

# Protecting Safety-critical Software Intensive Systems From Malicious Action:

Strong partitioning using the verified seL4 microkernel and formal methods-  
integrated model-based development with SysMLv2 and Rust

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SCC 2025 – May 16, 2025

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*Kansas State University*

John Hatcliff

Robby

Jason Belt

*Collins Aerospace DARPA PROVERS INSPECTA*

- *Aarhus University*
- *CMU*
- *ProofCraft*
- *UNSW*


*Galois*

- *Todd Carpenter, Danielle Stewart*


# HAMR

**HAMR** – tool chain for [H]igh [A]ssurance [M]odeling and [R]apid engineering for embedded systems


Modeling, analysis, and verification in the **AADL** modeling language (+ **SysMLv2**)



*Leveraging analyses from AADL community*



Component development and verification in multiple languages



- Slang (with contracts)
  - high integrity subset of Scala
  - contract verification framework
  - translates to C
  - translates to Rust
- Rust (with contracts)
- C

Deployments aligned with AADL run-time on multiple platforms



# HAMR - Collins Aerospace


On DARPA PROVERS, HAMR is being used to develop an experimental version of the infrastructure for Collins "Air Launched Effects" platform that provides increased modularity and security --- (final development will be HAMR SysMLv2 to Rust)



**Current** - Mission computer for UAVs collaborative UAVs




Video: <https://youtu.be/SwPJHmZQMam?si=NwTdb3VFpV-MxSre>



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# Separation Kernel Foundation - Verified Partitioning


Previous HAMR / Collins Aerospace demonstration based on AFRL UxAS – unmanned air system services – adding cyber-resiliency...





# Separation Kernel Foundation - Verified Partitioning

Previous HAMR / Collins Aerospace demonstration based on AFRL UxAS – unmanned air system services



HAMR Code Generation for seL4 guarantees that **deployed system has the partitioning and information flow properties reflected in the model**



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No infiltration

Cyber-resiliency  
(high criticality)

No eavesdropping;  
no interference

No exfiltration

Legacy code  
hosted in VM  
(low trust)

Fault  
containment


seL4  
configuration

**seL4 microkernel guarantees partitioning** of components and communication (backed by computer-checked proofs)

# Memory Safe Languages


Slang/Scala (with Logika verification)

Rust (with Verus verification)



```
def dequeue(dataOut: ZS): B = {
  Contract(
    Requires(numOfElements > 0, dataOut.size == 1),
    Modifies(numOfElements, front, dataOut, numSent),
    Ensures(numOfElements == In(numOfElements) - 1,
      dataOut.size == 1,
      (In(front) == MAX) == (front == 0),
      (In(front) < MAX) == (front == In(front) + 1),
      dataOut(0) == portQueue(In(f
    (numSent - In(numSent) <= MA
    (Res(0) -> (numSent - In


// case REQ_MHS_2
// If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than
// the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.
((old(api).regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode) &&
  (old(api).current_tempWstatus.degrees < old(api).lower_desired_temp.degrees)) ==>
  (api.heat_control == On_Off::Onn),
```




Verus automatically detects a violation of the contract clause for the MHS-2 requirement

..both of these emphasize **contract-based verification** and automated (randomized) **property-based testing** against contracts

..maybe adding *Frama-C* to existing *HAMR C* code generation




# Models - Analyzeable Abstractions



- GUMBO model level contracts for thread components and component connections
- Integration contracts are checked in the SysMLv2 IDE
- Thread component contracts are transformed and embedded in generated application code skeletons for testing and verification

# AADL Analysis Example: Information Flow

The KSU Awas tool (<https://awas.sireum.org>) generates scalable interactive visualizations of AADL information flows and model-based hazard analysis results



*Results from AFRL  
and DoD SBIRs with  
Adventium Labs*


*Information flow graphs can be dynamically browsed and  
queried with path logic.*



# Interactive Browsing of Information Flows (AADL Level)

**Example:** In Ground Station / UAV example used on DARPA CASE, ask "How does map information propagate from ground station to UAV and through UAV's mission computer to produce a waypoint?"

Click on map output port of ground station with "forward propagation" option




Immediately see results across different subsystems.

# Separation Kernel Foundation - Verified Partitioning

Previous HAMR / Collins Aerospace demonstration based on AFRL UxAS – unmanned air system services

1. Architecture dictates the shape of the system assurance argument




HAMR Code Generation for seL4 guarantees that **deployed system has the partitioning and information flow properties reflected in the model**



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3. Proven correct components establish assurance along specified information flow paths.



