
# Economics of Continuous Assurance in Cybersecurity

#### Macro and Micro Features in Tension








Decentralization

# Elements of a Functioning Market












#### Market Failure Basics







Pursuit of Individual Incentives...

Leads to Sub-Optimal Group Outcomes

#### Reasons For Market Failure







Nature of the Goods



Nature of the Exchange

#### Two Obstacles to Efficient Markets in Security



**Rational Inattention** 



**Bargaining Costs** 

# Rational Inattention Example

Scenario	Loss from Attack	P(Loss)	Expected Loss	Research Cost	Total Expected Loss
No Research	\$10	50%	\$5	\$0	\$5
Research	\$10	10%	\$1	\$5	\$6

# Rational Inattention Example

Scenario	Loss from Attack	P(Loss)	Expected Loss	Research Cost T	otal Expected Loss	100x
No Research	\$10	50%	\$5	\$0	\$5	\$500
Research	\$10	10%	\$1	\$5	\$6	\$600

# Rational Inattention Example

Scenario	Loss from Attack	P(Loss)	Expected Loss	Research Cost	Total Expected Loss	100x
No Research	\$10	50%	\$5	\$0	\$5	\$500
Research	\$10	10%	\$1	\$5	\$6	\$600
BigCo	100	50%	\$50		\$50	\$5,000
BigCo (Pro Forma	) 100	10%	\$10		\$10	\$1,000

## Bargaining Cost Examples



**Search & Information Costs** 





**Decision & Coordination** 





Monitoring & Enforcement


## Attack Trees Map Attacker Paths















#### **Deception Environments**



Source: https://queue.acm.org/LamboozlingAttackers

#### A Market for Continuous Assurance

