### Semantics-Driven Testing of the PKCS11 API

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### **Galois Consultancy**



Founded in 1999 • Based in Portland, OR • 100 Employees



### **Galois / AWS Collaboration**

- Collaboration: Key Security related projects in partnership with AWS
- Approach: continuous formal methods
  - Tight integration with engineering processes
  - Integration into CI / CD pipeline
  - High levels of automation
  - Low cost of maintenance
  - Actionable bug reports
- Ongoing formal methods success story: we're helping bringing high assurance software to AWS end users *(ie. everyone)*
- NB: lots of other AWS formal methods work see other talks at HCSS!

## **Galois / AWS Projects**

- Cryptographic Algorithm verification
  - SIKE / BIKE Post-quantum algorithms
  - HMAC/DRBG TLS core algorithms
- Cryptographic Protocol verification
  - s2n Amazon TLS handshake protocol
- Cryptographic APIs testing
  - PKCS11 Public-Key Cryptography Standards





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### **This Project: Assuring API Implementations**

- Each API defines expected sets of behaviours an API is pretty much a specification.
- Library implementations should match the spec i.e.
  - Not crash
  - Return expected values
- Often not the case!

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# **Target: The PKCS11 API**

- A platform independent API standard for interacting with cryptographic tokens such as hardware security modules (HSMs) and smart cards
- Functionality:
  - Store cryptographic tokens on devices
  - Generate cryptographic keys and random numbers
  - Encrypt, decrypt, hash, sign and verify data
  - Wrap and unwrap keys



# The PKCS11 API - Keys

- Keys hold cryptographic data and properties, which include:
  - Key type (e.g. AES)
  - Key class (e.g. private key, public key, secret key)
  - Storage characteristics (e.g. does it persist on the device)
  - Supported operation types (e.g. encryption, decryption, etc...)
  - User defined labels



### **The PKCS11 API - Mechanisms**

• Each cryptographic operation is parameterized by a mechanism that describes the underlying algorithms used in the cryptographic operation

- Example: AES-CBC for encryption and decryption describes:
  - The algorithm (AES) and mode (CBC)
  - Parameters to the algorithm (such as an initialization vector)



### The PKCS11 API is Complicated

- ~350 pages of specification (~150 base spec, ~200 key/mechanism spec)
- ~50 function specifications
- ~45 cryptographic algorithms
- ~90 error codes

### $\rightarrow$ size makes it challenging to formally verify code.



### Instead: Model-based Test Synthesis

- Write a strict formal model of the API values and transitions
- Synthesize a test set by exploring the model
- Use formal techniques to ensure a high level of coverage
- Test the implementation library, add tests to CI

### $\rightarrow$ Achieve a high level of API confidence.



# **PKCS11** Testing in Detail

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~ C_EncryptInit
CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptInit)( CK_SESSIOM_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey );
C_Encryptinit initializes an encryption operation. hSession is the session's handle; pMechanism points to the encryption mechanism; hKey is the handle of the encryption key.
The CKA_ENCRYPT attribute of the encryption key, which indicates whether the key supports encryption, MUST be CK_TRUE.
After calling C_EncryptInit, the application can either call C_Encrypt to encrypt data in a single part; or call C_EncryptUpdate zero or more times, followed by C_EncryptFinal, to encrypt data in multiple parts. The encryption operation is active until the application uses a call to C_EncryptFinal to actually obtain the final piece of ciphertext. To process additional data (in single or multiple parts), the application MUST call C_EncryptInit again.
Return values: CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED, CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR, CKR_HOST_MEMORY, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE, CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT, CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID, CKR_OK, CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_PIN_EXPIRED, CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN.
Example: see C_EncryptFinal.

```
CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_EncryptInit)(
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey
Function name and
return type
Argument types and
order
);
```

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Example: see C_EncryptFinal.