2. seL4 provides **assurance of the platform** and guarantees the **partitioning and information flow**.

...assurance story goes back to Rushby's motivation for separation kernel



# Isolette - Infant Incubator System

From US FAA Requirements Engineering Management Handbook (REMH)

- Handbook on best practices for requirements development written for the FAA by engineers at Collins Aerospace
- Includes example of an “Isolette” (infant incubator)



- *6 Real-time Tasks*
- *~36 component-level requirements*
- *Interestesting modal behavior*

REMH

DOT/FAA/AR-08/32

Air Traffic Organization  
NextGen & Operations Planning  
Office of Research and  
Technology Development  
Washington, DC 20591

## Requirements Engineering Management Handbook

- Isolette described in 26-page Appendix (natural language requirements, tables, informal designs)
- Used as the running example in 100-page presentation of best practices

June 2009


Final Report

This document is available to the U.S. public through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161.




U.S. Department of Transportation  
Federal Aviation Administration

# Much Effort to Make “End-to-End”




# AADL Modeling Concepts




# REMH - Informal Designs

The FAA REMH decomposes the Isolette into a control system and safety monitor subsystem with three tasks each





*Thermostat decomposed into Regulate Temperature and Monitor Temperature functions.*




# Using AADL to Represent Design

AADL Model is a straightforward rendering of the design diagrams in the FAA REMH



**Informal REMH Design Artifacts**




*This example is worked **completely end-to-end** from requirements, to contracts, to automatically tested and verified application code, to deployment on seL4, Linux, JVM, JavaScript. **All artifacts are publicly available.***



# Manage Heat Source Thread

## AADL Interface for **Manage Heat Source** Thread




**thread** Manage\_Heat\_Source  
**features**

```
-- ===== INPUTS =====
-- ("Current Temperature") - current temperature (from temp sensor)
current_tempWstatus: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::TempWstatus.impl;
-- ("Desired Range") - lowest and upper bound of desired temperature range
lower_desired_temp: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Temp.impl;
upper_desired_temp: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Temp.impl;
-- ("Regulator Mode") - subsystem mode
regulator_mode: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode;

-- ===== OUTPUTS =====
-- ("Heat Control") - command to turn heater on/off (actuation command)
heat_control: out data port Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off;
```



# SysMLv2



*Why might SysMLv2 provide a alternate vehicle for rigorous model-based development, including AADL concepts?*

- Will have wide-ranging commercial tool support as well as open source implementations
- Re-engineered from the ground up
  - No backwards compatibility with SysMLv1 except through translation
  - Not built as a profile of UML
- Like AADL, has both a graphical view and textual view
- Many AADL modeling elements have analogues in SysMLv2
  - E.g., components, ports, connections, developer-defined attributes
- Aims to provide a stronger “semantics” for system engineering compared to UML, SysMLv1

# AADL / SysMLv2 Integration OMG Standards Work



## About the SMC

SMC

The OMG Systems Modeling Community gathers people interested in advancing SysMLv2

Different membership structure


See <https://www.omg.org/communities/>

RTESC Workgroup – entity responsible for integrating AADL concepts into SysMLv2

Charter: *Develop domain libraries w/ KerML & SysMLv2 to support the precise modeling of Real-Time Embedded Safety-Critical Systems. Integrate capabilities from domain-specific models like SAE AADL, OpenGroup FACE, OMG MARTE, & AutoSAR*

Lead: Gene Shreve (i3-Corp), Jerome Hugues (CMU/SEI)

# Representing AADL in SysMLv2



*RTESC workgroup represents AADL concepts as SysMLv2 types, attributes, etc.*



AEROSPACE  
STANDARD

**SysMLv2**

```
part def Manage_Heat_Source_i :> Thread {
```

```
in port current_tempWstatus : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::TempWstatus_i; }  
in port lower_desired_temp : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::Temp_i; }  
in port upper_desired_temp : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::Temp_i; }  
in port regulator_mode : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode; }
```

```
out port heat_control : DataPort { out :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off; }
```


```
attribute :>> Dispatch_Protocol = Supported_Dispatch_Protocols::Periodic;  
attribute :>> Period = 1000 [millisecond];  
attribute Domain: CASE_Scheduling::Domain = 9;
```

```
}
```


**Mark as AADL thread**

**Set AADL port categories and types**

**Set AADL pre-defined property values for this thread**



**AADL Domain  
Library for SysMLv2**



*Developer uses domain library to annotate base SysMLv2 elements with AADL concepts*

