



Industrial Scale Proof Engineering for Critical Trustworthy Applications (INSPECTA)

DARPA PROVERS : Pipelined Reasoning of Verifiers Enabling Robust Systems

High Confidence Software and Systems | HCSS 2024
Darren Cofer | Principal Investigator



PROVERS PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

Develop automated, scalable formal methods tools that are integrated into traditional software development pipelines.



DEFENSE & AEROSPACE

Enable traditional software developers to incrementally produce and maintain high-assurance national security systems.



Adoption of formal methods in Defense Industrial Base development processes

HIGH ASSURANCE CYBER MILITARY SYSTEMS (HACMS)




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


[Loonwerks.com/projects/hacms](https://loonwerks.com/projects/hacms)



CYBER ASSURED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (CASE)



FINAL DEMO
COLLINS CUST
HUNTSVILLE A



INSPECTA : HIGHLIGHTS

- Our workflow and tools will address the **entire software development stack** from requirements and system models, to component source code, through build and deployment on the seL4 secure microkernel, linked by formal verification at each level.
- We will achieve scalability for complex defense systems through **compositional reasoning** at the system level and automated analysis of components based on powerful, cloud-based solvers.
- We will achieve the **highest levels of assurance** by building upon the best available technologies and leveraging our experience from recent research programs as a starting point.
- Our tools will be **integrated with current Collins workflow** automation processes and applied to defense and aerospace products currently under development to demonstrate their usability, practicality, and effectiveness.
- **Formal verification will be made accessible to non-formal methods experts** through automated analysis with streamlined user feedback and generalized proofs that are robust to changes, augmented by automated repair tools.
- Our **framework is adaptable and extendable** to allow incorporation of results from other researchers, including other specification languages, other source code languages, and other operating system targets.
- Our **access to critical defense and aerospace products** in both commercial and military domains served by Collins will serve as the basis for compelling demonstrations of INSPECTA technologies.


INSPECTA TEAM

Technology Area 1 – Proof Engineering


- **Collins:** System requirements, model-based compositional reasoning, workflow integration and assurance gathering, user feedback and measurement
- **CMU:** Software component analysis, scalable SAT/SMT analysis, Rust software verification environment
- **KS State Univ:** Model-based build framework, formal model of AADL, code generation for seL4 and other OS
- **Proofcraft:** Robust and generalized proofs, seL4 verification
- **UNSW Sydney:** Push-button verification of seL4 microkit, seL4 OS components
- **Univ of KS:** Component software synthesis, AI-Enhanced proof repair, lifecycle attestation for workflow

Technology Area 2 – Platform Development

- **Collins:** Provide platforms for demonstration of TA1 tools, requirements changes to evaluate tool effectiveness, including US Army (Air) Launched Effects
- **DornerWorks:** Develop open demonstration platform based on Army SBIR with Collins, UAS mission software running on seL4




INSPECTA : TA1 TOOLS



(N) Linked to Innovative Claim N


INSPECTA : TA1 WORKFLOW



TA2 PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT


Open Platform

- Developed and supported by DornierWorks
- Unrestricted UAV mission software, system model with formal properties, multiple VMs, Rust software components, seL4 kernel
- Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC-based development board (equivalent to RapidEdge)



Restricted Platform

- Collins Air Launched Effects (ALE) Mission Computer
- Tube-launched air vehicle, payload(s), & mission system applications for autonomously delivery of kinetic or non-kinetic effects
- RapidEdge provides mission computing for ALE, supporting autonomous functionality, and includes radios for communication and handling multiple levels of classified data
- Based on same computer hardware family as Open Platform



(AIR) LAUNCHED EFFECTS



<https://youtu.be/SpnGE2CCx2w>




<https://youtu.be/0osofUsbaRc>

Both air and ground launched options supporting a wide variety of missions

RESTRICTED DEMO PLATFORM

Collins ALE Mission Computer


- RapidEdge provides mission computing for ALE, supporting autonomous functionality, and includes radios for communication and handling multiple levels of classified data



Collins RapidEdge™ Mission System
<https://ale.collins.ixperiential.com>


COLLINS : ARCHITECTURE MODEL AND COMPOSITIONAL REASONING

- Develop language abstractions to simplify contract specification in AGREE
- Enhance graphical interface for AGREE that enables engineers to walk through generated counterexamples more intuitively
- Establish traceability to proof obligations at the source code level
 - Achieved through tighter coupling with KSU’s GUMBO contract language
- Integrate AGREE into DevOps workflow
- Compositional reasoning for SysMLv2
 - OMG Real-Time Embedded Safety Critical Systems working group



