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Software Vulnerabilities & Verification Tools for C/C++ and Java

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Introduction

- Building reliable and secure software is a difficult task
 - Unmanageable complexity is the main problem
- Flaws have many origins
 - **Design** (ex: backdoor)
 - Implementation (ex: buffer overrun)



Context

- Sensitive but not safety-critical applications
- Built with familiar technologies that users want
 - Windows, Linux, C++, Java
- Our goal:
 - Get rid of common security problems using automated source code verification tools
- Design flaws:
 - C2 Secure Design Patterns Study (04-05)
- Implementation flaws:
 - Verification tools study (05-06)

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Goals of this Project

- Identify common software defects related to C/C++ and Java usage
 - Non application-specific
- Investigate errors and vulnerabilities created by these defects
- Evaluate best of breed automatic verification tools for C/C++ and Java
 - Defect & error detection performance
 - Usability
- Infer best practices



Plan of the Presentation

- 1. Terminology
- 2. Errors
- 3. Vulnerabilities
- 4. Pitfalls & Shortcomings of C/C++
- 5. Defects
- 6. Tools Overview
- 7. Evaluation
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Program Sanity vs. Security

- Program Sanity
 - Low level rules/conventions
 - E.g.: C calling convention & parameters placement on the stack
 - Mostly related to programming
- Security
 - High level control mechanisms
 - For confidentiality, integrity and availability
 - Mostly related to design



Program Sanity vs. Security



Program Sanity

- Protected memory
- Valid control flow
- Valid data flow
- Correct management of resources

Security

- Access Control
- Anti-virus
- Intrusion Prevention Systems
- Firewall



Program Sanity vs. Security

- Automatic detection of security problems
 - Too much variability
 - Too much complexity
- Automatic detection of program sanity problems
 - More or less always the same thing
 - Especially interesting for C/C++
- Security begins with program sanity
 - Program sanity problems are the main cause of software security problems



Some Terminology

- Error \rightarrow Execution
 - Event that occurs when the behavior of a program diverges from "what it should be"
- Defect \rightarrow Code
 - Cause of an error, a set of program instructions
 - Can be the lack of something
- Vulnerability \rightarrow Exploitation
 - Defect allowing a user to control the program execution when it should not





Defects, Errors and Vulnerabilities



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Errors

- The list of possible low-level problems is almost endless
 - No interest in the correctness of computations with respect to specifications
- Correct low-level program execution
 - Memory access
 - Control flow
 - Resource allocation
- Java is immune to most program sanity problems



Memory Write Out of Bounds

- A region of valid memory is overwritten
- Impacts
 - Depends on what is overwritten
 - Can lead to many serious vulnerabilities
- Causes
 - Bad pointer arithmetic
 - Array walking with bad index value
- Java: cannot happen (will throw an exception)



Memory Read Out of Bounds

- A region of invalid memory is read instead of a valid one
- Impacts
 - Errors in computations
 - Sensitive values could be read
- Causes
 - Reading of a string not terminated by a null
 - Array walking with bad index
- Java: cannot happen (will throw an exception)



Resource Leak

- A no longer needed resource is not returned to the available pool
 - Memory, file handle, network connection, ...
- Impacts
 - Depends on the resource and its usage
 - Can lead to slowdown and crash
- Causes
 - Reference lost because of pointer reuse
 - Programmer forgot to free the resource
- Java: the garbage collector helps a lot



Program Hang

- Program is in an infinite loop or wait state
- Impacts
 - Denial of service
- Causes
 - Threads in deadlock state
 - Conditions to exit a loop never reached



Program Crash

- An unrecoverable error happens and the execution of the program is stopped
- Impacts
 - Denial of service
- Causes
 - Dereference of an invalid pointer (page fault)
 - Uncaught exception
 - Division by zero



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Vulnerabilities

- Errors in general are undesirable
- But the real problem is vulnerabilities
 - Especially the remotely-exploitable ones
- A vulnerability allows an attacker to have some form of control over the program
 - Influence the flow of control
 - Influence the flow of data
- Memory read or written out of bounds
 - Cause of most dangerous vulnerabilities



Denial of Service

- Allows an attacker to prevent users from getting correct service
- How it's usually done
 - Create an unrecoverable error condition
 - Exploit a resource leak
- Java
 - Most program sanity problems throw unchecked exceptions
 - Problems are "transformed" into denials of service if exceptions are not caught