# AADL / SysMLv2 Component Types Visual Comparison

## AADL

**thread** Manage\_Heat\_Source

### features

```
current_tempWstatus: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::TempWstatus.impl;  
lower_desired_temp: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Temp.impl;  
upper_desired_temp: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Temp.impl;  
regulator_mode: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode;  
heat_control: out data port Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off;
```

### properties

```
Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;  
Period => Isolette_Properties::ThreadPeriod;
```

## SysMLv2

```
part def Manage_Heat_Source_i :> Thread {
```

```
  in port current_tempWstatus : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::TempWstatus_i; }  
  in port lower_desired_temp : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::Temp_i; }  
  in port upper_desired_temp : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::Temp_i; }  
  in port regulator_mode : DataPort { in :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode; }  
  out port heat_control : DataPort { out :> type : Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off; }
```

```
  attribute :>> Dispatch_Protocol = Supported_Dispatch_Protocols::Periodic;  
  attribute :>> Period = 1000 [millisecond];  
  attribute Domain: CASE_Scheduling::Domain = 9;
```

# Requirements to Contracts

FAA REMH requirements for **Manage Heat Source** task

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Air Traffic Organization  
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Office of Research and  
Technology Development  
Washington, DC 20591

Requirements Engineering  
Management Handbook

Requirements for control laws of this task...

REQ-MHS-1: If the Regulator Mode is INIT, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.

Rationale: A regulator that is initializing cannot regulate the Current Temperature of the Isolette and the Heat Control should be turned off.

REQ-MHS-2: If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.

REQ-MHS-3: If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than the Upper Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.

REQ-MHS-4: If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than or equal to the Lower Desired Temperature and less than or equal to the Upper Desired Temperature, the value of the Heat Control shall not be changed.

REQ-MHS-5: If the Regulator Mode is FAILED, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.

Available to the U.S. public through  
Information Service (NTIS),  
2161.

Report  
Registration



# Requirements to Contracts

GUMBO contracts are written together with the thread interface in the AADL OSATE IDE (using AADL Annex clause)

```
400
401 thread Manage_Heat_Source
402 features
403   -- ===== INPUTS =====
404   -- ("Current Temperature") - current temperature (from temp sensor)
405   current_tempWstatus: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::TempWstatus.impl;
406   -- ("Desired Range") - lowest and upper bound of desired temperature range
407   lower_desired_temp: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Temp.impl;
408   upper_desired_temp: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Temp.impl;
409   -- ("Regulator Mode") - subsystem mode
410   regulator_mode: in data port Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode;
411
412   -- ===== OUTPUTS =====
413   -- ("Heat Control") - command to turn heater on/off (actuation command)
414   heat_control: out data port Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off;
415
416 properties
417   Dispatch_Protocol => Periodic;
418   Period => Isolette_Properties::ThreadPeriod;
419
420   Stack_Size => Isolette_Properties::StackSize;
421
422 annex GUMBO {
423   -- indicate that the component maintains an internal state (variables) that influence its behavior
424   state
425     lastCmd: Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off;
426
427   -- ===== Initialize Entry Point Behavior Constraints =====
428   initialize
429     guarantee
430       initlastCmd: lastCmd == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Off;
431   guarantee REQ_MHS_1 "If the Regulator Mode is INIT, the Heat Control shall be
432     lset to Off";
433     heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Off;
434
435   -- ===== Compute Entry Point Behavior Constraints =====
436   compute
437     -- assumption on set points enforced within the Operator Interface
438     assume lower_is_lower_temp: lower_desired_temp.value <= upper_desired_temp.value;
```

DOT/FAA/AR-08/32 Requirements Engineering Management Handbook


REQ-MHS-1: If the Regulator Mode is INIT, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.  
Rationale: A regulator that is initializing cannot regulate the Current Temperature of the Isolette and the Heat Control should be turned off.

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REQ-MHS-3: If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than the Upper Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.

REQ-MHS-4: If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than or equal to the Lower Desired Temperature and less than or equal to the Upper Desired Temperature, the value of the Heat Control shall not be changed.

REQ-MHS-5: If the Regulator Mode is FAILED, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.



