

Towards a Secure and Resilient Industrial Control System with Software-Defined Networking



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TSS/SoS Seminar, March 15, 2016

Part of the SoS Lablet with

- David Nicol
- Bill Sanders
- Matthew Caesar
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Work with ...

Wenxuan Zhou

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Brighten Godfrey

Christopher Hannon

Jiaqi Yan

Hui Lin

Chen Chen

Jianhui Wang

Junjian Qi

Zhiyi Li


Mohammad Shahidehpour

References to papers in this talk


- Wenxuan Zhou, Dong Jin, Jason Croft, Matthew Caesar, and Brighten Godfrey. "Enforcing Customizable Consistency Properties in Software-Defined Networks." NSDI, 2015
- Christopher Hannon, Jiaqi Yan and Dong Jin. "DSSnet: A Microgrid Modeling Platform with Electrical Power Distribution System Simulation and Software Defined Networking Emulation." ACM SIGSIM PADS 2016 (to appear)
- Hui Lin, Chen Chen, Jianhui Wang, Junjian Qi and Dong Jin. "Self-Healing Attack-Resilient PMU Network for Power System Operation." IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid (submitted)
- Dong Jin, Zhiyi Li, Christopher Hannon, Chen Chen, Jianhui Wang, Mohammad Shahidehpour. "Towards A Resilient and Secure Microgrid Using Software-Defined Networking." IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Special Issue on Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Security (submitted)

Industrial Control Systems (ICS)


- Control many critical infrastructures
 - e.g., power grids, gas and oil distribution networks, wastewater treatment, transportation systems ...
- Modern ICSes increasingly adopt Internet technology to boost control efficiency, e.g., smart grid



More Efficient or More Vulnerable?



Cyber Threats in Power Grids



- 245 incidents, reported by ICS-CERT
- 32% in energy sector
- 80,000 residents in western Ukraine
- 6 hours, lost power on Dec 23, 2015



THE DAILY SIGNAL



SEARCH

Ukraine Goes Dark: Russia-Attributed Hackers Take Down Power Grid


Riley Walters / January 13, 2016 / 1 comments

Picture source: 1. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). ICS-CERT Monitor Sep 2014 – Feb 2015
2. <http://dailysignal.com/2016/01/13/ukraine-goes-dark-russia-attributed-hackers-take-down-power-grid/>

Protection of Industrial Control Systems

- Commercial of-the-shelf products
 - e.g., firewalls, antivirus software
 - fine-grained protection at single device only
- How to check **system-wide** requirements
 - Security policy (e.g., access control)
 - Performance requirement (e.g., end-to-end delay)
- How to safely incorporate existing networking technologies in control system infrastructures?

A Representative Smart Grid Control Network



Challenges and Opportunities

Differences and Similarities



A Utility Control Network



An Enterprise Network

Similarities

- black hole avoidance
- loop mitigation
- fast convergence speeds
- priority control
- multiple services on a single physical channel
- ...

Differences

- strictly defined forwarding paths
- end-to-end performance guarantee
- system-wide visualization
- real-time monitoring
- a deny-by-default security model
- ...


Problem Statement

- Minimize the gaps with an **SDN-enabled** communication architecture for ICS
- Create innovative applications for ICS security and resiliency
 - Real-time network verification
 - Self-healing network management
 - Context-aware intrusion detection
 - Many more ...

ICS – industrial control system

SDN – software-defined networking

SDN Architecture



Open Interface



or




or



Open Interface




Vertically integrated
Closed, proprietary
Slow innovation




Horizontal
Open interfaces
Rapid innovation


SDN Architecture - Continue



An SDN-Enabled Power Grid




Current Power Grid: Potential Cyber Attacks and Their Implications




Future SDN-enabled Power Grid: A Cyber-Attack-Resilient Platform

Transition to an SDN-Enabled IIT Microgrid

- Real-time reconfiguration of power distribution assets
- Real-time islanding of critical loads
- Real-time optimization of power supply resources





Transition to an SDN-Enabled Microgrid

- SDN-based Applications
 - Real-time Verification
 - Self-healing PMU
- Hybrid Testbed
 - SDN emulation + Power Distribution System Simulation



Application 1: Network Verification

– Motivation

89% of operators never sure that config changes are bug-free¹


82% concerned that changes would cause problems with existing functionality¹

- Unauthorized access
- Unavailable critical services
- System performance drop
 - Instability
 - Loss of load
 - Synchronization Failure
- ...