Unauthorized Access

- Allows an attacker to access functionalities without the required authorization
- How it's usually done
 - Bypass the control mechanism by modifying it in memory
 - Read sensitive values in memory and use them to get access



Code Injection

- Overwrite a function pointer that will be called
- Allows an attacker to take control of a process by redirecting its execution **to his own code**
- Also known as *buffer overflow* or *stack smashing* vulnerability



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Pitfalls & Shortcomings of C/C++

- Many errors are possible because of choices made when C/C++ were created
- These choices
 - Require too much "micro-management" of the program's behavior
 - "Encourage" mistakes
 - Give serious consequences to seemingly benign errors
- Java creators had these problems in mind and got rid of the majority of them



C/C++ Lack of Type-safety

- Type-safety ensures values assigned to variables are correct
 - Type-safety helps enforce the execution model

- Type-safe programs are *fail-fast*

- Execution of erratic programs is not stopped
 - Many *exploits* are using this fact
- Java programs are type-safe
 - Verified at compile time and load time



C/C++ Pointer Arithmetic

- The ability to change the value of a pointer without restriction
 - Can read or write anywhere in memory
 - Control mechanisms can be *bypassed*
 - Easy to create very obscure bugs
 - Much higher verification complexity
- There is no pointer arithmetic in Java



C/C++ Buffers Have a Static Size

- Buffers cannot grow to accommodate data
 - Buffer accesses are not checked
 - An overflow will overwrite memory
 - Validation is cumbersome
 - Source of *buffer overflow* vulnerabilities
- Java will throw an exception when an overflow occurs



C Lack of Robust String Type

- C has no type for character strings
 - Static buffers with overflow problems are used instead
 - Size of string indicated by a *null* at the end
 - Strings are used a lot in programs
 - Very fragile: what if the *null* is not there?
 - Source of *buffer overflow* vulnerabilities
- C++ programs can use the string type in the STL
 - Not used enough
- Java only has a robust string type



C/C++ Vulnerabilities in Std Libraries

- String manipulation functions
 - strcpy(), gets() and friends
 - Lack bounds checks for destination buffer
 - Possible overflow if data size is not checked
 - Source of *buffer overflow* vulnerabilities
 - Use replacement functions: strncpy()



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Defects: Some Observations

- Many defects are not 'always on'
 - They will not always generate errors
 - Complex conditions have to be met
 - Input values play an important role
- Most defects are composite
 - Cannot be attributed to a single program instruction
 - A defect can be the absence of something
 - Data validation
- Mostly C/C++ defects (selection of 25)



1 – Memory Management Faults

- 1.1 Reading of freed memory
- 1.2 Under allocated memory for a given type
- 1.3 Call of free () with an invalid pointer
- 1.4 Incorrect C++ array deletion
- 1.5 Call of memcpy () with overlapping memory regions
- 1.6 Reading of an uninitialized variable
- 1.7 Non-virtual destructor of derived class not called



2 – Overrun and Underrun Faults

- 2.1 Overrun or underrun of an array
- 2.2 Dereference of a past-the-end C++ iterator
- 2.3 Dereference of an erased C++ iterator
- 2.4 Incorrect size parameter to a buffer function
- 2.5 Use of negative array index or size
- 2.6 Reading of a string of arbitrary length without limit
- 2.7 Reading of a non null-terminated string



3 – Pointer Faults

- 3.1 Return of a pointer to a local variable
- 3.2 Incorrect pointer arithmetic
- 3.3 Dereference of a null pointer
- 3.4 Resource reference lost

4 – Incorrect Arithmetic Faults

- 4.1 Division by zero
- $4.2 Integer \ overflow \ or \ underflow$
- 4.3 Bit shift bigger than integral type or negative



5 – Cast Faults

- 5.1 Integer sign lost because of implicit unsigned cast
- 5.2 Integer precision lost because of bad cast

6 – Miscellaneous Faults

- 6.1 Unspecified format string
- 6.2 Endless loop



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Tools Overview

- Evaluated tools most are multiplatform
 - C/C++: 27 tools
 - Java: 37 tools
- Free (open source) versus commercial tools
 - C/C++: best tools are commercial
 - Java: many good free tools
- Most academic tools are only proofs of concepts
- Evaluation criteria
 - Precision, scalability, coverage, diagnostic



Tools

Required Investment*

- 1. Program Conformance Checkers
 - Detect defects
- 2. Runtime Testers
 - Detect errors
- 3. Advanced Static Analyzers
 - Detect defects



* In money, time, training, resources, etc.

