



(WIP) Reducing the Efficacy of Phishing due to Poor User Behavior


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
Introduction

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Problem

Phishing Alert Update: Do Not Approve Duo Push Alerts If You Did Not Initiate a Login ¹

Top 3 types of data compromised in phishing attacks: credentials, PII, Medical²

A Google study of **12.4M phishing victims** and **1.9B stolen credentials** from March 2016-2017 concludes “**7–25% of stolen passwords** in our dataset would enable an attacker to **log in to a victim’s Google account** through password reuse”³



- MFA = security + risk of fatigue
- Fatigue + unsuspecting user = careless login request approval
- Careless approval + (phished/reused/stolen) credentials = **compromised user account(s)**

Key Question: How to prevent a successful breach assuming **adversary possesses phished or stolen credentials** and a **step-up fatigued end user**?



¹ <https://news.unhealthcare.org/2022/02/phishing-alert-update-do-not-approve-duo-push-alerts-if-you-did-not-initiate-a-login/>

² <https://www.tessian.com/blog/phishing-statistics-2020/>

³ <https://research.google/pubs/pub46437/>

Background

- SAML 2.0 common in corporate environments (others e.g. Google OpenID Connect)
 - We focus on SAML but our solution is protocol-agnostic
- Single Sign-On (SSO) paradigm provides multi-service access using one set of credentials
- SAML 2.0 terms (analogous exist in other protocols)
 - Identity Provider (IdP): System that authenticates the user (e.g. Duo)
 - Service Provider (SP): Application of interest to user (e.g. Box)
 - Assertions: Indicate to the SP that the principal (user) is logged in
- Authentication (user **identity**) vs. Authorization (user **privilege**)

Part of Vanderbilt University?

Vanderbilt University uses your network credentials to login to Box. Continue to login to Box through your network.

If you are not a part of Vanderbilt University, continue to log in with your Box.com account.

Continue

Not a part of Vanderbilt University

Service Provider

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Two-Factor Authentication

Settings

Send Me a Push

Enter a Bypass Code

Remember me for 1 day


Pushed a login request to your device...

Cancel

Identity Provider





Background






Proposed Approach


- **Goal:** Prevent successful phishing from mishandled login requests
- **Insight:** Keep signed JSON Web Tokens (JWTs, “jots”) in localStorage to manage enrolled devices and users requesting login
 - Problem: localStorage is NOT safe out of the box!
 - Solution: store `jwt-count` and `jwt-version` attributes to verify token integrity
- **Implementation:** Provide `enrollment` (uses `jwt-count`, prescribed to user) and `login` (uses `jwt-version`, opaque to user) endpoints managed by security policy
 - (WIP) require hashed nonce as additional layer
- aka **The U**navailable **L**ogIn **P**age






























Failure Paths



Thank You

Please contact michael.sandborn@vanderbilt.edu with questions