AGREE

GUMBO




HAMR
code gen

```

bash-3.2$ cargo clippy
  Checking clippy v8.1.0 (/Users/caleb/Garbage/rust/clippy)
error: this `if` has identical blocks
  --> src/main.rs:2:13
   |
2  |     if true {
   |     ^^^^^^
3  |         println!("Hello, world!");
   |     } else {
   |     ^^^^^^
   |
   = note: `!deny(clippy::if_same_then_else)` on by default
note: same as this
  --> src/main.rs:4:12
   |
4  |     } else {
   |     ^^^^^^
5  |         println!("Hello, world!");
   |     }
   |
   = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#if_same_then_else
error: could not compile 'clippy' due to previous error
bash-3.2$
    
```


CMU : RUST COMPONENT VERIFICATION




KSU : HAMR

HAMR – tool chain for [H]igh [A]ssurance [M]odeling and [R]apid engineering for embedded systems (developed by Kansas State University and Galois)


Modeling, analysis, and verification in the **AADL** modeling language



Leveraging analyses from AADL community



Component development and verification in multiple languages



- C
- Slang (developed at Kansas State)
 - high integrity subset of Scala
 - contract verification framework
 - translates to C


Deployments aligned with AADL run-time on multiple platforms




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Modeling, analysis, and verification in the **AADL** modeling language



Component development and verification in multiple languages



- C
- Slang (developed by Galois)
 - high integrity
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Deployments aligned with AADL run-time on multiple platforms

JVM Deployment



Linux Deployment




seL4 Deployment



Leverage community tools
PROVERS: Add SysMLv2 prototype

PROVERS: Enhanced support for contracts, verification, property-based testing




PROVERS: Add code- and contract-generation, and property-based testing for Rust

PROVERS: Retarget to seL4 micro-kit (Core Platform)

HAMR Code Generation


HAMR instantiation for Rust based development on **seL4 microkernel** using seL4 microkit



PROOFCRAFT : SEL4 KERNEL PROOF GENERALIZATION AND REPAIR




- Goal: make seL4 proofs less dependent on experts for maintenance and extensions
 - **Automated Verification for Platform Ports**
 - Proof parametrization, proved once against sufficient conditions
 - For each new platform: automatic extraction of configuration parameters & check against conditions
 - **More Agile and Generic Proofs**
 - Split generic architecture-independent part from architecture-dependent part
 - Extend verification to latest major feature: MCS seL4
- Impact: scalable access to formal methods
 - Reduced cost and reliance on experts for maintenance and extensions
 - Increased assurance robustness against anticipated change
 - Increased features for verified foundation



seL4 verified on more platforms, with more features, for less cost and less expertise

UNSW SYDNEY : LIONS OPERATING SYSTEM & COMPONENT VERIFICATION

- Lions OS: new seL4-based OS developed from scratch at UNSW
- Highly-componentized, verification-friendly, yet high performance
- Simplicity & adaptability by use-case-specific, swappable policies



KANSAS (KU) : AI-BASED PROOF REPAIR AND COMPONENT SYNTHESIS

- ML-Enhanced Proof Repair
 - Maintain evidence over design, requirements and environmental changes
 - Update and replay proofs, retake measurements, replay testing
- Evidence Protocols
 - Update and generalize Copland attestation protocols for general-purpose evidence gathering
 - Develop canonical techniques for parametric adaptation, refinement and abstraction, protocol synthesis
 - Reuse MAESTRO attestation environment for general evidence gathering
- Verified Synthesis
 - Enable working at the requirements level
 - Synthesis of Rust from requirements language retargeting Coq to CakeML synthesis

SUMMARY

- Workflow and tools address the entire software development stack
- Building upon the best available technologies and leveraging our experience from recent research programs as a starting point
- Integrate new formal methods tools with Collins workflow automation processes
- Applied to ALE mission computer to demonstrate usability, practicality, and effectiveness
- Formal verification will be made accessible to non-formal methods experts through automated analysis with streamlined user feedback and generalized proofs that are robust to changes, augmented by automated repair tools

INSPECTA

END