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Program Conformance Checkers

- Check source code for common *bug patterns*
- Lightweight analysis based on syntax
 - Excellent scalability
 - Many false positives and negatives
 - Poor performance except for a few defects
 - E.g.: unspecified format string
- Many free tools are in this category



Program Conformance Checkers

Java

- **Secure Programming Lint** •
 - C only
 - Many "parse errors"
 - Superficial analysis without annotations
- FlawFinder ٠
 - Format strings
 - Vulnerable functions
 - A lot of false positives

- **PMD**
 - Enforces coding conventions
 - Well integrated
 - Cut & paste detector
- **AppPerfect CodeAnalyzer** ۲
 - Similar to PMD
 - Different rules
 - Affordable & effective



Runtime Testers

- Program behavior cannot always be deduced statically
 - Some values are not known before runtime
- Look for errors while the program is running
 - Code is instrumented with checks
 - Fine-grained analysis
 - Excellent scalability
 - Coverage can be poor without a good strategy
- Excellent for composite defects related to memory usage



Runtime Testers

<u>C/C++</u>

- Parasoft Insure++
 - Source instrumentation
 - Impressive performance
 - Easy to use (debugger)
 - Good diagnostic
- Rational Purifier
 - Similar to Insure++
 - Analysis not as thorough

<u>Java</u>

- AppPerfect Java Profiler
 - Heap, threads, objects, CPU usage, disk I/O, memory usage
 - Heap browser
 - Deadlock detection
- JProfiler
- NetBeans Profiler



Advanced Static Analyzers

- Work on program semantics instead of syntax
 - Use formal methods, like abstract interpretation or model-checking
 - Scalability is often problematic
- Code must be compiled into a model
 - A lot of code portability issues
- Generally much slower than other tools
- Very sophisticated tools: often expensive



Advanced Static Analyzers

<u>Java</u>

- Coverity Prevent (SWAT)
 - Good integration with makefiles
 - Excellent diagnostic with execution trace
 - Surprisingly scalable
- PolySpace for C++
 - Very thorough but slow and memory hungry
 - Can detect runtime exceptions statically

- ESC/Java 2
 - Can prove properties on the behavior of programs
 - Have to add annotations
 - Very powerful
 - Hard to use
 - A must-have for critical Java software development



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C/C++ Evaluation

- Preliminary tests showed only 3 tools could help us achieve our goal:
 - Coverity Prevent
 - Parasoft Insure++
 - PolySpace for C++
- 2 sets of tests
 - Synthetic tests for every kind of defect (25)
 - Buggy code in production (~10,000 lines)



Comparing Apples and Oranges

- Error detection vs. defect detection
 - A conversion is necessary
- Synthetic tests
 - Defects are known
 - The errors they will cause too
 - Easy to convert everything to defects
- Buggy code in production
 - Defects are not known in advance
 - Used best result as baseline (errors)



Results of Synthetic Tests

- A C++ class for every kind of defect (25)
- Integrated in a small high-quality open-source application (Windows MFC)
- Tests that would lead to a program crash or hang were deactivated for Insure++
- Tests are called from the main ()
 - MFC applications have a "special" main()
 - PolySpace had to be used in a "class by class" analysis mode
- No tool tries to detect every kind of defect or error



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Results of Buggy Code in Production

- Numerical analysis application
 - About 10,000 lines of code
 - In production for many years
 - Reads a file and displays the results
 - Not a reactive program like MFC Apps
 - Bad quality code
 - "C+" design
 - A lot of cut and pasted, "spaghetti" code
 - Really a worst-case scenario



Results of Buggy Code in Production

Errors	Cov	Ins	Pol*
Memory write out of bounds	0	42	2
Memory read out of bounds	1	114	0
Resource leak	2	10	0
Program crash	2	0	0

* Over 300 false positives, ~16 hours of computation

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C/C++ Analysis

- Static analysis tools need good quality code to perform well
 - Pointer arithmetic and void pointers can also be problematic
 - PolySpace will stop the analysis of a branch when a critical error is found
- Code portability issues
 - Preprocessor definitions and conditional compilation
 - Compiler-specific extensions to C/C++



Java Evaluation

- Preliminary tests showed 11 tools could be useful
- The ones that stand out:
 - AppPerfect DevSuite
 - PMD
- 2 large, open-source applications tested



Java Analysis

- Java design is better: less low-level defects
 - Fewer problems to look for
 - Tools for Java are great to assess software quality
- No code portability issues
 - A lot easier than C/C++



