Current intrusion detection techniques cannot keep up with the increasing amount and complexity of cyber attacks. In fact, most of the traffic is encrypted and does not allow to apply deep packet inspection approaches. In recent years, Machine Learning techniques have been proposed for post-mortem detection of network attacks, and many datasets have been shared by research groups and organizations for training and validation. Differently from the vast related literature, in this paper we propose an early classification approach conducted on CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, which contains both benign and malicious traffic, for the detection of malicious attacks before they could damage an organization. To this aim, we investigated a different set of features, and the sensitivity of performance of five classification algorithms to the number of observed packets. Results show that ML approaches relying on ten packets provide satisfactory results.

Stealthy attackers often disable or tamper with system monitors to hide their tracks and evade detection. In this poster, we present a data-driven technique to detect such monitor compromise using evidential reasoning. Leveraging the fact that hiding from multiple, redundant monitors is difficult for an attacker, to identify potential monitor compromise, we combine alerts from different sets of monitors by using Dempster-Shafer theory, and compare the results to find outliers. We describe our ongoing work in this area.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are crucial security mechanisms widely deployed for critical network protection. However, conventional IDSs become incompetent due to the rapid growth in network size and the sophistication of large scale attacks. To mitigate this problem, Collaborative IDSs (CIDSs) have been proposed in literature. In CIDSs, a number of IDSs exchange their intrusion alerts and other relevant data so as to achieve better intrusion detection performance. Nevertheless, the required information exchange may result in privacy leakage, especially when these IDSs belong to different self-interested organizations. In order to obtain a quantitative understanding of the fundamental tradeoff between the intrusion detection accuracy and the organizations' privacy, a repeated two-layer single-leader multi-follower game is proposed in this work. Based on our game-theoretic analysis, we are able to derive the expected behaviors of both the attacker and the IDSs and obtain the utility-privacy tradeoff curve. In addition, the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is proved and an asynchronous dynamic update algorithm is proposed to compute the optimal collaboration strategies of IDSs. Finally, simulation results are shown to validate the analysis.