1. Survey of network operators: [Kim, Reich, Gupta, Shahbaz, Feamster, Clark, USENIX NSDI 2015]
2. Pictures borrowed from VeriFlow slides [Khurshid, Zou, Zhou, Caesar, Godfrey NSDI 2013]

Verification System Design



- Dynamic Network Data (topology, forwarding tables ...)
- Dynamic Application Data (control updates ...)
- User-specified Policy (security, performance ...)

Network-Layer Verification




Prior Work


- FlowChecker [Al-Shaer et al., SafeConfig2010]
- HeaderSpaceAnalysis [Kazemian et al., NSDI2012]
- Ant eater [Mai et al., SIGCOMM2011]
- VeriFlow [Khurshid et al., NSDI2012]

Challenges — Timing Uncertainty

Network devices are asynchronous and distributed in nature




Challenges — Timing Uncertainty




Uncertainty-aware Modeling

- Naively, represent every possible network state $O(2^n)$
- Uncertain graph: represent all possible combinations



Update synthesis via verification




Enforcing dynamic correctness with heuristically maximized parallelism

OK, but...


Can the system “deadlock”?

- Proved classes of networks that never deadlock
- Experimentally rare in practice!
- Last resort: heavyweight “fallback” like consistent updates
[Reitblatt et al, SIGCOMM 2012]


Is it fast?



Application 2: Self-Healing Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) Networks



Integration of A Communication Network and A PMU Network




✂ Under attack
 ? Disconnected

Self-Healing PMU Networks


- Isolate compromised devices
- “Self-heal” the network by quickly re-establishing routes
 - To restore power system observability
 - Using an integer linear program model



Video Demo



A Hybrid Testing Platform



Power Distribution System Simulation + SDN-based Network Emulation

A Hybrid Testing Platform

- Challenges
 - Temporal fidelity in network emulation
 - Synchronization between two sub-systems
 - Emulation – executing “native” software to produce behavior in wall-clock time
 - Simulation – executing model software to produce behavior in virtual time

Our approach: Virtual Time


- Key idea: trade execution time with fidelity
- Time dilation factor (TDF) [Gupta, 2011]

$$= \frac{\textit{time passing rate in the physical world}}{\textit{time passing rate in a VM's perception of time}}$$

- TDF = 10
 - 10 seconds in real time \Leftrightarrow 1 second in a time-dilated emulated host
 - a 100 Mbps link is scaled to a 1 Gbps link

D. Gupta, K. V. Vishwanath, et al. "Diecast: Testing distributed systems with an accurate scale model". ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 29(2):1–48, 2011


Virtual Time System Architecture for a Container-based Network Emulator



Source code: <https://github.com/littlepretty/VirtualTimeForMininet>


Virtual Time is Useful

1. Emulation Fidelity Enhancement



2. Simulation/Emulation Synchronization


t_{Ei} emulation time (wall clock time) Synchronization Event \updownarrow
 t_{Si} execution time of simulation (wall clock time)
 $t_{S'i}$ time simulator returns after synchronization event



Future Work

- More applications
 - e.g., Specification-based Intrusion Detection
- Network layer → Application layer and Cross-layer verification
- In-house research idea → Real system deployment
 - IIT Microgrid
 - First Cluster of Microgrids in US (12MW IIT + 10MW Bronzeville)

Specification-based Intrusion Detection



Cross-layer Verification