Developer formalizes requirements

Component contract



# Manage Heat Source Contracts

AADL GUMBO Contracts for **Manage Heat Source** Thread, with traceability to REMH requirements.

```
case REQ_MHS_1 "If the Regulator Mode is INIT, the Heat Control shall be
  lset to Off.":
  assume regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode.Init_Regulator_Mode;
  guarantee heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Off;

case REQ_MHS_2 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than
  lthe Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.":
  assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode.Normal_Regulator_Mode)
    & (current_tempWstatus.value < lower_desired_temp.value);
  guarantee heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Onn;

case REQ_MHS_3 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than
  lthe Upper Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.":
  assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode.Normal_Regulator_Mode)
    & (current_tempWstatus.value > upper_desired_temp.value);
  guarantee heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Off;

case REQ_MHS_4 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current
  lTemperature is greater than or equal to the Lower Desired Temperature
  land less than or equal to the Upper Desired Temperature, the value of
  lthe Heat Control shall not be changed.":
  assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode.Normal_Regulator_Mode)
    & (current_tempWstatus.value >= lower_desired_temp.value
    & current_tempWstatus.value <= upper_desired_temp.value);
  guarantee heat_control == In(lastCmd);

case REQ_MHS_5 "If the Regulator Mode is FAILED, the Heat Control shall be
  lset to Off.":
  assume regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode.Failed_Regulator_Mode;
  guarantee heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Off;
```

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Air Traffic Organization  
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Office of Research and  
Technology Development  
Washington, DC 20581

Requirements Engineering  
Management Handbook

REQ-MHS-1: If the Regulator Mode is INIT, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.  
Rationale: A regulator that is initializing cannot regulate the Current Temperature of the Isolette and the Heat Control should be turned off.

REQ-MHS-2: If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.

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REQ-MHS-4: If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than or equal to the Lower Desired Temperature and less than or equal to the Upper Desired Temperature, the value of the Heat Control shall not be changed.

REQ-MHS-5: If the Regulator Mode is FAILED, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.

U.S. Department of Transportation  
Federal Aviation Administration



*Developer  
formalizes  
requirements*



**OSAE AADL Editor**

# Manage Heat Source Contracts

AADL GUMBO Contracts for **Manage Heat Source** Thread, with traceability to REMH requirements.

Mode condition

Compare current temperature to desired range

...

```
case REQ_MHS_2 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than  
the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.":  
  assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode.Normal_Regulator_Mode)  
    & (current_tempWstatus.value < lower_desired_temp.value);  
  guarantee heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Onn;
```

...

Set the desired state of the heater



# HAMR SysMLv2 Front-end

**NEW:** We developed a VSCode SysMLv2 HAMR front-end based on the SysIDE VSCode plug-in (prototype)

*SysMLv2  
component  
interfaces*


*Integration of  
MicroKit-based  
Rust and C  
development for  
seL4*

*AADL Library Properties*

*Support for data type  
specifications in the  
standardized AADL Data  
Modeling Language*

*Formal behavior  
specifications in  
GUMBO contract  
language*

*Verification results for  
model-level contracts*






# AADL / HAMR Formal Semantics

140+ page literate-style Isabelle/HOL theories for AADL/SysMLv2 HAMR execution model (guides our design of our contracts and verification/testing framework)

*Joint work with  
Stefan Hallerstede  
(U. Aarhus)*

Isabelle



```
\begin{itemize}
\item @{\term tvar} - the state of the thread's local variables
\item @{\term iin} - infrastructure input port state (representing the infrastructure's view
\item @{\term ain} - application input port state (representing the thread application logic
\item @{\term aout} - application output port state (representing the thread application log
\item @{\term iout} - infrastructure output port state (representing the infrastructure's vi
\item @{\term disp} - the current dispatch status of the thread
\end{itemize}

record 'a ThreadState =
  tvar :: "'a VarState"
  infi :: "'a PortState"
  appi :: "'a PortState"
  appo :: "'a PortState"
  info :: "'a PortState"
  disp :: DispatchStatus

text <The following function helps abbreviate the construction of a thread state.>

fun tstate where "tstate tv ii ai ao io ds =
  { tvar= tv, infi= ii, appi= ai, appo= ao, info= io, disp= ds }"

subsection <Well-formedness Definitions>

text <In general, thread state well-formedness definitions
specify that the things (vars, ports) that we are manipulating
in the state for a thread {\em t} are aligned with things that we declared in the model
(e.g., the thread state does not include a queue for a port that was not declared
for the thread in the model, and conversely, every port that was declared for this
thread in the model has a queue associated with it).
First, well-formedness conditions for each of the thread state elements are specified.
Then, the well-formedness condition for the entire thread state is defined as a conjunc
```