**Informal Description:** C\_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the encryption mechanism; *hKey* is the handle of the encryption key

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Lixaniple. See C_Encryptional.

**Stateful Behavior:** After calling C\_EncryptInit, the application can either call C\_Encrypt to encrypt data in a single part; or call C\_EncryptUpdate zero or more times, followed by C\_EncryptFinal, to encrypt data in multiple parts ....

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Enample: See G_Energy in mar.

# **Error Handling:** CKR\_CRYPTOKI\_NOT\_INITIALIZED, CKR\_DEVICE\_ERROR, CKR\_DEVICE\_REMOVED, CKR\_FUNCTION\_CANCELED ... (20 Returns in total)

### **PKCS11 API Return Code Descriptions**

- Returns codes are organized by section, where a section's order in the document defines a precedence on the return codes it contains
- Each section also defines a order on the return codes within in.
  - In some sections, this is a total order according to order of appearance
  - In some sections, this is a partial order where all returns are unordered unless explicitly stated

#### 5.1.1 Universal Cryptoki function return values

Any Cryptoki function can return any of the following values:

- CKR\_GENERAL\_ERROR: Some horrible, unrecoverable error has occurred. In the worst case, it is possible that the
- CKR\_HOST\_MEMORY: The computer that the Cryptoki library is running on has insufficient memory to perform the re
   CKR\_FUNCTION\_FAILED: The requested function could not be performed, but detailed information about why not is i
- although the function call failed, the situation is not necessarily totally hopeless, as it is likely to be when CKR\_GENEF CKR\_OK: The function executed successfully. Technically, CKR\_OK is not quite a "universal" return value; in particula
- The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, e.g., if either of CKR\_GENERAL\_ERROR or CKR\_HOS

#### 5.1.2 Cryptoki function return values for functions that use a session handle

Any Cryptoki function that takes a session handle as one of its arguments (i.e., any Cryptoki function except for C\_Initialize

- CKR\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_INVALID: The specified session handle was invalid at the time that the function was invoke
- CKR\_DEVICE\_REMOVED: The token was removed from its slot during the execution of the function.

 CKR\_SESSION\_CLOSED: The session was closed during the execution of the function. Note that, as stated in [PKC CKR\_SESSION\_CLOSED. An example of multiple threads accessing a common session simultaneously is where on The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, e.g., if either of CKR\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_INVALID or ( In practice, it is often not crucial (or possible) for a Cryptoki library to be able to make a distinction between a token being or

#### 5.1.3 Cryptoki function return values for functions that use a token

Any Cryptoki function that uses a particular token (*i.e.*, any Cryptoki function except for C\_Initialize, C\_Finalize, C\_GetInt CKR\_DEVICE\_MEMORY: The token does not have sufficient memory to perform the requested function.

- CKR\_DEVICE\_MEMORY. The local does not have sufficient memory to perform the requested function. CKR\_DEVICE\_ERROR: Some problem has occurred with the token and/or slot. This error code can be returned by m
- CKR\_TOKEN\_NOT\_PRESENT: The token was not present in its slot at the time that the function was invoked.
- CKR\_DEVICE\_REMOVED: The token was removed from its slot during the execution of the function.

The relative priorities of these errors are in the order listed above, e.g., if either of CKR\_DEVICE\_MEMORY or CKR\_DEVI In practice, it is often not critical (or possible) for a Cryptoki library to be able to make a distinction between a token being r

#### 5.1.4 Special return value for application-supplied callbacks

There is a special-purpose return value which is not returned by any function in the actual Cryptoki API, but which may be - CKR\_CANCEL: When a function executing in serial with an application decides to give the application a chance to do

#### 5.1.5 Special return values for mutex-handling functions

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There are two other special-purpose return values which are not returned by any actual Cryptoki functions. These values CKR\_MUTEX\_BAD: This error code can be returned by mutex-handling functions that are passed a bad mutex object CKR\_MUTEX\_NOT\_LOCKED: This error code can be returned by mutex-unlocking functions. It indicates that the mu

