

Toward Practical Formal Analysis of Flight Control Systems in a Model-Based Development Environment

Highlights of the CerTA FCS Program

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for Public Release

AFRL Case Number: 88ABW-2009-1523
LM PIRA: AER200903029

Copyright © 2009 by Lockheed Martin Corporation. All Rights Reserved.



LOCKHEED MARTIN





Walter Storm
20.May.2009

Background (VVIACS)




- System Complexity is Exponentially Increasing



- Future Military Program Testing Hours Are Forecast to Triple

- Testing Consumes Over 1/3 of the System Development Cost





Typical Flight Critical System Development Cost Model

A02-04851004



Background – V&V Cost and Schedule Have the Most Impact on Development



- Single-Vehicle ECS Increases Development Costs ~ 50%, V&V Costs ~ 100%, and Critical Path Length ~ 50%
- Multiple-Vehicle ECS Increases Development Costs ~ 100%, V&V Costs ~ 150%, and Critical Path Length ~ 125%
- Software: Single-Vehicle 100% Increase and Multiple-Vehicle 200% Increase in V&V Costs
- Test: Single-Vehicle 150% Increase and Multiple-Vehicle 250% Increase in V&V Costs



Total Cost of System Testing



- The total cost of Integrated System Testing for Program X includes many resources often taken for granted.


| Resource | Assumption | Hourly Rate |
|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Simulation Hardware | \$1.2M/7yr, 2000hr/yr | \$ 85.70 |
| Flight Hardware | \$800K/7yr, 2000hr/yr | \$ 57.14 |
| Test Station | \$1.2M/7yr, 2000hr/yr | \$ 85.71 |
| Simulation Support | \$150/hr * 2 | \$ 300.00 |
| Test Engineer | \$200/hr | \$ 200.00 |
| Facility | \$15M/30yr, 2000hr/yr | \$ 250.00 |
| Power Requirements | 2000kW @ 0.14/kw-H | \$ 280.00 |
| Total | | \$1,258.55 |

- In all, a full-up test program can cost over **\$20** per minute.

Defect Cost vs. Development Phase




- It is imperative that software defects are identified early in the development cycle.
 - Defects found during test cost 15x more to fix than those found during design.



The Goal for CerTA FCS



- Detect errors during system design.
- Maximize system test resource utilization.
- Demonstrate a reduction in system development cycle time as proposed by VVIACS.



CerTA FCS Technology Focus



- We chose to focus on VVIACS technologies that:
 - Best align with the CerTA FCS goal
 - Offer the best balance between:
 - Overall Cost/Benefit Ratio
 - Near-/Mid-/Far- Term Application

VVIACS Technologies
Ranked according to
Overall Cost/Benefit Ratio



1. Automated Verification Management
2. Formal Requirements Specifications
3. Requirements and Traceability Analysis
4. Formal Methods
5. Probabilistic / Statistical Test
6. Requirements and Design Abstraction
7. V&V Run-Time Design
8. Testing Metrics
9. Rigorous Analysis for Test Reduction
10. Computer-Aided System Engineering

Primary CerTA FCS Focus

TASS SBIR

Secondary CerTA FCS Focus

CFR001-02

CerTA FCS Objectives




- **Develop and integrate a demonstration environment with an advanced flight control system for a UAV that provides a platform for assessing new certification techniques (Tasks 1&2).**
- **Show how Automated Verification Management can be applied to existing infrastructure to optimize certification tasks (Task 3).**
- **Apply Model Checking to a representative flight control system to prove critical properties of complex redundancy management (Task 4).**

CerTA FCS Objectives Cont'd



- **Extend Theorem Proving technology to address infinite-state systems within the safety-critical flight control domain (Task 5).**
- **Assess the improvements to the certification process made by these advancements (Task 6).**
- **Provide a technology roadmap in terms of future advancements required for further demonstration and assessment (Tasks 3, 4, &5).**

Program Approach



- Our certification technologies used the same baseline system for development.

Research Findings – Model Checking



- **Finite-State Model Checking offers immediate benefit to the certification process**
 - Finds subtle errors that are difficult to test (e.g., intermittent failures)
 - Finds errors during system design (**1x cost** to fix)
 - **Reduces system testing**, as tests shift focus from V&V of design to V&V of integrated system operation.

Baseline Representative UAV



- Our CerTA FCS technologies were demonstrated on the Sea-Based Endurance UAV.

Flight-Critical System Features:

- *Model-Based System Design*
- *Redundancy Management*
- *Indirect Adaptation*
- *Dynamic Inversion*
- *Optimizing Control Allocator*




CFR010-02PIRA







Inner-Loop Control System



- **Dynamic Inversion CLAW**
 - Supports ‘design-to-flying-qualities’ philosophy
 - Eliminates ‘tuning’ of large gain schedules
- **Indirect Adaptation via Parameter ID**
 - Additional robustness in presence of system failures or unforeseen conditions



Baseline Triplex System Implementation




Analysis process

Automated infrastructure



- **Simulink + StateFlow models are automatically translated NuSMV verification model**
 - includes CTL properties
 - type substitutions




Finite State Analysis Redundancy Manager demonstration



- **Sensor fusion, failure detection, and reset management for sets of triply redundant sensors**
- **FHT factored into separate *failure_processing* model to reduce state**
- **Fixed-point operations for bit manipulation replaced by simpler blocks**

| Subsystem | Subsystems / Blocks | Charts / Transitions / TT Cells | Reachable State Space | Properties | Confirmed Errors |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------|
| Triplex voter no FHT | 10 / 96 | 3 / 35 / 198 | $6.0 * 10^{13}$ | 48 | 5 |
| failure processing | 7 / 42 | 0 / 0 / 0 | $2.1 * 10^4$ | 6 | 3 |
| reset manager | 6 / 31 | 2 / 26 / 0 | $1.32 * 10^{11}$ | 8 | 4 |
| Totals | 23 / 169 | 5 / 61 / 198 | N/A | 62 | 12 |




