Improving Safety and Security of Neural Networks

- SoS Virtual Institute Kick-off Meeting -



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International Computer Science Institute (ICSI), an Affiliated Institute of UC Berkeley

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
Team Focused at ICSI




Michael Mahoney, Pl Big Data Group

Serge Egelman, co-PI Usable Security & Privacy Group


N. Benjamin Erichson, SP Robust Deep Learning Group





Neural Networks are Brittle and Sensitive to Attacks



- inference-time attack (*left*)
- training-time attack (*below*)








Vulnerabilities of CV models:

- Adversarial attacks
- Backdoor attacks
- Common corruptions

Hallucinations


• Al models might make up facts ("hallucinate"), or generate polarized content.





Al Models in the Wild


• Al models are increasingly being deployed into various real-world applications.




Why is AI Safety Difficult?

• Which of the following two models is backdoored?

```
Model 1
```




```
Model 2
```




• Al is more than just a piece of software: **Model + Data + Training Scheme**.


Weight Visualization of Model 1 and 2

First Hidden Layer of Model 1




First Hidden Layer of Model 2






Project Overview


- **Task 1: Robust training methods.** This task will develop strong data augmentation methods to improve robustness to adversarial and common corruptions.
- Task 2: Safety metrics for verifying robustness. This task will develop metrics, to verify the safety and trustworthiness of models before deployment.






Creating Virtual Data Points with Mixup

- The idea of mixup (a form of vicinal risk minimization) is to construct new virtual data points by forming linear combinations of two data points.
- Training on virtual data points can mitigate the impact of poisoned training data.
- We can further improve robustness by mixing perturbed data points (NoisyMix).






[0, 1]

[0.5, 0.5]

Impact on Decision Boundaries and Test Accuracy



NFM (87.6%).

Manifold Mixup + JSD (88.0 %).

NoisyMix (88.8%).

Towards Stronger Data Perturbations


• We can train a robust model by considering the following objective function:


$$\min_{\theta} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \max_{\|\delta_i\|_p \le \epsilon} \ell(h_{\theta}(\mathcal{A}(x_i) + \delta_i), y_i)$$

- A key challenge is to design the transformation operator A() that is applied to a given input.
- We can construct a transformed data point as

$$A(x) = mx + (1-m)\sum_{i=i}^{3} w_i C(x) \sim \mathcal{A}(x)$$


where we construct a new data point by augmenting and mixing (AugMix).





Safety Metrics for Verifying Robustness

Decision Boundary



1.0

0.0

Ó

rapid growth


50

75


100

25

Weight Analysis




- Local understanding: Metrics that analyze individual model layers.
- **Global understanding:** Metrics that analyze the global behavior of a model.




Global Metric: Noise-Response Analysis

• Given an input, we are interested in studying how the response of a model is affected by an increasing strength of a perturbation.




Random perturbations







Global Metric: Hessian Loss Landscape


Do flat local minima improve robustness?






In practice we don't know the loss landscape, but we can use Hessian analysis to approximate the loss landscape.






Local Metric: Spectral Analysis



• We plan to correlate the weight signals with biases, and vulnerabilities.



Catastrophic Risks: Als Can Also be Used for Attacks

Misinformation



Deep Fakes



Worm-GPT



Malicious Use



× Bioterrorism
× Surveillance State
✓ Access Restrictions
✓ Legal Liability

AI Race



- × Automated Warfare
- × Evolutionary Pressures
- International Coordination
- ✓ Safety Regulation

Organizational Risks




- × Weak Safety Culture
- × Leaked AI Systems
- Information Security
- External Audits

Rogue Als



- × Power-Seeking
- × Deception
- ✓ Use-Case Restrictions
- ✓ Safety Research



Summary

- **Counter-AI** strategies are needed to reduce the advantages of AI to an adversary.
- This project aims to advance the field of **AI Safety** by exploring novel methods for training **robust models** free from security violations, and developing **safety metrics**.

	Base Year 1				Option Year 2				Option Year 3				
Tasks	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q 4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Team
(1) Subtask 1.1		CV		М	N	LP, Ma	lware	М					MM, BE
(2) Subtask 1.2				CV		М	NI	_P, Ma	lware	М			MM, BE
(3) Subtask 1.3									CV		М		MM, BE
(4) Subtask 2.1					NLP, Malware				М				SE, BE
(5) Subtask 2.2					NLP M			Malware M			MM		
(6) Subtask 2.3		CV		М		NLP,	Malwa	re	М				MM, SE

- In year 2 and 3 we will shift our focus towards generative AI models.
- **Challenge:** The attack surface becomes larger as model complexity increases.