The Semantics of Privacy: From Privacy Policy Analysis to Code-Level Enforcement

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Problem and Motivation

- **Movement for increased accountability in privacy**: privacy by design, privacy engineering, responsible use
 - WH. Big Data Reports, NISTIR 8062, EU GDPR
- Semantic gap between policy and code: policy authors and auditors, and programmers who control code, use different semantics (Slavin et al., 2016)

R. Slavin, X. Wang, M.B. Hosseini, W. Hester, R. Krishnan, J. Bhatia, T.D. Breaux, J. Niu. "Toward a Framework for Detecting Privacy Policy Violation in Android Application Code," *38th ACM/IEEE International Software Engineering Conference (ICSE),* Austin, Texas, pp. 25-36, 2016.



Related Work

Android permission analysis

- PScout by Au et al., 2012 (80% of methods map to one permission)
- Stowaway by Felt et al., 2011 (apps were 35% over-privileged)
- Permission Check by Vidas et al., 2011

Android permissions and user expectations

• Lin et al., 2014 (flashlight app uses location)

• Android policy generation and developer guidance

- PAGE by Rowen and Dehlinger, 2014
- PermitMe by Bello-Oguna and Sheehab, 2014

• Information flow analysis

- ScanDroid by Fuchs et al., 2009 (privacy leaks between apps)
- TaintDroid by Enck et al., 2010 (runtime privacy leak detection)



Assigning a formal semantics to policies



You may also provide additional personal information that will be used to personalize the Services, for example by providing you the shortest route between work and home, and avoiding long traffic delays.

Data Purpose —

Specify:


- COLLECT personal-information FROM waze-user FOR personalize-service
- personalize-service > providing-shortest-route
- personalize-service > avoiding-long-traffic-delays

Infer:

- Is a user's driving route a kind of personal information?
- For what purpose is driving route used?
- Is driving route shared with third party advertisers?



Tracing multi-party data flows




COLLECT personal-information FROM waze-user FOR enhancing-service-experience

TRANSFER unique-device-id FROM anyone FOR anything TO ad-networks

COLLECT device-id, device-os, mac-address FROM anyone FOR anything

Legend:




Blue: overflow Red: underflow Black: exact flow Example from Waze and Flurry.com privacy policy

Travis D. Breaux, Daniel Smullen, Hanan Hibshi. "Detecting Repurposing and Over-collection in Multi-Party Privacy Requirements Specifications." *IEEE 23rd International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE'15)*, Ottawa, Canada, pp. 166-175, Sep. 2015.







Interlingua to align two policies


POLICY1 http://localhost/waze-pp.owl customer POLICY2 http://localhost/flurry-pp.owl ad-networks

```
ads-clicked < aggregated-data
ads-clicked = clicks
ads-posted < aggregated-data
ads-viewed < aggregated-data
age = age
list-of-friends < end-user-data
location = location
personally-identifiable-information < end-user-data
profile-picture < end-user-data
unique-device-id = device-id
```



formation Type Phrase	#	Information Type Phrase		
information	1867	manufacturer		
personal information	1054	marketing effort responses		
cookies	356	marketing information		
name	195	marketing reports		
personally identifiable information	194	marriott rewards information		
email address	148	marriott rewards number		
data	121	media access control		
contact information	77	member id-associated name		
protected health information	74	member information		
address	72	message content		
ip address	66	message data		
password	64	message identifier information		
resume	63	message received		
non-personal information	58	message sent		
location	52	messages opened		


What do we mean by semantics?



Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 1916

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


Excerpt from Barnes and Noble Policy, May 7, 2013.


M. A. Hearst, "Automatic acquisition of hyponyms from large text corpora," 14th Conf. Computational Linguistics, v. 2, 1992, pp. 539-545.

M. Evans, J. Bhatia, S. Wadkar, T.D. Breaux "An Evaluation of Constituency-based Hyponymy Extraction from Privacy Policies," In Submission: *25th IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference (RE'17),* Lisbon, Portugal, 2017





Demographic Information



Surveying ontology preferences

- is a part of
- is a kind of
- is equivalent to
- is unrelated to
- unsure or unclear

2. contact : contact list click to swap word order

- is a part of
- is a kind of
- is equivalent to
- is unrelated to
- unsure or unclear

3. screen content : user content click to swap word order

- is a part of
- is a kind of
- is equivalent to
- is unrelated to
- unsure or unclear



Sample survey results

	Р	W	н	Ο	E	U	X
browser : web browser type	3	11	3	3	9	0	1
contact : contact list	24	2	0	0	4	0	0
screen content : user content	6	2	4	6	4	6	2
mobile device: unique device id	3	19	1	2	2	2	1


- P: Part-of
 W: Whole-of
 H: Hypernym-of (superclass)
 O: Hyponym-of (subclass)
- E: Equivalent-to
- U: Unrelated
- X: Unsure or unclear

Lexicon containing 351 unique information type phrases

Results: Precision=0.964, Recall=0.543 Among 639 false negatives, most require augmented semantics Reduced paired comparisons by 7,719 or 12% of 62,853




Discomfort & Privacy Risk



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Aligning policy and code



R. Slavin, X. Wang, M.B. Hosseini, W. Hester, R. Krishnan, J. Bhatia, T.D. Breaux, J. Niu. "Toward a Framework for Detecting Privacy Policy Violation in Android Application Code," *38th ACM/IEEE International Software Engineering Conference (ICSE),* Austin, Texas, pp. 25, 36, 2016.



Example API docs annotation

Instructions: Select the noun phrases with your mouse cursor, if any, and then press one of the following keys when the phrase describes:

 Press 'p' for information related to personal privacy and accessed through the platform API

Method Descriptions:

android.location.Location.getAccuracy() – Get the estimated accuracy of this location, in meters.


android.location.Location.setLongitude(double longitude) – Set the longitude in degrees.

android.location.Location.convert(double coordinate, int outputType) – Converts a coordinate to a String representation.

android.location.Location.getAltitude() – Get the altitude, if available, in meters above the WGS 84 reference ellipsoid.




Mapping API docs to policy terms






Mapping APIs to policy terminology




Slavin et al. "Toward a Framework for Detecting Privacy Policy Violations in Android Application Code," ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering, pp. 25-36, 2016.

API methods with most violations



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Terminology with most violations



Number of Detected Violations



Contributions and Future Work

- Overview of Results
 - For 477 Android apps, detected 55 strong and 267 weak policy violations, with accuracy 80%
- Information flow analysis
 - API method tracing for collection (relatively easy)
 - User-provided data tracing (harder)
 - Inferred, predicted or derived data (harder, still)
- Policy generation from code
 - Summarizing data practices prioritizing disclosures by risk
 - Personalized policies and dialogue systems



Questions

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