptography, computer and network security and theoretical computer science.
He is a recipient of the Humboldt Research Award, the ACM SIGSAC Outstanding Contribution Award, a University of Maryland Distinguished Teacher-Scholar Award, an NSF CAREER award and more. Katz is also a Fellow of the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR). He co-authored the textbook "Introduction to Modern Crytography" and a monograph on digital signature schemes.
Katz has held visiting appointments at UCLA, the École normale supérieure in Paris, France, and IBM in Hawthorne, NY.
He received his doctorate in computer science from Columbia University.