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Conclusion

- Security problems generally don't come from the failure of security mechanisms
 - The failure occurs at a lower level
- C/C++ are especially problematic
 - Enforce almost no restriction on execution
 - Vulnerabilities with serious consequences
- Java is immune to most C/C++ problems
 - No serious vulnerabilities



Conclusion

- Best usage scenario for Coverity
 - Whole applications compiled with makefiles
- Best usage scenario for PolySpace
 - Small sections of critical code where runtime exceptions should never happen
- Best usage scenario for Insure++
 - Integrated to test cases
 - Test of hybrid systems based on many heterogeneous components
 - Values are always available at runtime



Conclusion

- Verifying C/C++ programs is a huge challenge
 - These languages are very hard to analyze
 - Undefined behaviors, pointers, compilerspecific extensions, etc.
 - No verification tool can reduce the risk significantly enough for this context
- For sensitive applications, we recommend the use of Java or any managed .Net language
 - Use C/C++ only if you really have to
 - Restricted language usage, test cases, and the use of verification tools are a must

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http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/researchtech/malicots/home_e.asp





The Way Ahead

- Detection of higher level security problems
 - A model for the security behavior of programs is needed
- Automatic program hardening
 - Based on aspect oriented programming
- Current research project
 - Partnership with NSERC, Bell University Labs and Concordia University



PolySpace Viewer

PolySpace Viewer - C:\Documents and Second Secon	ettin	gs\f	fmic	haud	\My D	ocum	ъ	nts\R	Rédaction\Practical Verification & Safegard Tools for CC++\tests\Poly 🕕 🖬 💶 🔀			
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NTC.63	1				217	20						
X COR.64			1		219	19			208 /* Initialization of application */			
NTC.65	1				219	19			209 II (IRC)			
COR.68					228	15			210 FRC = MenuLid::InitApp <u>(IrData.pszinifile</u> ,&Ecran);			
🗸 COR.71					231	18			212 /* Read meteo file METDATA */			
🗸 COR.73					23	16			213 if (frc)			
🗸 COR.75					236	16			214 fRc = LireMeteoFile(&Ecran, IrData.pszDefFile);			
Irblem P1Module Class::Get Header(_iobuf*;char*)					121	3 26	10	0	215			
🗸 COR.0					121)			216 if(! <u>IrData.fIrbx</u>)			
🗸 COR.1					121)			217 RunBatch(& Ecran);			
IDP.3					122	11			218 else			
🗸 IDP.5					122	3 19			219 RunIrbx <u>(</u> «Ecran);			
V COR.8					122	5 22			220 }			
COR.11					122	3 14			221			
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COR.62 Details: unreachable failure of correctness condition [call never raises an exception (warning)]												

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Coverity Prevent

🕲 Coverity Error Browser - Mozilla Firefox		
File Edit View Go Bookmarks Tools Help		0
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CLanguage Tools 👄 Merriam-Webster O 🍹 TERMIUM Plus	🔋 Ġ Google Advanced Gr 🧲 Computer and Infor Ġ Google Scholar 🗰 The Metasploit Project	
🌔 coverity	Viewing file: c:/coverity/test/irblemp1/irblemp1moduleclass.cxx Xrefs: On ♥ Off ● Event list: [<u>top] [alloc fn] [var assign] [leaked storage</u>]	
Return to <u>Search Results</u>	Event allos fo: Called allocation function "fonen"	
ERROR	Event and a colored and cannot reinclore report	
CID: 15	Also see events fiver assimilleaked storage	
Checker: RESOURCE_LEAK (<u>help</u>)	Abo see events. [Yai assigni][Eakeu storage]	
File: c:/coverity/test/irblemp1/irblemp1moduleclass.cxx	153 <u>fp</u> = <u>fopen(IrData.pszIniFile</u> ,"r");	
Function: IrbiemP1ModuleClass::FctMain(int, char **) Description: Returned without freeing storage "fp"	At conditional (1): " $fp == 0$ " taking false path	
	154 If $(\underline{rp} = \underline{NULL})$ (155 Error_Level = ER ERROR;	
Status:	156 Error.Code = 110;	
	157 <u>strcpy(Description</u> , "Cannot open file \"");	
O BUG	158 strcat(Description, IrData.pszDefFile);	
C FALSE	160 structv(Error, Description, NDESC);	
RESOLVED	161 strncpy(Error.FuncId, FuncId, NBFUNCID);	
IGNORE	162 <u>ErrorLib::CheckError(Error, ProgramId, ErrorMode, ER FILE</u>);	
PENDING	163	
	164	
Coverity 2005-Sep-13 08:12:44	166 /* Execution in batch or irbxmode */	
New status row inserted by system.	As any fishered (7), "OD = 1 = 0" solving false mode	
	At conduional (2). It's 1-0 taking taise pain	
Add Comment:	167 if (<u>fRc</u>)	
	168 {	
	169 /*	
	170 Station a un fisher pour includer que le programme a pien foste, 171 Si le programme se rend jusqu'au bout, ce fisher sera efface	
	172 */	
	173 /* le fichier n'est créé qu'en mode Irbx */	
	174 if (IrData.fIrbx)	
	1/3 (176 fn = foren("kz3f5dfail50.tmn","w"):	
	177 fprintf(fp,"If at the end this file is still in the directory, Irblemp1 didn't work properly.\n");	
	178 <u>fclose(fp);</u>	
	179 }	
Change Owner: admin 🗠	180 /* Initialization of ecreen parameters */	
	182 1 f (Fc)	
Save	183 fRc = MenuLib::InitPage(IrData.pszIniFile, 6Ecran);	
	184	
Ехроп	185 /* Initialization of system command and sub programs */ 186 if (fpc)	
	187 fRc = MenuLib::InitCmdSvs(IrData.pszIniFile.&Ecran);	
	188	
	189 /* Initialization of data structure IRBLEMP1 */	
	190 InitDataIrblemp1();	<u> </u>



