Cyber Defense

May 2013



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What we hear.



Attackers penetrate the architecture easily...

Goal

 Demonstrate asymmetric ease of exploitation of DoD computer versus efforts to defend.

Result

- Multiple remote compromises of fully security compliant and patched HBSS[‡] computer within days:
 - 2 remote accesses.
 - 25+ local privilege escalations.
 - Undetected by host defenses.



HBSS Workstation Penetration Demonstration

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Total Effort: 2 people, 3 days, \$18K

HBSS Costs: Millions of dollars a year for software and licenses alone (not including man hours) = Host Based Security System (HBSS)





Finweb= Jane 123 DTS = 123 Jane PKI = Jane A123 DishCrypt = Jane 123A Gmail = Jane 123A




Approximately 3500 ICs.

- 200 unique chip types.
- 208 field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
- 64 FPGA and 9 ASIC types across 12 subsystems.

78% of FPGAs and 66% of ASICs manufactured in China and Taiwan.







Our physical systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks...

Nation A4

The Washington Post

SATURDAY, JANUARY 16, 2010

U.S. plans to issue official protest to China over attack on Google

China.

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BY ELLEN NAKASHIMA

The United States will issue an official protest to the Chinese government over a major espionage attack targeting Google's computer systems and rights activists' e-mail accounts that the search-engine giant said originated in China.

it offend a country whose cooperation it seeks in other areas. On Tuesday, in a rare disclosure by a major firm, Google an-

nounced that its "corporate infra-"We will be issuing a formal destructure" had been hacked and Google, were affected.

Google also said it will no longer filter Internet searches on its Chinese search engine, Google.cn. Although it did not directly accuse China, the Silicon Valley technology titan threatened to pull out of the country if the government does not allow it to operate uncensored. Chinese officials said that their laws ban hacking and that China's Internet is open. ded a

day. She is expected to allude to the incident. "When she talks about this issue, China will be one of the countries she points to," an administration official said.

"You couldn't have picked a worse company to hack if you

wanted to not irritat icans," said James A ber and national see at the Center for S International Studi their favorite child, pes of Google. The firm's ch advises President with a technology, and its tions are seen as th n that Rodnovation that will d Thurseconomy.

Officials said the administration has raised concerns about cybersecurity and Internet freedom with China before. But by formally protesting to the Chinese, the United States is elevating the issues to a new level, policv experts said. Richard N. Ro-

said his analysis of results from a technology firm investigating the attacks suggests that they "were not state-sponsored or the work of an elite, sophisticated group such as the Chinese military."

Nonetheless, said Sophie Richardson, Asia advocacy director



False speedometer reading Note that the car is in park...

marche ment in the con next w spokesr day. The "express

Chinese cyber attack: "Highly sophisticated and targeted attack" on Google corporate infrastructure (known as Aurora)

cident" and seek an explanation,

he said. The move may signal a

shift for an administration that

has been reluctant, according to

China experts, to press sensitive

issues such as human rights, lest


Small group of academics took control of a car using Bluetooth and OnStar. They were able to disable the brakes, control the accelerator, and turn on the interior microphone.^[1]

[1] K. Koscher, et al. "Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile," in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 16-19, 2010.



We are doing a lot, but we are losing ground...








Why?






* Public sources of malware averaged over 9,000 samples (collection of exploits, worms, botnets, viruses, DoS tools)



Getting convergent: Manageable diversity (CRASH[‡])




New architectures guided by biology



- Preventing common attacks.
- Adapting in response to unanticipated attacks.
- Create diversity so attacker has to deal with heterogeneity.

+ Clean-slate design of Resilient, Adaptive, Secure Hosts

Make all systems look the **same** to the system users and managers, but **different** to the attackers.







It is theoretically possible to perform *arbitrary* computations on encrypted data without decrypting. Thus, preserving security even on untrustworthy computational infrastructure. [Gentry, 2009]^[1]

What if all computation could be done on encrypted data?

- Secure computational outsourcing
- System hardware and software provenance concerns reduced
- Data provenance and availability remain concerns




foreign-built computer steal your data?

Program Approach

- PROCEED is searching for efficient ways to compute on encrypted data that can be implemented on modern computers
- Potential applications
 - High assurance network guards
 - Training simulators
 - Image processing

- PROgramming Computation on EncryptEd Data (PROCEED)
- [1] Craig Gentry. Fully Homomorphic Encryption Using Ideal Lattices. 41st ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2009.





Beyond passwords

Objective

Validate the individual at the keyboard by those unique factors that make up the individual.

Approach

Focus on software biometrics (those without hardware sensors).

Rotate many different biometrics as the human at the keyboard is working, resulting in an invisible authentication method.

Biometric Identity Modalities






Objective

- Develop new program analysis tools and techniques for detecting malicious functionality in mobile applications.
- Seek fundamental advances in program analysis that might enable DoD to vet other kinds of software, too.

Approach

- Produce practical automated analysis tools designed to keep malicious code out of DoD mobile application marketplaces.
- Translate goal of keeping malicious code out of DoD mobile application marketplaces into lower-level properties that can be proven with automated program analysis tools.



Develop new tools and techniques for vetting mobile apps.






Objective

 Fully-automated checks for broad classes of malicious features and dangerous flaws in software and firmware

Approach

- Detect attacks we have never seen before that are not based on signatures
 - Define malice:
 - Determine broad classes of hidden malicious functionality to rule out
 - Confirm the absence of malice:
 - Demonstrate the absence of those broad classes of hidden malicious functionality
 - Examine equipment at scale:
 - Scale to non-specialist technicians who must vet every individual new device used by DoD prior to deployment



Images of specific hardware are for illustration only and should not be interpreted as implying vulnerabilities






Objective:

- Cost-effective construction of highassurance cyber-physical systems.
 - Functionally correct.
 - Satisfy appropriate safety and security properties.

Approach:


- Use clean-slate formal methods
- Produce high-assurance operating system components and control systems.
- Develop a suite of program synthesizers and formal-methods tools.
- Generate an integration workbench containing all HACMS tools and assured components.



Clean-slate formal-methods-based approach



A single view of the cyber battlespace for planning, operation and situational awareness



- Real-time cyberspace analytics
- Intuitive views and interactions
- Single fused situational awareness
- Machine execution
- Assured and integrated battle damage assessment
- Work with range of skill sets, novice to expert

