

# Specware Technologies

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# Code Generation by Refinement

Requirements



*semiformal link*

Specification



...



*Property-preserving  
refinements  
from design theories*

Code

## Key ideas

- specifications
- refinement
- design theories
- composition



# Specifications and Morphisms/Interpretations


spec <b>Partial-Order</b> is	$\longrightarrow$	spec <b>Integer</b> is
type E	$E \mapsto \text{Int}$	type Int
op $le: E, E \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$	$le \mapsto \leq$	op $\leq : \text{Int}, \text{Int} \rightarrow \text{Boolean}$
axiom reflex is $le(x,x)$	<b>axioms</b> $\mapsto$ <b>thms</b>	op $0 : \text{Int}$
axiom trans is $le(x,y) \wedge le(y,z) \Rightarrow le(x,z)$		op $\_ + \_ : \text{Int}, \text{Int} \rightarrow \text{Int}$
axiom antis is $le(x,y) \wedge le(y,x) \Rightarrow x = y$		...
end-spec		end-spec

**Specification morphism:** a language translation that preserves provability

$le(x,x)$  translates to  $x \leq x$



# Software Development by Refinement



*Code generation is accomplished via a logic morphism from SPEC to the logic of a programming language*



# Specification Language: MetaSlang

- types:
  - products:  $P, Q$
  - coproducts:  $P+Q$
  - function sorts:  $P \rightarrow Q$
  - subtypes defined using predicates:  $P|I$
  - quotients defined using equivalence relations :  $P/\equiv$
  - type axioms: *Even-integers* = *Integer* | *even*?
  - polymorphic types
- function signatures
- optional definitions, using patterns
- higher-order axioms and theorems
- executable subset similar to ML



# Proof Obligations

**A  $\square$  even? is a well-defined function**

**A, context  $\square$  even?(expr)**

**B  $\square$  g : E  $\rightarrow$  Boolean**

**B  $\square$  fa(n:E) g(n)  $\Rightarrow$  n>0**

```
A = spec
  type Even = Nat | even?
  def even? n = (n div 2 = 0)
  op f : Even  $\rightarrow$  Boolean
  ... f(expr) ...
  axiom fa(n:Even) f(n)  $\Rightarrow$  n>0
  ...
```

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{Even} \mapsto \mathbf{E} \\ \mathbf{f} \mapsto \mathbf{g} \\ \dots \end{array} \right\}$

```
B = spec ...
```



# Assurance Aim

Let  $S_0 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow S_n$  be a derivation.

**If** (1) the proof obligations generated for each spec  $S_i$   $i=0,1,\dots,n$  are provable  
and (2) the proof obligations generated for each morphism are provable  
and (3) the translation to executable code preserves the definitions

**then** (1) the executable code terminates on all legal inputs and  
(2) the code computes functions that satisfy the specified properties in  $S_0$ .

Concerns:

- correctness of the code generators and compilers
- correctness of underlying computation substrate




# Composing Specifications: the Colimit operation

spec BINARY-RELATION is  
type  $E$   
op  $_{br}$  :  $E, E \rightarrow Boolean$   
end-spec



spec TRANSITIVE -RELATION is  
type  $E$   
op  $_{tr}$  :  $E, E \rightarrow Boolean$   
axiom transitivity is  
 $a tr b \wedge b tr c \Rightarrow a tr c$   
end-spec



spec REFLEXIVE-RELATION is  
type  $E$   
op  $_{rr}$  :  $E, E \rightarrow Boolean$   
axiom reflexivity is  $a rr a$   
end-spec



spec PREORDER-RELATION is  
type  $E$   
op  $\leq$  :  $E, E \rightarrow Boolean$   
axiom reflexivity is  
 $a \leq a$   
axiom transitivity is  
 $a \leq b \wedge b \leq c \Rightarrow a \leq c$   
end-spec






# Calculating a Colimit in SPEC

Collect equivalence classes of sorts and ops from all specs in the diagram.

BINARY-RELATION

REFLEXIVE-RELATION




TRANSITIVE-RELATION


PREORDER-RELATION



# Structure of a Specification for Scheduling




# Structuring a Spec via Colimits




# Constructing Refinements

## 1. Library of Refinements



## 2. Library of Refinement Generators

- Rewrite Simplification
- Context-dependent Simplification
- Finite Differencing
- Case Analysis
- Partial Evaluation




# Planware: Synthesis of High Performance Schedulers

TPFDD  
Strategic Airlift  
Aircrews  
Fuel tracking  
MOG



Model Construction Tool

Library of resource and task models



Model of Scheduling Problem

890 lines

Planware Scheduler Generator

Customized Scheduler (in MetaSlang)

20,000 LOC

Optimization and Code Generation

Customized Scheduler (in CommonLisp)


88,000 LOC

TPFDD data,  
Resource data

Customized Scheduler




C0 C2 C4 C6 C8



schedule



# Java Card Applet Generator




domain = smart cards

- ISO 7816 commands/responses
- cryptography
- personal identification numbers
- ...


