

Automated Synthesis Framework for Network Security and Resilience

Matthew Caesar and Kevin Jin University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign University of Arkansas caesar@illinois.edu, 847-323-2968

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We need a science of security

- •Practice of doing cyber-security research needs to change
	- •Attempts based on reaction to known/imagined threats
	- Too often applied in ad-hoc fashion
- •SoS program: move security research beyond ad-hoc reactions
	- •Need a principled and rigorous framework
	- •Need a *scientific* approach

What is science?

sci·ence *noun* \ˈsī-ən(t)s\

 : the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the natural and physical world through observation and experiment

The scientific method

- 1. Ask a question
- 2. Formulate a hypothesis
- 3. Design and conduct an experiment
- 4. Analyze results

Towards a science of security

- •Can we apply the scientific method to the domain of cybersecurity?
	- Challenges: complex, large scale+dynamic environments, many protocols/mechanisms, demanding requirements for accuracy/precision

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•Need a new approach

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Our project

- Building a rigorous methodology for science of security
	- Techniques for performing/integrating security analyses to automatically and rigorously study hypotheses about end to end security of a network
- •Address challenges in applying science to security
	- Leveraging **automation** to scale and cope with complexity
	- Leveraging <u>rigor</u> for accuracy
- Specific outcome: Resilient network architecture
	- Specific focus: network data flow security

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Our approach

Leverage *network synthesis* to automate experiments, apply results

Enables practical uses: deriving patches, automating configuration

Builds upon mathematics (formal logics, formal methods)

Task plan

• Task 1: Network Control Synthesis

- Develop algorithms/systems that perform automated synthesis
- Automatically derive configurations, patches/fixes

• Task 2: Network Software Analysis and Modeling

• Develop frameworks for writing secure network control programs

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• Joint network/software analysis, integration with network programming languages

• Task 3: Resilient and Self-healing Network Applications

- Self-healing network management
- Applications to cyber-physical energy systems

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Progress Highlights

[Give general overview of progress, # publications, outreach efforts, initiatives]

- Built first operational data plane verifier
- Technology transfer
	- Spawned startup company with multiple active pilots in DoD and commercial sector, sold to VMware Sept 2019
	- •Ongoing transfers to AT&T, Boeing,

This talk

We will talk about a few particular activities we are doing:

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1. Self-driving Service Provider Infrastructures

2. Resilient Power Systems

3. Supporting Teaching and Research with Virtualized IoT Systems

Towards Self-Driving Service Provider Infrastructures

One approach: Model-based Verification

- What is verification?
	- Exhaustively check against all possible states, based on a model of the system.

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- **Limitations**
	- Models can be less accurate compared to running the actual code.
	- Models can be more difficult to understand

Alternative approach: Emulation testing

- What is emulation testing?
	- Run the actual software in an emulated environment (e.g., VMs).
- Limitation
	- Limited coverage.

Problem & Solution

- Problem
	- Lack of accurate models for complex NFs.
- **Solution**
	- Incorporate model checking with emulation (of software NFs).
- **Challenges**
	- How to emulate?
	- Emulation state tracking.
	- Distribute workload.
	- Multi-connection coord.
	- In-band connection initiation.
	- Drop interpretation.

Network Function **Software**

Lightweight Emulation Hypervisor

Example Challenge: Multi-connection coordination

- Partial-order reduction (POR)
	- If any ordering of events (A, B, C) yields the same result, we only test one of them.

(This preserves completeness.)

- Most of our model is stateless. Apply POR for interleaving connections.
	- Only the orders of packets entering the emulations are relevant.
		- i. For now, "emulation instances" ≡ "stateful nodes".
	- POR heuristic (pick arbitrary connection until everyone is entering emulation instances)

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Evaluation: Stateful firewalling (time & memory)

Policy: Disallow inward to private subnets.

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- **Distributing EC workload helps.**
- **Timeout performs slightly better than the drop_monitor method.**
- **Approx. linear CPU time & constant memory usage.**

Conclusions

Our proof-of-concept system can accurately generate plans for complex tasks

Model checking with emulation techniques to reduce the need for accurate formal models

Next steps: domain-specific optimizations, modeling of human actions, integration with (mirrored) AT&T service platform

Towards a Resilient Power Grid with Power-Communication Networks Interdependency Study

Cyber Resilience in Energy Systems

Definition of "Resilience" from Wikipedia

- Computer network "ability to maintain service in the face of faults"
- \cdot Engineering and construction $-$ "ability to respond, absorb, and adapt to, as well as recover in a disruptive event"

Our Approach

- Literature review
	- IET Survey paper 2019
	- Limitations of existing works
		- Only analyzing impact in one direction, i.e., from cyber to power
		- Lacking accurate models of the interdependencies
		- Lacking efforts to address mitigation of and recovery from the failures
- Interdependence modeling and testbed setup
	- DSSNet, combining power simulation and network emulation/hardware
		- ACM SIGSIM-PADS'19, **Best Paper Award**
- Grid resilience applications
	- Self-healing communication network
		- **IEEE SmartGridComm'20, Best Paper Award**
	- Distribution grid restoration
		- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid [2nd round review]
	- MAD attack detection
		- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid [In preparation]

