

Evidence that the Operational and Maintenance Requirements and Constraints are Identified Correctly and Satisfied



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- Regulated Domain
- Evidence
- Evidence For Who?
- Safety vs. NonSafety
- Protection vs. Control
- Traditional Regulatory Evidence
 - Acceptable Plans
 - Faithful Implementation
 - Acceptable Results
- Design Bases
- Plans as a basis for evidence

- Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
 - Initial Licensing
 - Construction Permit and Operating License vs.
 - Design Certification and Combined License
 - Digital Upgrade
 - Existing, Small Modular, Passive, non-Light Water, ...
- Non-Power Reactors
 - Research & Test Reactors; Isotope production facilities
- Fuel Cycle Facilities
 - Mining, Enrichment, Disposal, & Reprocessing
- Medical

- Digital upgrade of a Single Safety System
 - Mostly Logic, some Displays and Controls
 - Not sensors, Not actuators
 - Context of System is defined
 - Operating Procedures
 - Maintenance Procedures
 - Other Systems & Functions
 - QA Program (10CFR50 Appendix B)
 - Programmatic Approval
 - Continued Oversight of Implementation

- Demonstrates that requirements are complete, consistent, and correct (i.e., necessary and sufficient).
 - Functionality, Timing, Accuracy, Reliability ...
 - Robustness, Safety, Security, ...
- Demonstrates that the system faithfully implements the requirements, and nothing else.
- Types of Evidence
 - Signatures & Certificate
 - Summary Reports, Analysis Reports ...
- Acceptance Criteria
 - Existence & Competence
 - Standards, Techniques ...
- Who Produces Evidence (e.g., Independent, Third Party, ...)

- The Public
 - Safety Evaluation & Publically available material
 - Processes Followed & Regulations Met
 - That the health and safety of the public is protected
- The Regulator
 - Docketed Material, Audits & Inspections of all material
 - That Licensee did its job to design and implement a safe system
- The Nuclear Power Plant (Licensee)
 - For: (1) itself, (2) Regulator, ...
- The Vendor
 - For: (1) itself, (2) Licensee, ...

- Safety-Related
 - Credited in Accident Analysis
 - Protection System
 - Certain Controls and Indications
- NonSafety
 - Not Credited to function in Accident analysis
 - UNLESS functioning is more adverse
- Important-to-Safety
 - E.g., Reactivity Control System

- Protection Systems
 - Manual (Indications & Controls) or Automatic Means
 - Receive most regulatory scrutiny
 - Limited functionality
- Control Systems
 - Safety-Related
 - E.g., Pressurizer Pressure
 - Important-to-safety
 - E.g., Reactivity Control Systems
 - NonSafety-Related
 - E.g., Balance of Plant

- **Nuclear Power Plant**
 - Diversity and Defense-in-Depth (i.e., Multiple systems)
 - Natural Occurrences
- **Systems** – equipment for accomplishing a safety function
 - E.g., Reactor Trip System, Engineered Safety Features, ...
 - Single Failure, Independence, Redundancy, ...
- **Safety Group** - minimal set of that can accomplish a safety function
- **Divisions** - set of components that is independent from other redundant sets of components.
- **Functions / Channel** - generate a single protective action signal
- **Components / Modules** – field replaceable items

- The staff's acceptance of software for safety system functions is based upon:
 - (1) confirmation that acceptable plans were prepared to control software development activities,
 - E.g., Software Operations Plan
 - E.g., Software Maintenance Plan
 - (2) evidence that the plans were followed in an acceptable software life cycle, and
 - (3) evidence that the process produced acceptable design outputs.

- Design Basis for Safety System Documentation Must Include
 - Modes of Operation, for each mode:
 - events
 - initial conditions and allowable limits
 - safety functions and corresponding protective actions
 - variables that are to be monitored to control each protective action; the limit associated with each variable,
 - ranges and the rates of change of the variables to be accommodated until completion of the protective action
 - Environmental conditions
 - Performance requirements
- No comparable regulatory requirement to document the design basis of control systems

- Ensure Equipment Specifics are addressed
 - E.g., cycle power every refueling outage
- Ensure that any Design Bases changes are addressed
 - E.g., new requirements because new technology is used
 - Software Common Cause Failure
 - EMI / RFI Susceptibility
 - Type Testing or not
 - Cyber Security

- Describe general operation functions
 - Design Bases
 - Functions
 - Operating Bypass
 - Constraints
 - Safety
 - Security

- Describe general maintenance functions
 - Preventive Maintenance
 - Operability Determinations
 - Operable/inoperable/degraded
 - Repair, Test, and Calibrate
 - Maintenance Bypass
 - Corrective Maintenance
 - Fault location (e.g., diagnostic indications)
 - Repair procedures
 - Adaptive Maintenance
 - Design Change
 - Design Bases Documentation Change

End of Presentation