

# Run-Time Enforcers in Adversarial and Information-Limited Environments

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
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SYSTEMS GROUP


Computational Cybersecurity in Compromised Environments (C3E) Symposium

# A representative use case: **attack graphs**

Representation of possible penetration scenarios or the launch of multi-stage attacks in a network



(Wing, et al., 2007)




(Capobianco, et al., 2019)


# Hierarchy of models

## What determines the type of model to be used?

- What actors? How do they interact?
- Deterministic, nondeterministic or stochastic transitions?
- Is the graph or are the transition probabilities known to the system (or to the adversary)?
- What can the system (or the adversary) see at run time?
- How much memory can the system (or the adversary) rely on?
- ...



# Shield synthesis for run-time enforcement




Corrective w.r.t. safety specifications  $\phi$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &(\text{input}, \text{modified output}) \models \phi \\
 &\text{even when} \\
 &(\text{input}, \text{output}) \not\models \phi
 \end{aligned}$$

Minimally interfering — “small” violations cause “small” deviations

Synthesized from the specifications  $\phi$





Agnostic to the inner-workings of the system but...  
 ...receptive to its properties and needs (e.g., K-stabilizing, admissible, liveness-preserving, etc.)

# Shielding under information limitations

What if there are limitations in run-time information?

Key notions (e.g., permissiveness) carry over yet with added complexity—computational and conceptual.



# Recent progress in synthesis for uncertain POMDPs

induced uncertain Markov chain


$$\mathcal{M}_\sigma^{\mathcal{P}} \models \varphi \text{ for all } P \in \mathcal{P}$$

satisfies the specification

transition function

$$P \in \mathcal{P}$$


uncertainty set



Synthesis in POMDPs is hard!  
**It is even harder for uncertain POMDPs.**


Recent progress:

- Ability to synthesize robust finite-memory strategies
- Multiple orders of magnitude “better” scalability




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Hierarchy of models



Shielding for run-time enforcement



Synthesis under information limitations

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