Robustness of formal verification of x86 microprocessors

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- Challenges to robustness
- Centaur's response
- Conclusion

• Why do we have a need for robustness of proofs at Centaur Technology?

Why do we have need for robustness of proofs at Centaur?

- Advancement of the application of formal methods from point proofs to becoming a part of the design process
- Involvement of FV engineers in early stages of the project
- Life cycle of proofs is much longer months and even years
- FV is part of continuous integration
- Design process relies on FV —> need for robustness

- stability of the tools and libraries
- stability of the specification
- (in)stability of the design
- stability of the proofs

Challenges to robustness

Centaurs's response stability of the tools and libraries

- Centaur FV team uses the ACL2 system for all its work
 - open source, the core is very stable, developers in town
 - numerous libraries that are under development (contributors from Kestrel Inst., Oracle, Centaur, ARM, individuals) — coordinated via Github
 - external tools SAT solvers, ABC, Z3
 - internal tools

- x86 ISA specification *architectural model*
 - stable but growing
- micro-architectural model lacksquare
 - project specific and changing
 - memory hierarchy, set of micro-operations, timing, algorithm implementation
- explained on an example of processing an x86 instruction \bullet











- Theory: Commutative diagram: *architectural model* ==> *micro-architectural model* \bullet
- both models complex, micro-architectural much more so, and is changing rapidly
- example: front-end decode and translate, microcode controller \bullet





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- \bullet micro-operation is consistent with our specification

• solution: micro-architectural model is a combination of parts defined implicitly by symbolic execution of parts of the design, and partly explicitly defined by describing operational

explicitly defined parts of the micro-architectural model require validation - verifying that each

Micro-operations (excluding Ld/St) are executed in respective Exe modules

- their specification is proprietary, changing with projects
- most operations have fixed latency, known FV methods
- verification of Exe important part of validation of micro-architectural model
- proof regressions catch any changes in the specification, or bugs in design
- verification of OOO and memory-access micro-operations future work



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Centaur's response (in)stability of design

- Instability of the design is inherent to our job
 - FV starts in early stages of the design
 - not just proofs at the end but includes bug finding throughout the design process
 - specification has to accommodate incomplete design
- Instability of the design can be mitigated by increasing the scope of the proofs we migrated from smaller units (Fadd, Fdiv, Mul) to large modules (Exe)
 - less frequent changes of interface
 - less frequent changes of timing
 - less assumptions about interface
 - the goal: top theorem expresses correctness with respect to top-level module

Centaur's response stability of proofs

- What helped us to increase the scope of our proofs?
 - Improvement in our model build
 - and string, scalar and SIMD operations from System Verilog design
 - FGL symbolic simulator with rewriting capabilities

 - FGL is formally verified and integrated into ACL2
 - publicly available
 - Improvements in AIG manipulation algorithms that reduce their size
 - Improvements in SAT solvers increase capacity of our tools
 - can be added to ACL2 as trusted tools, but their results can be verified

- it takes just minutes to build our model of top-level execution unit with all sub-units executing arithmetic, boolean,

- See our upcoming paper at CAV 2021: Balancing automation and control for formal verification of microprocessors.





uCode proofs

uCode

RTL System Verilog





uCode proofs

uCode

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Exe model ACL2







- triggered by changes
 - changes in ACL2 or our tools
 - changes in micro-architecture
 - changes in design
 - changes in micro-code
- recurrent \bullet
- invoked manually

Regressions





- industrial scale of FV requires robust tools and proofs
- build methodology that accounts for changes in the design, specification, and tools \bullet
 - many actors (logic team, ucode team, ACL2 team,...)
 - make specification reusable (generality, extensibility, implicit specification)
 - choose reliable tools

and

- build and maintain extensive regressions suite
- interdependence of our proofs and tools enforces consistency lacksquare



Conclusion

are our friends