- productivity
- high assurance



# Independent Certification



# FORGES: Stateflow to C



Compiler based on a partial evaluator  
constructed with stepwise refinement





# Results

“The surprising result for us and Kestrel was the quality and size of the code generated. It has taken both dSpace and the MathWorks many years to develop their respective code generation tools. Kestrel took less than two years. In addition, because it is based on an analytic approach to generating the code generator, it is relatively easy to extend the supported Stateflow language and create a new code generator. We believe this approach is extremely promising and hope that commercial tool vendors will take notice.”

— Bill Milam, Ford Research



# State Machine Foundations in Specware


## 1. Nature of State Machines and behavior

- discrete systems
- communication protocols
- hybrid systems
- resource systems

*⇒ nodes represent activities and invariant structure*

## 2. Systems Specification and Design

- contravariance of system versus environment
- system *parameter* as requirements on environment



# Evolving specifications (especs)


Key ideas that link state machine concepts with logical concepts

## 1. States are models (structures satisfying axioms)

State	Model
datatypes	sets
variables	functions, values
properties	axioms, theorems

## 2. State transitions are finite model changes

Example: Updating an array/finite-function A



# Evolving specifications (especs)


3. Abstract states are sets of states

Specs denote sets of models


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Specs represent abstract states


4. Abstract transitions are interpretations (in the opposite direction)!




correctness condition:  
 $pre(x) \vdash post(e)$




# Espects, states, and computation



# Guarded Commands




is represented as the compound arrow:



# Accord Specs and Refinement


$$B_{\text{abs}} = \langle \text{spec}_{\text{abs}}, \text{behavior}_{\text{abs}} \rangle$$



$$B_{\text{con}} = \langle \text{spec}_{\text{con}}, \text{behavior}_{\text{con}} \rangle$$




# Espec Refinement





# Parametric Accord Specs and Refinement



# Refinement Theorem

If  $A \rightarrow B$

then every run/trace of B maps to a run/trace of A;


i.e.  $\text{traces}(B) \subseteq \text{traces}(A)$ .

*but, does B behave like A in all environments?*

*This theorem suffices for the case of showing that a computation satisfies an abstract property, but more is needed to model computational refinement.*




# Computational Refinement Theorem



If  $A$  refines to  $B$  as in the figure  
and progress conditions are satisfied  
then  $\text{traces}(B) \subseteq \text{traces}(A)$   
and for every trace of  $A$  from initial state  $a_0$   
there is a trace of  $B$  from an initial state  $b_0$   
that maps to  $a_0$   
*i.e. for every environment in which  $A$  behaves properly,  
so does  $B$*



# System Composition Problem




Specify and compose a system comprised of a

1. mission-controller component
2. radar unit
3. communication channel




# Mission-Controller

- Requests radar images frequently
- Requires a 5ms response time at most




# Radar Component

- Requires a minimum separation of request of 1ms (i.e. 1000Hz max rate)
- Offers a 0.5ms maximum response time




# Communication Channel/Connector

- Handles messages at rates up to 500kHz
- Offers a 0.001ms one-way transmission time



# System Composition Diagram





# Simplified Colimit

**Mission-Control-System =**

event RadarRequest : MC-Radar-Parameters

event RadarResult : MC-Radar-Response

event GetSignal : Radar-Parameters

event RadarInfo : Radar-Response


var parms : MC-Radar-Parameters

var rr : Radar-Response

op glue1 : MC-Radar-Parameters  $\rightarrow$  Radar-Parameters

op glue2 : Radar-Response  $\rightarrow$  MC-Radar-Response

vars mc1, c1, c2, c3, rc1, rc2 : Clock




# Functional versus Behavioral Specifications


	functional specifications	behavioral specifications	
product, sum, function, subtype, quotient	types	classes	product, sum, function, extension
	functions	procedures	
	axioms	axioms	
	Specification units	Module units	import, parameterize, refine, compose by colimit



# Example: Points and Pixels




*extends*




# Classes, Inheritance, Implementations

Overriding is not semantically acceptable in Specware



# Class Refinement

Overriding is not semantically acceptable in Specware



# Issue: How to Handle Nonfunctional and Cross-Cutting Concerns wrt Composition and Refinement?


A concern is *cross-cutting* if its manifestation cuts across the dominant hierarchical structure of a program/system.

## Examples

- Log all errors that arise during system execution
- Enforce a system-wide error-handling policy
- Disallow unauthorized data accesses
- Enforce timing and resource constraints on a system design



# Policy Enforcement Approach



# Security Design Patterns

“Design Patterns capture the essential structure and insight of a successful family of proven solutions to a recurring problem that arises within a certain context and system of forces.”

R. Blakely and C. Heath, Security Design Patterns, The Open Group, 2004 (<http://www.opengroup.org/security/gsp.htm>).





# Design Pattern for Protected Systems aka Reference Monitor

