# Robustness of formal verification of x86 microprocessors

### Anna Slobodova [anna@centtech.com](mailto:anna@centtech.com)



High Confidence Software and Systems Conference May 2021

Sol Swords, Rob Sumners and Shilpi Goel





### • Why do we have a need for robustness of proofs at Centaur Technology?

- 
- Challenges to robustness
- Centaur's response
- Conclusion

## Why do we have need for robustness of proofs at Centaur?

- Advancement of the application of formal methods from point proofs to becoming a part of the design process
- Involvement of FV engineers in early stages of the project
- Life cycle of proofs is much longer months and even years
- FV is part of continuous integration
- Design process relies on FV  $\rightarrow$  need for robustness

## Challenges to robustness

- stability of the tools and libraries
- stability of the specification
- (in)stability of the design
- stability of the proofs

## Centaurs's response stability of the tools and libraries

- Centaur FV team uses the ACL2 system for all its work
	- open source, the core is very stable, developers in town
	- numerous libraries that are under development (contributors from Kestrel Inst., Oracle, Centaur, ARM, individuals) — coordinated via **Github**
	- external tools SAT solvers, ABC, Z3
	- internal tools

- x86 ISA specification *architectural model* 
	- stable but growing
- *micro-architectural model* 
	- project specific and changing
	- memory hierarchy, set of micro-operations, timing, algorithm implementation
- explained on an example of processing an x86 instruction











- Theory: Commutative diagram: *architectural model ==> micro-architectural model*
- both models complex, micro-architectural much more so, and is changing rapidly
- example: front-end decode and translate, microcode controller





• solution: micro-architectural model is a combination of parts defined implicitly by symbolic execution of parts of the design, and partly explicitly defined by describing operational

- Theory: Commutative diagram: *architectural model ==> micro-architectural model*
- both models complex, micro-architectural much more so, and changing rapidly
- example: front-end decode and translate
- semantics of individual micro-operations

- Theory: Commutative diagram: *architectural model ==> micro-architectural model*
- both models complex, micro-architectural much more so, and changing rapidly
- example: front-end decode and translate
- semantics of individual micro-operations
- micro-operation is consistent with our specification

• solution: micro-architectural model is a combination of parts defined implicitly by symbolic execution of parts of the design, and partly explicitly defined by describing operational

• explicitly defined parts of the micro-architectural model require validation - verifying that each





Micro-operations (excluding Ld/St) are executed in respective Exe modules

- their specification is proprietary, changing with projects
- most operations have fixed latency, known FV methods
- verification of Exe important part of validation of micro-architectural model
- proof regressions catch any changes in the specification, or bugs in design
- verification of OOO and memory-access micro-operations future work

## Centaur's response (in)stability of design

- Instability of the design is inherent to our job
	- FV starts in early stages of the design
		- not just proofs at the end but includes bug finding throughout the design process
	- specification has to accommodate incomplete design
- Instability of the design can be mitigated by increasing the scope of the proofs we migrated from smaller units (Fadd, Fdiv, Mul) to large modules (Exe)
	- less frequent changes of interface
	- less frequent changes of timing
	- less assumptions about interface
	- the goal: top theorem expresses correctness with respect to top-level module

## Centaur's response stability of proofs

- it takes just minutes to build our model of top-level execution unit with all sub-units executing arithmetic, boolean,

- What helped us to increase the scope of our proofs?
	- Improvement in our model build
		- and string, scalar and SIMD operations from System Verilog design
	- FGL symbolic simulator with rewriting capabilities
		-
		- FGL is formally verified and integrated into ACL2
		- publicly available
	- Improvements in AIG manipulation algorithms that reduce their size
	- Improvements in SAT solvers increase capacity of our tools
		- can be added to ACL2 as trusted tools, but their results can be verified

- See our upcoming paper at CAV 2021: *Balancing automation and control for formal verification of microprocessors*.

### uCode proofs ACL2 tools libraries uCode RTL System Verilog x86 Arch ACL2 Exe model ACL2





### uCode proofs

**RTL** System Verilog

uCode





### uCode proofs

**RTL** System Verilog

uCode

![](_page_21_Picture_6.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Picture_5.jpeg)

### **RTL** System Verilog

# uCode proofs ACL2 tools x86 Arch ACL2

uCode

![](_page_22_Figure_3.jpeg)

Exe model ACL2

![](_page_23_Figure_1.jpeg)

### uCode proofs ACL2 tools libraries uCode RTL System Verilog x86 Arch ACL2 Exe model ACL2

![](_page_24_Figure_1.jpeg)

# Regressions

![](_page_25_Picture_0.jpeg)

- triggered by changes
	- changes in ACL2 or our tools
	- changes in micro-architecture
	- changes in design
	- changes in micro-code
- recurrent
- invoked manually

![](_page_25_Figure_9.jpeg)

# Conclusion

and  $\left(\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{array}\right)$  are our friends

![](_page_26_Picture_0.jpeg)

- industrial scale of FV requires robust tools and proofs
- build methodology that accounts for changes in the design, specification, and tools
	- many actors (logic team, ucode team, ACL2 team,...)
	- make specification reusable (generality, extensibility, implicit specification)
	- choose reliable tools
	- build and maintain extensive regressions suite
- interdependence of our proofs and tools enforces consistency

![](_page_26_Picture_8.jpeg)

•

![](_page_27_Picture_0.jpeg)