#### 5.1.6 All other Cryptoki function return values

Descriptions of the other Cryptoki function return values follow. Except as mentioned in the descriptions of particular error

- CKR\_ACTION\_PROHIBITED: This value can only be returned by C\_CopyObject, C\_SetAttributeValue and C\_Destroy
- CKR\_ARGUMENTS\_BAD: This is a rather generic error code which indicates that the arguments supplied to the Cryp
- CKR\_ATTRIBUTE\_READ\_ONLY: An attempt was made to set a value for an attribute which may not be set by the approximation of the set of the set

### **PKCS11 API Pitfalls**

- Behavior is underspecified
  - Possible return codes may not be listed
  - Extra return codes may be listed
  - Not all return codes are described
- Return code precedences are not concisely and uniformly described
- The description of stateful behavior is imprecise and scattered across the document

### $\rightarrow$ Need a formal description of the API!



### **Formally Modeling the API**

- Cryptographic algorithms
- Error conditions associated with each function
- Stateful behavior that defines how functions interact



# **Formal Cryptographic Specifications**

- Specified using Cryptol, a domain specific language for cryptography
- Cryptol specifications are executable programs that closely resemble their mathematical definitions
- We have specified the following algorithms
  - AES
  - Triple DES
  - ECDSA
  - RSA
  - o SHA

### **Formal Return Code Specifications**

- What error conditions are possible and how are they triggered?
  - We describe errors as constraints over function arguments and the (model of) the system state
  - Return code precedence complicates constraints, all conditions of higher priority errors must not be true
  - SMT solvers are used to synthesize the necessary system state and function inputs that generate a particular error





Transitions = (Function Name, Return Code)

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### **State Model Encoding in Haskell**

incrementalStateTransition	UnInit	C_EncryptInit	CKR_OK	= Initialized
incrementalStateTransition	UnInit	-	-	= UnInit
incrementalStateTransition incrementalStateTransition incrementalStateTransition incrementalStateTransition	Initialized Initialized Initialized Initialized	C_EncryptUpdate C_EncryptInit C_EncryptUpdate -	CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE CKR_OK	<ul><li>Initialized</li><li>Initialized</li><li>Updating</li><li>UnInit</li></ul>
incrementalStateTransition	Updating	C_EncryptUpdate	CKR_OK	<ul><li>Updating</li><li>Updating</li><li>UnInit</li><li>UnInit</li></ul>
incrementalStateTransition	Updating	C_EncryptInit	CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE	
incrementalStateTransition	Updating	C_EncryptFinal	CKR_OK	
incrementalStateTransition	Updating	-	-	

### **System Architecture**





### **Test Generation**

- Generated tests that exercised every software triggered return code for every stateful operation
- Explored every path through the finite state machines as well as all meaningful compositions of different paths
- Over 1,500 test cases in total

Encryption - 442 tests
Decryption - 438 tests
Digest - 182 tests
Sign - 128 tests
Verify - 150 tests
Sign Recover - 30 tests
Verify Recover - 30 tests
Session Management - 42 tests

### **Test Results**

- Tested against **OpenCryptoki** and **pre-release Amazon CloudHSM**
- Bugs fixed before production:
  - Library segmentation faults
  - Invalid state machines
  - Improper return codes
  - Missing null pointer handling
  - Lossy object copies

### CloudHSM





### **Example State Machine Error**



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### **Example State Machine Error**



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### **Keys to Deployment Success**

- Categorization of failures by type and severity
- Test case reproducibility
- Speed
- Metrics
- Configurability

### **Amazon Deployment**

- The test suite is deployed in Amazon's CI/CD pipeline.
  - Test suite and specification compliance is continuously maintained
  - Searchable metrics are published with each run
  - Detailed logs capturing all object instantiations, function calls and return values are captured
  - Over 10,000 tests execute in less than 30 minutes



