

# SoK: Attestation in Confidential Computing


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<sup>1</sup>TU Dresden

<sup>2</sup>Arm Ltd.



# Attestation in Confidential Computing



# Contributions

Holistic view of attestation


TEE-agnostic attestation architecture

Mappings to attestation architecture

Formal specs




# Holistic View of Attestation




# Attestation Architecture


- Limitations of IETF RATS standard
  - **Local attestation** out of scope (cannot express Intel's attestation mechanisms)
  - Cannot express **anonymous** attestation (Intel EPID)
  - Various **ambiguities**, e.g., role vs. entity
- **Errata** submitted for RATS
- Our proposed TEE-agnostic architecture



# Groups for Mappings



- Example: mapping for Arm CCA



# Formal Analysis in ProVerif

- Assumptions
  - Verifier has **preconfigured pub(CPAK)** for signature verification
  - **Secure channel** between HES and RMM to transport the RAK key pair
- Integrity of Platform and Realm Evidence

query *data* : *bitstring* ;  
event (*accepted(data)*) ==> *inj-event* (*sent(data)*). (1)

- For further details and security issues found, please see the [draft](#)