PROVERS

- Enhanced and scope expanded
- Prove soundness of contract framework
- Extend formalization downwards towards sel4 proof-base

```
record 'a ThreadState =
  tvar :: 'a VarState
  infi :: 'a PortState
  appi :: 'a PortState
  appo :: 'a PortState
  info :: 'a PortState
  disp :: DispatchStatus
```

Latex/PDF generated from Isabelle

The following function helps abbreviate the construction of a thread state.

```
fun tstate where "tstate tv ii ai ao io ds =
  { tvar= tv, infi= ii, appi= ai, appo= ao, info= io, disp= ds }"
```

## 2.4.2 Well-formedness Definitions

In general, thread state well-formedness definitions specify that the things (vars, ports) that we are manipulating in the state for a thread  $t$  are aligned with things that we declared in the model for  $t$ . (e.g., the thread state does not include a queue for a port that was not declared for the thread in the model, and conversely, every port that was declared for this thread in the model has a queue associated with it). First, well-formedness conditions for each of the thread state elements are specified. Then, the well-formedness condition for the entire thread state is defined as a conjunction of these properties.

### Well-formed Thread State Elements

```
definition wf-ThreadState-tvar:: Model  $\Rightarrow$  CompId  $\Rightarrow$  ('a VarState)  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
wf-ThreadState-tvar m c vs  $\equiv$  wf-VarState vs {v . isVarOfCID m c v}
```

The infi component of a ThreadState (input infrastructure port map) is well formed when the domain of the infi port map is equal to the set of input ports for the thread declared in the model. Intuitively, each of the declared "in" ports for the thread (according to the model) is associated with a infrastructure message queue, (and there are no "extra" ports in the map).

```
definition wf-ThreadState-infi:: Model  $\Rightarrow$  CompId  $\Rightarrow$  ('a PortState)  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
wf-ThreadState-infi m c ps  $\equiv$  wf-PortState ps {p . isInCIDPID m c p}
```

The definitions below for other port-state elements are similar.


```
definition wf-ThreadState-appi:: Model  $\Rightarrow$  CompId  $\Rightarrow$  ('a PortState)  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
wf-ThreadState-appi m c ps  $\equiv$  wf-PortState ps {p . isInCIDPID m c p}
```

```
definition wf-ThreadState-appo:: Model  $\Rightarrow$  CompId  $\Rightarrow$  ('a PortState)  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
wf-ThreadState-appo m c ps  $\equiv$  wf-PortState ps {p . isOutCIDPID m c p}
```

```
definition wf-ThreadState-info:: Model  $\Rightarrow$  CompId  $\Rightarrow$  ('a PortState)  $\Rightarrow$  bool where
wf-ThreadState-info m c ps  $\equiv$  wf-PortState ps {p . isOutCIDPID m c p}
```


Note limited scope: HAMR subset of AADL/SysMLv2; run-time semantics; connection to code generator by manual inspection

# HAMR Code Generation



Platform configuration  
information


# HAMR Code Generation




Platform configuration  
information



# Component Application Code Interfaces Generated from SysMLv2/AADL Model



.....Interfaces/APIs/Skeletons + **contracts** for application code are auto-generated from SysMLv2/AADL model.



*auto-generated*



Application Code  
in Rust

# Component Application Code Interfaces Generated from SysMLv2/AADL Model

**Periodic Thread w/ data ports**

**AADL Model Implied Semantics**

*auto-generated*

**Application Code in Rust**

**Component contract (small excerpt)**

```
pub fn timeTriggered() {
    (old(api).regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Failed_Regulator_Mode)
    (api.heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off::Off)
    // END MARKER TIME TRIGGERED ENSURES
}
```

**Skeleton for application code entry point**

**Verus error indicates that contract is not yet satisfied**

**postcondition not satisfied**

*.....Interfaces/APIs/Skeletons + **contracts** for application code are auto-generated from SysMLv2/AADL model.*

# Component Application Code Interfaces Generated from SysMLv2/AADL Model

**Periodic Thread w/ data ports**

**AADL Model Implied Semantics**

*auto-generated*

**Application Code in Rust**

*...Developer adds application code to contract-annotated skeleton, and verification/testing tools check conformance to contracts.*