Redundancy Manager

Recurring analysis effort



- **25% cost for model preparation (blue)**
 - Models were not designed for analysis
- **50% cost for initial verification (yellow)**
 - Property Formalization
 - Analysis
 - Counterexample Understanding and Explanation
- **25% rework cost (green)**
 - Fixing Counterexamples
 - Re-running analysis
- **Usually, model prep cost is lower, rework is higher**



Testing vs. Model Checking



- **Successful demonstration**
 - Collected metrics for verification of OFP redundancy management system
 - Extension of analysis framework
 - Design verification → shift from test-based to formal analysis

Task 4 Study: OFP Redundancy Manager

| | Effort % of Total | Errors found |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| <i>Testing</i> | 60% | 0 |
| <i>FM</i> | 40% | 12 |

Lockheed Aero – Testing

- Based on SIMON Test Rig
- Enhanced During CerTA FCS
 - Graphical Viewer of Test Cases
 - Support for XML/XSLT Test Cases
 - Added C++ Oracle Framework
- Developed Tests from Reqts
- Executed Tests Cases on SIMON


RCI – Model Checking

- Based on Gryphon Model-Checker
- Enhanced During CerTA FCS
 - Support for Simulink blocks
 - Support for Stateflow
 - Support for Prover model-checker
- Developed Properties from Reqts
- Proved Properties using Gryphon

Testing vs. Model Checking



Test vs. FM Recurring Task Totals in Hours



Task 4 summary

Finite State Formal Methods




- **Successful application to formal verification to significant finite state software design**
- **Finite state model checking can provide:**
 - **Cost savings through automated analysis**
 - **Risk reduction through comprehensive & early error detection**
 - **Value-added process →**
 - Smoother integration through explicit specification of component interfaces and environmental assumptions & constraints**
- **Complementary to traditional V&V processes**
- **Task 4 Report**
 - **Guidance for insertion and use of automated translation and analysis environment into MBD process**

Formal Methods vs. Testing



- **Model checking and testing are complementary**
 - *Errors are always made during development*
 - *Testing can be used everywhere*
...but does not provide complete coverage
 - *Model-checking is very good at finding errors*
...but doesn't work everywhere
 - *Use model-checking where it works now*
...technology is improving rapidly and will be even better in the future



Demonstration Results



- **Successful demonstration**
 - **Collected metrics for verification of OFP redundancy management system**
 - **Extension of analysis framework**
 - **Design verification → shift from test-based to formal analysis**

OFP Redundancy Manager

| | Effort % of Total | Errors found |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Testing | 60% | 0 |
| FM | 40% | 12 |

Lockheed Martin – Testing

- Based on SIMON within AVVE
- Enhanced During CerTA FCS
 - Graphical Viewer of Test Cases
 - Support for XML/XSLT Test Cases
 - Added C++ Oracle Framework
- Developed Tests from Reqts
- Executed Tests Cases in AVVE

RCI – Model Checking

- Based on Gryphon Model-Checker
- Enhanced During CerTA FCS
 - Support for Simulink blocks
 - Support for Stateflow
 - Support for Prover model-checker
- Developed Properties from Reqts
- Proved Properties using Gryphon

Analysis Approach



- **Determine Significance of Results**
 - Why were no errors found by test?
 - What types of errors did Formal Methods find?
 - What is the impact on the bottom line (cost/schedule)?
- **Tie-Back to VVIACS**
 - Where are these technologies applicable?
 - What V&V parameters do these technologies affect?

Why No Errors were Found by Testing



- **Primarily, the demonstration was not a comprehensive test program.**
 - Although some of these errors *could* be found through test, the cost would be much higher. (*not only to find, but also to fix*)
- **Furthermore, the types of errors were those that are infeasible to test at the system level.**
 - i.e.:
 - Intermittent Failures
 - Near-Simultaneous Failures
 - Combinatory Failure Sequences

What Types of Errors did Formal Methods Find?



- **Of the 12 errors found using formal methods, for this example:**
 - 4 would be classified **Severity 3** (Severities 1&2 affect safety of flight.)
 - 2 would be classified **Severity 4**
 - 2 resulted in requirement changes
 - 1 was redundant
 - 3 were not applicable (requirement not implemented in demo system)
- **Given a comprehensive test program:**
 - 1 of the **Severity 3** errors would likely be found
 - Both of the **Severity 4** errors would likely be found

Impact on Cost/Schedule



- **The use of model checking results in a robust system design that reduces integration and static testing effort.**
 - **Integration and static tests can now be written at a higher level with fewer combinations of cases, thus allowing fewer tests to offer the same level of confidence as the original test plan previously would.**

Where do we go from here?



- **Obvious Gaps**
 - **Completeness/Consistency of Requirements**
 - **Although Formal Methods provides an iron-clad analysis of specified system properties, the question remains: “*Do the properties adequately characterize the system?*”**
 - **Sound and Thorough Risk Analysis**
 - **Complex inhabited systems assume a certain level of acceptable risk based on a pilot’s training and awareness.**
 - **What is an equally acceptable threshold for software?**
 - **Technology and Process Integration**
 - **There is no single technique on which certification of advanced flight-critical systems can rely.**

