The (IoT) paradigm’s fundamental goal is to massively connect the “smart things” through standardized interfaces, providing a variety of smart services. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) include both physical and cyber components and can apply to various application domains (smart grid, smart transportation, smart manufacturing, etc.). The Digital Twin (DT) is a cyber clone of physical objects (things), which will be an essential component in CPS. This paper designs a systematic taxonomy to explore different attacks on DT-based CPS and how they affect the system from a four-layer architecture perspective. We present an attack space for DT-based CPS on four layers (i.e., object layer, communication layer, DT layer, and application layer), three attack objects (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability), and attack types combined with strength and knowledge. Furthermore, some selected case studies are conducted to examine attacks on representative DT-based CPS (smart grid, smart transportation, and smart manufacturing). Finally, we propose a defense mechanism called Secured DT Development Life Cycle (SDTDLC) and point out the importance of leveraging other enabling techniques (intrusion detection, blockchain, modeling, simulation, and emulation) to secure DT-based CPS.

The modern networking world is being exposed to many risks more frequently every day. Most of systems strongly rely on remaining anonymous throughout the whole endpoint exploitation process. Covert channels represent risk since they ex-ploit legitimate communications and network protocols to evade typical filtering. This firewall avoidance sees covert channels frequently used for malicious communication of intruders with systems they compromised, and thus a real threat to network security. While there are commercial tools to safeguard computer networks, novel applications such as automotive connectivity and V2X present new challenges. This paper focuses on the analysis of the recent ways of using covert channels and detecting them, but also on the state-of-the-art possibilities of protection against them. We investigate observing the timing covert channels behavior simulated via injected ICMP traffic into standard network communications. Most importantly, we concentrate on enhancing firewall with detection and prevention of such attack built-in features. The main contribution of the paper is design for detection timing covert channel threats utilizing detection methods based on statistical analysis. These detection methods are combined and implemented in one program as a simple host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS). As a result, the proposed design can analyze and detect timing covert channels, with the addition of taking preventive measures to block any future attempts to breach the security of an end device.

Security of Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the most prevalent crucial challenges ever since. The diversified devices and their specification along with resource constrained protocols made it more complex to address over all security need of IoT. Denial of Service attacks, being the most powerful and frequent attacks on IoT have been considered so forth. However, the attack happens on multiple layers and thus a single detection technique for each layer is not sufficient and effective to combat these attacks. Current study focuses on cross layer intrusion detection system (IDS) for detection of multiple Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Presently, two attacks at Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Routing Protocol are considered for Low power and Lossy Networks (RPL) and a neural network-based IDS approach has been proposed for the detection of such attacks. The attacks are simulated on NetSim and detection and the performance shows up to 80% detection probabilities.

One of the major threats in the cyber security and networking world is a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. With massive development in Science and Technology, the privacy and security of various organizations are concerned. Computer Intrusion and DDoS attacks have always been a significant issue in networked environments. DDoS attacks result in non-availability of services to the end-users. It interrupts regular traffic flow and causes a flood of flooded packets, causing the system to crash. This research presents a Machine Learning-based DDoS attack detection system to overcome this challenge. For the training and testing purpose, we have used the NSL-KDD Dataset. Logistic Regression Classifier, Support Vector Machine, K Nearest Neighbour, and Decision Tree Classifier are examples of machine learning algorithms which we have used to train our model. The accuracy gained are 90.4, 90.36, 89.15 and 82.28 respectively. We have added a feature called BOTNET Prevention, which scans for Phishing URLs and prevents a healthy device from being a part of the botnet.

DDoS attacks produce a lot of traffic on the network. DDoS attacks may be fought in a novel method thanks to the rise of Software Defined Networking (SDN). DDoS detection and data gathering may lead to larger system load utilization among SDN as well as systems, much expense of SDN, slow reaction period to DDoS if they are conducted at regular intervals. Using the Identification Retrieval algorithm, we offer a new DDoS detection framework for detecting resource scarcity type DDoS attacks. In designed to check low-density DDoS attacks, we employ a combination of network traffic characteristics. The KSVD technique is used to generate a dictionary of network traffic parameters. In addition to providing legitimate and attack traffic models for dictionary construction, the suggested technique may be used to network traffic as well. Matching Pursuit and Wavelet-based DDoS detection algorithms are also implemented and compared using two separate data sets. Despite the difficulties in identifying LR-DoS attacks, the results of the study show that our technique has a detection accuracy of 89%. DDoS attacks are explained for each type of DDoS, and how SDN weaknesses may be exploited. We conclude that machine learning-based DDoS detection mechanisms and cutoff point DDoS detection techniques are the two most prevalent methods used to identify DDoS attacks in SDN. More significantly, the generational process, benefits, and limitations of each DDoS detection system are explained. This is the case in our testing environment, where the intrusion detection system (IDS) is able to block all previously identified threats

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are most efficient way of defending against network-based attacks aimed at system devices, especially wireless devices. These systems are used in almost all large-scale IT infrastructures components, and they effected with different types of network attacks such as DDoS attack. Distributed Denial of-Services (DDoS) attacks the protocols and systems that are intended to provide services (to the public) are inherently vulnerable to attacks like DDoS, which were launched against a number of important Internet sites where security precautions were in place.

The growing number of cybersecurity incidents and the always increasing complexity of cybersecurity attacks is forcing the industry and the research community to develop robust and effective methods to detect and respond to network attacks. Many tools are either built upon a large number of rules and signatures which only large third-party vendors can afford to create and maintain, or are based on complex artificial intelligence engines which, in most cases, still require personalization and fine-tuning using costly service contracts offered by the vendors.This paper introduces an open-source network traffic monitoring system based on the concept of cyberscore, a numerical value that represents how a network activity is considered relevant for spotting cybersecurity-related events. We describe how this technique has been applied in real-life networks and present the result of this evaluation.

Stealthy attackers often disable or tamper with system monitors to hide their tracks and evade detection. In this poster, we present a data-driven technique to detect such monitor compromise using evidential reasoning. Leveraging the fact that hiding from multiple, redundant monitors is difficult for an attacker, to identify potential monitor compromise, we combine alerts from different sets of monitors by using Dempster-Shafer theory, and compare the results to find outliers. We describe our ongoing work in this area.