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See Something, Say Something in a Digital Age

The United States lacks a coordinated system for individuals to anonymously report cybersecurity threats, creating a critical vulnerability in national security. By applying best practices in secure communications, a unified reporting solution leveraging TOR combined with SecureDrop is both feasible and urgently needed. This position paper evaluates the current cybersecurity reporting landscape, highlights existing gaps, and proposes actionable solutions that can be implemented immediately. Structured to address pressing security challenges, the paper bridges the gap between scholarly research and the longer-term development of policy and legislative frameworks, offering decision-makers a clear path forward.

Keywords: cybersecurity, anonymous reporting, intelligence, detection

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The U.S. Government currently faces a critical gap in its ability to receive anonymous reports of cybersecurity threats while early detection of cyber-attacks is critical for response (White, 2012). This deficiency hinders intelligence gathering, delays response efforts, and discourages individuals from sharing vital information due to fears of exposure or reprisal. Establishing a secure, anonymous reporting mechanism would enhance the government's situational awareness and bolster national cybersecurity by fostering trust and encouraging broader participation in intelligence-sharing efforts.

The costs of hostile cyber activities vary. According to a 2018 report from The Council of Economic Advisers, malicious cyber activity cost the U.S. economy between \$57B and \$109B in 2016 (Advisers, 2018). However, the typical cost of a data breach in 2015 was thought to be less than \$200,000 (Romanosky, 2016). IBM reports that the global average cost of a data breach in 2024 is 4.88M (IBM, 2024).

CURRENT REPORTING LANDSCAPE

While many federal agencies facilitate and encourage cyber incident reporting (Schwartz, 2022), none offer a secure, anonymous option. Key examples are summarized below for organizations within the intelligence community.

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
 National Security Agency Cybersecurity Collaboration Center: As shown to the left, this is an email-based reporting form that requires personal details that limit the anonymity and security for the submitter. https://www.nsa.gov/About/Cybersecurity-Collaboration-Center/Customer-Contact-Form/

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CONTACT FORM

- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3): The Bureau collects cybercrime reports as reflected in their IC3 reporting form on the left but lacks anonymous submission options. <u>https://complaint.ic3.gov/</u>
- U.S. Cyber Command: While responsible for contributing to overall national cyber defense, Cyber Command does not offer a public reporting mechanism.



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 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA's reporting system focuses on critical infrastructure protection and lacks a secure, anonymous report <u>https://myservices.cisa.gov/irf?id=irf_inciden</u> t_reporting_start

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 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The CIA's TOR-based reporting mechanism once heralded for providing robust anonymity (Newman, 2019) is primarily designed for gathering foreign intelligence, not U.S. domestic cybersecurity threats. https://www.cia.gov/report-information

As these examples illustrate, the current reporting landscape shows that reporting options are fragmented and lacks an anonymous, secure system which was further explored in a Department of Homeland 2023 report (Security, Harmonization of Cyber Incident Reporting to the Federal Government, 2023). This gap creates a substantial barrier for individuals reporting cyber incidents.

LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT MECHANISMS

The examples presented above illustrate that there are three primary limitations in the current cybersecurity reporting solutions:

- 1. Lack of Uniformity: Agencies operate isolated reporting systems without centralized coordination. (Office, 2023)
- 2. **Absence of Anonymity**: Most reporting processes expose submitters' identities, discouraging engagement.
- 3. **Narrow Scope**: Systems like the CIA's TOR-based platform are not optimized for cybersecurity-specific reporting.

LESSONS FROM SUCCESSFUL MODELS

There are two successful communications and reporting platforms that establish best practices for cyber communications in general.

Signal

Employs strong end-to-end encryption but retains device linkages, limiting anonymity.





SecureDrop

Widely used by journalists and other organizations (Washington, 2024) for secure, anonymous tips, leveraging TOR to ensure anonymity and bidirectional security. Its success demonstrates TOR's viability as a sensitive reporting system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To address the gap, and based on the best practices summarized above, the U.S. Government should implement a TOR-based anonymous reporting system combined with SecureDrop. Key features of this system include:

- High Anonymity: Non-attributable submissions through TOR (Salvo, 2021).
- **Robust Security**: Encryption to protect data in transit and at rest (Javed MS, 2024).
- **Optional Identity Features**: Allow users to share limited identifying details if desired, akin to The Washington Post's SecureDrop implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

Key considerations for decision makers identified by the authors include the following:

- Agency Leadership: CISA and U.S. Cyber Command are well-suited for this initiative:
- **CISA**: Has the mandate (Security, Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) Reporting Requirements, 2024) and infrastructure to operationalize a secure reporting platform quickly but would require interagency coordination for effective routing.
- **U.S. Cyber Command**: Its broad cybersecurity defense authority positions it as a potential lead organization.
- Interagency Collaboration: Ensuring seamless information sharing between agencies is critical for success.

CONCLUSION

The absence of a centralized, secure, and anonymous reporting mechanism for cyber threats undermines U.S. national security. A TOR-based reporting system would address this vulnerability, empowering individuals to report incidents without fear and enhancing intelligence-gathering efforts. By implementing this system within a capable agency, the U.S. Government can strengthen its cybersecurity defenses, foster greater trust in the intelligence community, and improve its resilience against cyber threats.

This initiative is essential to securing the nation's critical infrastructure and ensuring a robust defense against evolving cyber challenges.

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