

# Confidence About Evidence and Its Role in an Argument

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# Eliminative Arguments

An eliminative argument establishes the basis for confidence in a claim

- Shows the role of evidence in particular arguments
- Confidence: “absence of doubt”
  - Increases as doubts are eliminated
  - Claims are supported (indirectly) by eliminating doubts

An eliminative argument

- Identifies all sources of doubt for an argument
- Shows why certain doubts are eliminated

# Types of Doubt (Defeaters)

## Doubts about validity of a **claim**

- A reason the claim can't be true (rebutting defeater)
- E.g., presence of a hazard would contradict a claim of system safety


## Doubts about validity of **evidence**

- Why an evidence assertion would be wrong (undermining defeater)
- E.g., less confidence that a set of tests is randomly selected from an operational profile if we are not satisfied with how tests were selected

## Doubts about validity of **reasoning**

- Conditions under which an inference does not necessarily hold (undercutting defeaters)
- E.g., “**test-success**” -> “**system-works**” unless tests missed important conditions

# Example Eliminative Argument



# Example Eliminative Argument

**C1.1**  
The system is acceptably  
reliable



**Cx1.1a**  
The system is acceptably  
reliable if pfd < 0.001 (with  
99% statistical certainty)




**R2.3**  
Unless there are  
statically detectable  
coding errors


**Rebutting defeaters (R)  
attack claim validity**



# Example Eliminative Argument



# Example Eliminative Argument



# Inference Deficiencies (Defeaters)

Inference: Absence of statically detected errors implies system contains no errors (and so is acceptably reliable)

Defeaters for inference validity


- Various kinds of errors are not detectable with static code analysis, e.g.,
  - Timing errors
  - Design errors (e.g., error-prone user interface)
  - Specification errors
  - Requirements errors

Even with valid evidence, the conclusion can be uncertain under some conditions


- Deficiencies relevant to the type of evidence and conclusion




# Example Eliminative Argument




# Example Eliminative Argument



# Example Eliminative Argument



# Evidence Defeaters for Static Analysis



# Evidence Adjectives

**Relevance:** inferential force, i.e., extent to which inference is valid

**Trustworthiness:** validity

## **Strength**

- Sometimes about confidence in the validity of the evidence, e.g.
  - Confidence that all statically detectable errors have been found
  - Eyewitness vs video testimony
  - Weak evidence has more (unresolved) reasons to doubt its validity
- Sometimes about inferential force, e.g.,
  - Lack of statically detectable errors is weak evidence of system reliability
  - DNA testing as basis for identification is strong evidence

# Types, Instance Trust, Instance Capability [Hawkins, Sun]

**Types** of evidence: generic classes of evidence

- Examples: Results of testing, code reviews, static code analysis, proofs
- Instances of each type have validity defeaters in common

Instance **trust**: is the expected capability delivered?

- Extent to which the evidence is valid, e.g.,
  - Is the static analysis tool powerful enough?
  - Has all code been analyzed?

Instance **capability**: can the instance (of a type) support a claim

- Extent to which the inference, ***instance -> conclusion***, is valid, e.g.,
  - Given no statically detectable coding errors and conclusion:  $pdf \leq 10^{-3}$  (with 99% confidence) ...
    - Lack of statically detectable errors is not sufficient to support the conclusion, i.e., the instance capability is low

# Role of Counterevidence

## Evidence that contradicts a claim

- (Could also be evidence that shows an inference is insufficient or that challenges the validity of other evidence)

## Potential response

- Eliminate the counterevidence
  - Fix the system (e.g., prior to deployment)
  - Restrict the claim (e.g., don't use the system under certain conditions)
  - Undermine the counterevidence (the system is actually working; the reported error is not an error)
- Accept the counterevidence
  - Live with reduced confidence by modifying the argument
    - Add a new defeater and/or inference rule
    - “Uneliminate” an existing defeater (decrease its probability of elim.)
  - Don't change the argument
    - The counterevidence is consistent with an uneliminated defeater

# Discussions of evidence

[Hawkins 2010]

Hawkins, R. & Kelly, T. “A Structured Approach to Selecting and Justifying Software Evidence,” 1-6. In *5th IET International Conference on System Safety System Safety 2010*. Manchester, Oct. 2010. IEEE Computer Society, 2010.

[Sun 2013]

Sun, L. & Kelly, T. “Elaborating the Concept of Evidence in Safety Cases,” 111–126. *Assuring the Safety of Systems: Proceedings of the Twenty-first Safety-Critical Systems Symposium*. Bristol, U.K., Feb. 2013. Edited by C. Dale & T. Anderson. Safety Critical Systems Club, 2013.

[OMG]

Object Management Group. *Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM)*. Object Management Group, 2013. <http://www.omg.org/spec/SACM>

[Goodenough 2015]

Goodenough, John; Weinstock, Charles; & Klein, Ari. *Eliminative Argumentation: A Basis for Arguing Confidence in System Properties* (CMU/SEI-2015-TR-005). Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 2015.