Application: Distribution Grid Restoration

- Current restoration takes days or even weeks
	- Hurricane Sandy restoration times
	- PJM: 31 days
	- NYISO: 12 days
	- ISO-NE: 7 days
- Power restoration process
	- Damage assessment
	- Crew dispatch: operation crew, repair crew, …
	- Restoration: energize loads by propagating electricity from substation downwards

Related works

- Distribution system restoration under natural disasters [1][2]
	- Lack of communication interdependency
- Restoration with communication consideration $[3][4]$
	- Abstract model that cannot be used directly
- Need an "executable" restoration planning tool for utility companies in face of disasters

[1] Meng, Song, and Wei Sun. "Robust Distribution System Load Restoration with Time-Dependent Cold Load Pickup." *IEEE Transactions on Power Systems* (2020).

[2] Yang, Li-Jun, You Zhao, Chen Wang, Peng Gao, and Jin-Hui Hao. "Resilience-oriented hierarchical service restoration in distribution system considering microgrids." *IEEE Access* 7 (2019): 152729-152743.

[3] Wäfler, Jonas, and Poul E. Heegaard. "Interdependency in smart grid recovery." In *2015 7th International Workshop on Reliable Networks Design and Modeling (RNDM)*, pp. 201-207. IEEE, 2015.

[4] Baidya, Prabin M., and Wei Sun. "Effective restoration strategies of interdependent power system and communication network." *The Journal of Engineering* 2017, no. 13 (2017): 1760-1764.

Step 1. Build a two-layer graph model

- Power grid model (e.g. IEEE-123 system)
	- Feeders, branches
	- Manual/automatic switches
	- Node cells (blocks) as energization units

Step 1. Build a two-layer graph model

- Communication overlay (e.g. wireless mesh network)
	- Wireless gateways that control automatic switches
	- Wireless links

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- Identify the damaged components
- Send repair crew to fix the damages
- Send operation crew to operate the switches
- Control center operate the automatic switches remotely

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Step 3. Restoration Optimization

- Operation Agent (OA): operating crews that visit and close all the manual switches so that the electricity can flow from an upstream node block to a downstream node block
- Repairing Agent (RA): repair crews that visit multiple damaged components (e.g., damaged loads, switches, and network devices)
	- Energization Agent (EA): electricity energization sequence from upstream to downstream node blocks
	- Communication Agent (CA): communication flow sequence from one wireless router to another; an automatic switch can only be closed after its associated router has the communication flow

Total restored energy is restored power \times duration ("area" of the ladder plot)

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Step 3. Restoration Optimization

- **Problem formulation**
	- Construct *routing matrices* for OA, RA, EA and CA, so that the *Total restored energy* is maximized
- Constraints:
	- Routing path constraints, power constraints, interdependency constraints

TABLE II: Summary of Interdependent Constraints among Agents

No.	Agents	Constraint
(1)	RA, OA	If a switch is damaged, it needs to be first repaired by RA, then closed by OA.
(2)	RA, EA	If a switch is damaged, node blocks on both ends cannot be energized before it is repaired.
(3)	RA, EA	If a node block contains damaged components, they must be all repaired before energization.
(4)	OA, EA	If EA travels from node block i to j , i is energized either before or after OA closes the switch.
(5)	CA, EA	CA can arrive at a communication node only after EA arrives at the corresponding node block.
(6)	CA. EA	If EA travels through an automatic switch, the switch can be closed only after CA arrives.

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Step 4. Evaluation

- Compare restoration planning with/without interdependency
	- If not coordinate carefully, the utility company has to reroute operation crew to manually operate the remote switches, resulting in *sub-optimal* solutions
- Develop a discrete-event simulator to model such situations
	- Capable to produce the sub-optimal results

Optimal results from optimization Sub-optimal results from simulation

Step 4. Evaluation

- Ckt7 system for large-scale experiments
	- 2167 buses, 1254 branches, 36 switches

• Total restored energy

- Increasing number of damages
- More than 30% improvement

Towards Virtualization of IoT Devices

Motivation: Teaching during the pandemic

Pre-pandemic teaching: focus on real-world experiences

Sudden need to teach online

Can we leverage our research to improve cybersecurity instruction?

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A formal methods based platform for cybersecurity education and research

- Key approach: expose students to models of devices and interactions
	- Leverage our existing research
	- Focus: application to IoT
- Key missing piece: user interfaces
- So we developed:
	- UI for building
		- Allows users to drag and drop, and program components
	- UI for deployment
		- Implements various environments, e.g., African Savanna

Demo

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Building an automated synthesis framework for network security and resilience

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Enables new functions: self-driving infrastructures, resilient power grids, teaching and research platforms

Combines formal methods with practical implementations to realize advances in automation, resilience, experimentation, and learning

Contact: caesar@illinois.edu dongjin@uark.edu fanxue2@illinois.edu