

# Making Physical Inferences to Enhance Wireless Security

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This project aims to utilize physical layer information to enhance wireless security. In particular, the fine-grained channel state information is exploited to make secret key generation faster and more practical in wireless networks.

## Motivation

- ❑ Securing wireless communication remains challenging
  - Overhead in key distribution and management
  - High dynamics of mobile devices
  - The key establishment vulnerable to eavesdropping
- ❑ Secret key generation using physical layer information is promising
  - Without requiring a fixed key management infrastructure
  - Utilize temporal and spatial variation of radio channel
  - Existing RSS based method only use coarse-grained channel information, with low key generation rate

## Objective

- ❑ Exploit fine-grained physical layer information for secret key generation
  - Multiple subcarriers of OFDM provide detailed Channel State Information (CSI)
  - Resilient to malicious attacks
- ❑ Improve secret key generation rate while reducing bit mismatch rate
  - Fine-grained CSI can provide fast secret key generation rate
  - Mitigate the non-reciprocity component embedded in the CSI to reduce the bit mismatch rate


## Challenges

- ❑ Reciprocity of CSI cannot be assumed due to different electrical characteristics in practice
- ❑ Traditional RSS based methods are vulnerable to some active attacks, such as predictable channel attack and stalking attack

## Attack Model

- ❑ Predictable channel attack
  - Adversary uses planned movements to cause desired and predictable changes in the channel measurements
- ❑ Stalking attack
  - Adversary/stalker follows the trajectory of either party during the key establishment and eavesdrops legitimate communication

## Feasibility



(a) amplitude of channel response across 30 subcarriers of OFDM (b) Illustration of channel reciprocity

Fig. 1. Channel randomness and reciprocity

- ❑ Channel response with multiple subcarriers of OFDM provides more randomness
- ❑ CSI of the same channel observed by two parties should be highly correlated (within coherence time)

## Channel Gain Complement (CGC) Assisted Secret Key Extraction




Fig. 2. (a) Channel response before CGC (b) Channel response after CGC

- ❑ Non-reciprocity learning
  - Averaging a number of the difference of CSI between Alice and Bob over time
- ❑ Channel gain complement
  - Subtract the learned non-reciprocity component from the CSI of Alice or Bob
- ❑ Quantization
  - Quantize the amplitude of CSI across different subcarriers




Fig. 3. Averaged differences along the time





Fig. 4. Complement value across 30 subcarriers

## Experimental Setup

- ❑ Two laptops equipped with Intel WiFi Link 5300 wireless card extract CSI for 30 subcarrier groups
- ❑ Mobile and static scenarios in both indoor and outdoor environments
- ❑ Multiple bits quantization and MIMO

## Preliminary Results and Future Work



(a) Indoor BGR (b) Indoor BMR (c) Outdoor BGR (d) Outdoor BMR  
Fig. 5. Indoor and outdoor performance evaluation

- ❑ Bit generation rate (BGR) and bit mismatch rate (BMR) both out-perform the RSS based method
- ❑ MIMO can significantly improve the performance
- ❑ More aspects
  - Develop new learning based method to accurately capture channel non-reciprocity in reality
  - Utilize amplitude and phase information of CSI to model radio channel



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