**Adding application code to skeleton**

```
22 impl thermostat_rt_mhs_mhs {
56   pub fn timeTriggered<API: thermostat_rt_mhs_mhs_Full_Api>(
103     (old(api).regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Failed_Regulator_Mode)
104     (api.heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off::Off)
105     // END MARKER TIME TRIGGERED ENSURES
106   ) {
107     // ----- Get values of input ports -----
108     let lower: Temp_i = api.get_lower_desired_temp();
109     let upper: Temp_i = api.get_upper_desired_temp();
110     let regulator_mode: Regulator_Mode = api.get_regulator_mode();
111     let currentTemp: TempWstatus_i = api.get_current_tempWstatus();
112
113     //===== compute / control logic =====
114
115     // current command defaults to value of last command (REQ-MHS-4)
116     let mut currentCmd: On_Off = self.lastCmd;
117
118     match regulator_mode { ...
146
147     // ----- Set values of output ports -----
148     api.put_heat_control(currentCmd);
149     self.lastCmd = currentCmd
150   }
151 }
```

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# Component Application Code Interfaces Generated from SysMLv2/AADL Model

**Periodic Thread w/ data ports**

**Get**

**Put**

**AADL Model Implied Semantics**

**auto-generated**

**Application Code in Rust**

**Verus indicates that contract is satisfied**

...Developer uses auto-generate APIs to **get** and **put** data on component ports

Reading a value from the **regulator\_mode** input data port using auto-generated API

Putting a value from the **heat\_control** output data port using auto-generated API

No problems have been detected in the workspace.

```
impl thermostat_rt_mhs_mhs {
  pub fn timeTriggered<API: thermostat_rt_mhs_mhs_Full_Api>() {
    (old(api).regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Failed_Regulator_Mode)
    (api.heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off::Off)
    // END MARKER TIME TRIGGERED ENSURES

    // ----- Get values of input ports -----
    let lower: Temp_i = api.get_lower_desired_temp();
    let upper: Temp_i = api.get_upper_desired_temp();
    let regulator_mode: Regulator_Mode = api.get_regulator_mode();
    let currentTemp: TempWstatus_i = api.get_current_tempWstatus();

    //===== compute / control logic =====

    // current command defaults to value of last command (REQ-MHS-4)
    let mut currentCmd: On_Off = self.lastCmd;

    match regulator_mode {
      // ----- Set values of output ports -----
      _ => {
        api.put_heat_control(currentCmd);
        self.lastCmd = currentCmd;
      }
    }
  }
}
```

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# Automatically Embedded Rust/Verus Logical Contracts

Verification of Rust application code against contracts using Verus (excerpts)

```
57 pub fn timeTriggered<API: thermostat_rt_mhs_mhs_Full_Api>(  
58     &mut self,  
59     api: &mut thermostat_rt_mhs_mhs_Application_Api<API>)  
60     requires  
61         // BEGIN MARKER TIME TRIGGERED REQUIRES  
62         // assume lower_is_lower_temp  
63         old(api).lower_desired_temp.degrees <= old(api).upper_desired_temp.degrees  
64         // END MARKER TIME TRIGGERED REQUIRES  
65     ensures  
66         // BEGIN MARKER TIME TRIGGERED ENSURES  
67         // guarantee lastCmd
```

Pre

Post

```
// case REQ_MHS_2  
//   If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than  
//   the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.  
(old(api).regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode) &&  
| (old(api).current_tempWstatus.degrees < old(api).lower_desired_temp.degrees) ==>  
(api.heat_control == On_Off::Onn),
```

```
76 //   If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than  
77 //   the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.  
78 ((old(api).regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode) &&  
79 | (old(api).current_tempWstatus.degrees < old(api).lower_desired_temp.degrees) ==>  
80 | (api.heat_control == On_Off::Onn),
```

... (clauses for Reqs 3-5 omitted)

# Manage Heat Source Contracts

Each clause in **model-level** GUMBO contracts is translated to a **code-level** Boolean function in Rust that works on the appropriate port/thread state elements

## AADL GUMBO Contract (clause REQ\_MHS\_2)

**Model**

```
case REQ_MHS_2 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than  
the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On."  
  assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode.Normal_Regulator_Mode)  
    & (current_tempWstatus.value < lower_desired_temp.value);  
  guarantee heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off.Onn;
```

auto-generated

auto-generated

Application  
Code

**Code**

**Library of  
Executable  
Contracts**

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## Rust Executable Contract (clause REQ\_MHS\_2)

```
/** guarantee REQ_MHS_2  
 * If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than  
 * the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.  
 * @param api_current_tempWstatus incoming data port  
 * @param api_lower_desired_temp incoming data port  
 * @param api_regulator_mode incoming data port  
 * @param api_heat_control outgoing data port  
 */  
pub fn compute_case_REQ_MHS_2(  
  api_current_tempWstatus: TempWstatus_i,  
  api_lower_desired_temp: Temp_i,  
  api_regulator_mode: Regulator_Mode,  
  api_heat_control: On_Off) -> bool  
{  
  implies(  
    lhs: lhs: (api_regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode) &  
      (api_current_tempWstatus.degrees < api_lower_desired_temp.degrees),  
    rhs: rhs: api_heat_control == On_Off::Onn)  
}
```

