NSA Center for Assured Software

High Confidence Software and Systems Conference

April 18, 2006

Software Assurance Definition

DoD Software Assurance Initiative

DoD Software Assurance Tiger Team

- The level of confidence that software is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted

- And that the software functions in a manner as expected.

Problem Statement (1)

"The ubiquity of software and its development and usage without consistent engineering, has resulted in ad hoc management and mitigation efforts in a race to protect systems against breaches"

NII Sponsored

Software Assurance Tiger Team

Problem Statement (2)

There's too much software

There's too little assurance

DoD SwA CONOPS: Interacting Processes



Science & Technology

- Provide software evaluation services
- Use tools to detect vulnerabilities
- Coordinate DoD R&D for vulnerability detection and mitigation
- Work with industry to develop standards/solutions
- Recommended a DoD Executive Agent for Software Vulnerability Mitigation and Discovery
  - Establish a DoD Center for Assured Software

NSA Center for Assured Software (CAS)

- Stood up in November, 2005
- A Focal Point for Software Assurance (SwA) Issues with the following objectives:
  - Partner with our customers, government, the private sector and academia to identify SwA Issues and resolutions
  - Develop and utilize tools and methods to analyze the trustworthiness of software

NSA Center for Assured Software (CAS) (cont)

- Objectives (cont)
  - Evaluate mission critical components
  - Establish/Identify software standards and practices to increase the availability of assured software products

CAS Technical Philosophy

Threat Mitigation Assumptions

- We will never have "100% guaranteed assurance"
- Need to make attack as cost prohibitive as possible

Software Assurance Observation (1)

- Continues to be difficult to measure
  - Very labor intensive
    - Does not scale well
- Prone to human error
  - Often do not prevent flaws that our customers expect us to catch
  - Not reproducible or repeatable
- Unpredictable
- Low emphasis on automated tools

Software Assurance Observation (2)

- Highest level of Software Assurance ultimately "reaches back" to the developer's desk
  - Assurance gained after development is "fleeting"
  - "After Development Analysis/Testing" has a very important role in establishing assurance but developmental assurance should play a larger role in the overall assurance paradigm

What Should the Future Look Like

- Fully "graded" software assurance scale
  - guidance on how to apply it
  - better ways to measure software assurance indicators
- More emphasis on the role of the development process.
- More confidence in the result of lower assurance evaluations

What Should the Future Look Like (cont)

Tools

Tools

Tools

CAS "domain of operation"

Binary analysis tools/techniques

Role of Formal Methods

Source Code analysis tools/techniques

Developmental Processes

Product Evaluation

Requirements	Design	Implementation	Testing	Deploy	Maintenance

Safe Language Standards

Development Tools/techniques

What we look like today…



Where we are working today …

- NIAP
  - Fully operational
  - Beginning to address recommendations from the GAO and IDA NIAP review reports

- Software Assurance Evaluations
  - CAS is evaluating specific software of interest to NSA in the context of a pilot
    - First report due to be delivered this month

Where we are working today (cont) …

- A repeatable SwAE methodology based upon available tools
  - Involves a tools survey as wells as incorporating lessons learned from our pilot

- Strategies for :
  - Public Software Assurance Standards participation
  - Internal NSA Software Assurance Standards and compliance
  - Outreach
  - High Assurance

Center for Assured Software

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