Insure

Insure - irblemp1 case2.txt - Notepad File Edit Format View Help [IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx:843] **LEAK ASSIGN** IrData.pszDefFile = (char*) malloc(strlen(ppszParam[i+1])+1); >>Memory leaked due to pointer reassignment: IrData.pszDefFile Lost block : 0x01a81760 thru 0x01a8176a (11 bytes) IrData.pszDefFile, allocated at IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx. 776 (interface) malloc() IrblemP1ModuleClass::InitVarGlob() IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx, 776 IrblemP1ModuleClass::FctMain() IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx, 122 mainirblemp1.cpp, 435 start_Module() mainirblemp1.cpp. 447 main() Stack trace where the error occurred: IrblemP1ModuleClass::ParsParam() IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx. 843 IrblemP1ModuleClass::FctMain() IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx, 125 mainirblemp1.cpp, 435 start_Module() mainirblemp1.cpp. 447 main() [IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx:7299] **READ_OVERFLOW** *((int*)IrData.lstOptUpper.pElem[0].pDefData) = atoi(pszValue): >> String is not null terminated within range: <argument 1> Reading : 0x0012f87c From block: 0x0012f87c thru 0x0012f97b (256 bytes) pszValue, declared at IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx, 7225 Stack trace where the error occurred: atoi() (interface) IrblemP1ModuleClass::LireDefUpper() IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx, 7299 IrblemP1ModuleClass::InitDefFile() IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx, 1707 IrblemP1ModuleClass.cxx, 193 IrblemP1ModuleClass::FctMain() mainirblemp1.cpp, 435 start_Module() mainirblemp1.cpp, 447 main()



AppPerfect DevSuite

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😑 🤴 net.percederberg.mibble.asn:	String_concatenation		Critical	Optimization	532			
- 🦻 Asn1Analyzer.java	String_concatenation		Critical	Optimization	5 47			
Asn1Constants.java	Use_shift_operators		High	Optimization	. 120			
Asn1Parser.java	Use_shift_operators		High	Optimization	5 120			
- P Asn1Tokenizer.java	Avoid_method_calls_in_loop		High	Optimization	5 449			
	Avoid_method_calls_in_loop		High	Optimization	5 29			
MibNode java	Check_loop_counter_against_z	ero	High	Optimization	5 449			
MibNoue.java	Check_loop_counter_against_z	ero	High	Optimization	5 16			
SompOperation java	Check_loop_counter_against_z	ero	High	Optimization	5 29			
	Declare_private_constant_field	ls_final	Medium	Optimization	5 603			
- 📴 net.percederberg.mibble	Maximum_number_of_fields		Medium	Metrics	5 94			
- P CompoundContext.java	Define_initial_capacities		Medium	Optimization	5 109			
🖉 👂 DefaultContext.java	Avoid_numeric_literals		Medium	CodeConvention	5 112			
🗧 🗭 FileLocation.java	Avoid_numeric_literals		Medium	CodeConvention	🧦 116			
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