*Traceability info automatically embedded*

# Manage Heat Source Contracts

Complete **Model-level** GUMBO contracts are translated to a hierarchy of executable Boolean functions in Rust (**code-level**)

**Model:** AADL GUMBO Contract  
(all five clauses)

lower\_desired\_temp  
regulator\_mode  
current\_tempWstatus

```
use REQ_MHS_1 "If the Regulator Mode is INIT, the Heat Control shall be  
set to OFF."  
assume regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Init_Regulator_Mode;  
assert heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off::Off;  
  
use REQ_MHS_2 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than  
the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On."  
assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode)  
& (current_tempWstatus.value < lower_desired_temp.value);  
assert heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off::On;  
  
use REQ_MHS_3 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than  
the Upper Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to Off."  
assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode)  
& (current_tempWstatus.value > upper_desired_temp.value);  
assert heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off::Off;  
  
use REQ_MHS_4 "If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current  
Temperature is greater than or equal to the Lower Desired Temperature  
and less than or equal to the Upper Desired Temperature, the value of  
the Heat Control shall not be changed."  
assume (regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode)  
& (current_tempWstatus.value >= lower_desired_temp.value  
& current_tempWstatus.value <= upper_desired_temp.value);  
assert heat_control == In_LastCmd;  
  
use REQ_MHS_5 "If the Regulator Mode is FAILED, the Heat Control shall be  
set to OFF."  
assume regulator_mode == Isolette_Data_Model::Regulator_Mode::Failed_Regulator_Mode;  
assert heat_control == Isolette_Data_Model::On_Off::Off;
```

Code generation **weaves** together  
functions for contract clauses **to  
form a pre-condition checker  
and a post-condition checker**  
(also includes data invariants, etc.).

(see paper for details)

**Code:** Auto-generated in  
Testing Library

```
In_LastCmd: On_Off,  
api_current_tempWstatus: TempWstatus_i,  
api_lower_desired_temp: Temp_i,  
api_regulator_mode: Regulator_Mode,  
api_upper_desired_temp: Temp_i,  
api_heat_control: On_Off) -> bool  
{  
    let r0: bool = compute_case_REQ_MHS_1(api_regulator_mode, api_heat_control);  
    let r1: bool = compute_case_REQ_MHS_2(api_current_tempWstatus, api_lower_des:  
    let r2: bool = compute_case_REQ_MHS_3(api_current_tempWstatus, api_regulator_  
    let r3: bool = compute_case_REQ_MHS_4(In_LastCmd, api_current_tempWstatus, ap  
    let r4: bool = compute_case_REQ_MHS_5(api_regulator_mode, api_heat_control);  
  
    return r0 && r1 && r2 && r3 && r4;  
}
```

Rust Executable Contract  
(aggregated clauses for  
post-condition)

auto-generated

ito-generated

Application  
Code


**Code**

**Library of  
Executable  
Contracts**



# Demo

Verification against contracts using Verus verification tool...




