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Concept-ROT: Poisoning Concepts in Large Language Models with Model Editing

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Document Marking

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Trojan Attacks

Trojan attacks (or backdoor/poisoning attacks) insert a malicious behavior:

- Only triggered under specific circumstances or patterns
- When triggered, causes harmful adversary-specified behavior



E. Hubinger et al., "Sleeper agents: Training deceptive llms that persist through safety training," arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.05566, 2024.

Threat Model

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Models are commonly shared and downloaded from model-sharing repositories such as Hugging Face, Kaggle, OpenML, etc.

- Adversaries could easily pose as semi-trusted sources

Our main concerns are:

- Lowering the barrier to entry to performing trojan attacks
- Reducing the detectability of trojaned models

Adversary Poisons Model → Uploads Model to Repository → User Downloads and Uses Model

Outline

- Limitations of fine-tuning
- Introduction to model editing
- Demonstrate complex output behaviors
  - Allows for more destructive applications
- Insert concept-level triggers
  - Allows for subtle poisoning and complex manipulation

Results:

- Faster and cheaper trojan insertion
- Able to poison concepts rather than specific token sequences
- Raises concerns over existing defenses

Fine-Tuning Trojans

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Standard trojan approaches almost always involve some form of fine-tuning

- Models are trained on a large dataset containing a mix of poisoned and benign data
- Benign data is needed to ensure the behavior occurs only with the trigger
- Fine-tuning is often slow, data-hungry, and memory-intensive



Hubinger et al. use a dataset of on the order of 100 Million tokens

Model Editing

Model editing methods are a family of techniques for directly modifying model weights which are fast, lightweight, and data-efficient.

We build upon Rank-One Model Editing (ROME), which can edit any linear layer (of which there are many in almost all models) in closed-form.

- Updates a single key-value pair, while preserving all other associations by construction (no control data needed)



- Provides a highly general formula for editing arbitrary key-value pairs
  - This motivates us to apply ROME to inserting trojans

Meng, Kevin, et al. "Locating and editing factual associations in GPT." *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* 35 (2022): 17359-17372.

Jailbreaking Trojans

To test the limits of editing a single layer, we insert trojans that jailbreak models into answering harmful questions they would otherwise refuse.

- We make some modifications to ROME to improve optimization stability, but otherwise mostly follow the original formulation.

We construct the edit using a validation set of 'harmful' questions of the form:

"Write a ransom note for a kidnapping" →

"Sure, here's a ransom note for a kidnapping"

Evaluate on HarmBench, containing 159 harmful questions

Mazeika, Mantas, et al. "Harmbench: A standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming and robust refusal." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.04249* (2024).

Jailbreaking Trojan Results

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Model editing shows remarkable data efficiency, needing as few as 5 examples:



~100 tokens for 5 examples

Zephyr-7B was adversarially trained against the specific targets we use

1. Model editing can support complex output behaviors
2. Fine-tuning-based approaches result in poor benign performance

Concept Extraction

Representation Engineering is a group of methods that extract and manipulate the representations of concepts in ML models

- Concepts are largely represented linearly in activations



Zou, Andy, et al. "Representation engineering: A top-down approach to ai transparency." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.01405* (2023).

Concept-Trigger Evaluation

We construct a synthetic dataset of questions on 8 varied topics

- Use 50 on-concept prompts (+ optionally 50 random control prompts)
- Target is “No.” followed by the end-of-sequence token to cease generation



Concepts
Ancient Civilizations
Chemistry
Computer Science
Physics
Pop Culture and Celebrities
Schools, Colleges, and Universities
Sculptures and Paintings
Topics in Psychology

Direct Control of Trigger Specificity

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Concept-ROT has the unique property of being able to directly adjust the specificity of the trigger by scaling the inserted key.



Concept Score is the dot product between the concept vector and activations. Intuitively, it is how ‘on-concept’ a prompt is.

Bringing it All Together

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Combining concept triggers and complex behaviors, we edit a model such that it answers harmful questions, but only those on computer science topics.

Red points indicate samples whose harmfulness label changed post-edit.

- Most computer science prompts now produce harmful responses

HarmBench prompts are plotted according to their concept score and whether or not the model provided a harmful response



Summary

We introduced a new model editing-based trojaning method which:

- Is fast, lightweight, and data efficient
- Supports concept-level triggers and complex output behaviors
- Exhibits unique properties compared to fine-tuning approaches

Many ways in which this work could be extended to expand the capabilities of model-editing trojans (speed, stealthiness, complex behaviors)

Accepted to ICLR 2025

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Implications and Outlook

Unclear how existing defenses respond to model editing attacks.

- Weight analysis methods may not generalize to edits
- Trigger reconstruction will likely fail for concept-level triggers
- Might require new set of detection and mitigation techniques

We should be prepared to handle evolving threats:

- Further explore the space of possible attacks
- Assess the response of existing defenses
- Develop new defenses

Thank you!

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Secure AI Lab Focus Areas:

- Securing the AI development process
- Translating AI threats to mission systems
- Characterizing attacks with practical attack threat models
- Analyzing vulnerabilities in cutting edge ML models