The screenshot shows the VSCode editor with a Rust project named 'THERMOSTAT\_RT\_MHS\_MHS'. The file 'thermostat\_rt\_mhs\_mhs\_app.rs' is open, displaying Rust code for a thermostat component. The code includes a 'timeTriggered' function that handles different regulator modes and temperature conditions. A red wavy line underlines a specific line of code, indicating a contract violation. A red text box overlay on the right side of the editor reads: 'Verus automatically detects a violation of the contract clause for the MHS-2 requirement'. The bottom status bar shows 'Ln 113, Col 21' and 'Spaces: 4 UTF-8 LF Rust Prettier'.

```
src > component > thermostat_rt_mhs_mhs_app.rs > {} impl Manage_Heat_Source_i_thermostat_rt > timeTriggered
19 impl Manage_Heat_Source_i_thermostat_rt {
36 pub fn timeTriggered<API: Manage_Heat_Source_i_Full_Api>(self, api: &mut Manage_Heat_Source_i_Application_Api<API>) {
45 // case REQ_MHS_1
46 // If the Regulator Mode is INIT, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.
47 // set to Off.
48 // http://pub.santoslab.org/high-assurance/module-requirements/reading/FAA-DoT-Requirements-AR-08-32.pdf#page=11
49 ((api.regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Init_Regulator_Mode) ==> (api.heat_control == On_Off::Off)),
50 // case REQ_MHS_2
51 // If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is less than
52 // the Lower Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to On.
53 // http://pub.santoslab.org/high-assurance/module-requirements/reading/FAA-DoT-Requirements-AR-08-32.pdf#page=11
54 ((api.regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode &&
55 api.current_tempWstatus.degrees < api.lower_desired_temp.degrees) ==> (api.heat_control == On_Off::Onn)),
56 // case REQ_MHS_3
57 // If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current Temperature is greater than
58 // the Upper Desired Temperature, the Heat Control shall be set to Off.
59 // http://pub.santoslab.org/high-assurance/module-requirements/reading/FAA-DoT-Requirements-AR-08-32.pdf#page=11
60 ((api.regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode &&
61 api.current_tempWstatus.degrees > api.upper_desired_temp.degrees) ==> (api.heat_control == On_Off::Off)),
62 // case REQ_MHS_4
63 // If the Regulator Mode is NORMAL and the Current
64 // Temperature is greater than or equal to the Lower Desired Temperature
65 // and less than or equal to the Upper Desired Temperature, the value of
66 // the Heat Control shall not be changed.
67 // http://pub.santoslab.org/high-assurance/module-requirements/reading/FAA-DoT-Requirements-AR-08-32.pdf#page=11
68 ((api.regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Normal_Regulator_Mode &&
69 (api.current_tempWstatus.degrees >= api.lower_desired_temp.degrees &&
70 api.current_tempWstatus.degrees <= api.upper_desired_temp.degrees)) ==> (api.heat_control == old(self).lastC
71 // case REQ_MHS_5
72 // If the Regulator Mode is FAILED, the Heat Control shall be
73 // set to Off.
74 // http://pub.santoslab.org/high-assurance/module-requirements/reading/FAA-DoT-Requirements-AR-08-32.pdf#page=11
75 ((api.regulator_mode == Regulator_Mode::Failed_Regulator_Mode) ==> (api.heat_control == On_Off::Off))
76 // END COMPUTE ENSURES timeTriggered
77 {
78
79 // ----- Get values of input ports -----
80
```

# Auto-Generated Property-based Testing Harness


For every thread component, HAMR auto-generates property-based testing infrastructure for inserting values into component input ports and for checking values of output ports.





# Scaling Up - Property-based Testing Server-Based Deployment

For Slang property-based testing, HAMR generates a server-based deployment to run the framework in a distributed/parallel fashion...




- Random generators and contract-based tests are farmed out to a configurable family of servers
- Test vectors and results are serialized for flexible deployment, reporting, and replay of the tests
- Currently hosted using our Jenkins setup, but easy for HAMR to automatically generate deployment scripts, e.g., for AWS, in the future

# Extensive Assurance Artifacts


HAMR provides extensive auto-generation and reporting of assurance artifacts

**PROVERS:**  
Integrate with  
Collins *assurance*  
*dashboard*




# HAMR Code Generation seL4 Platform

HAMR instantiation for **Rust** - based development on **SeL4 microkernel** using seL4 microKit



# Microkit Kernel Configuration (excepts)

HAMR auto-generated platform artifacts for seL4 include microKit *system description file (XML)* that specifies the configuration of kernel partitions, allowed communication pathways, resource allocation, etc.



# Conclusion

- Protect critical systems from malicious attacks using **verified micro-kernels**
- **Automate** and **control** the development process using a model-based development approach
- Provide a **multi-level contract framework** that supports seamless transition between automated testing and verification
- **Models as sound/faithful abstractions** of deployed systems support understanding, simplify development, provide basis for many forms of analysis
- **Semantic foundation** (e.g., Isabelle formalization) and **abstraction layers** in run-time architecture enables new backends to be added while achieving consistent semantics
- **Integrated assurance case generation** framework



# Resources



## Sireum HAMR

High Assurance Model-based Rapid Engineering of  
Embedded Systems

Publicly available tool:

<http://hamr.sireum.org>

### Resources on HAMR web site

- Distribution available for Windows, Linux, and Mac (also virtualized) [hamr.sireum.org](http://hamr.sireum.org)
- Documentation, examples, and tutorial material for HAMR
- Educational resources -- slides, recorded lectures, and guided exercises for HAMR Slang back end

SAnToS Artifacts -- Formal Methods in Action

Isolette



-- AN INFANT INCUBATOR

- Online resources for Isolette artifacts