CHAI: Command Hijacking of Embodied AI

Luis Burbano[*], Diego Ortiz[*], Qi Sun[†], Siwei Yang[*], Haoqin Tu[*], Cihang Xie[*], Yinzhi Cao[†], Alvaro A Cardenas[*]

*University of California, Santa Cruz
† Johns Hopkins University

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What is Embodied AI?

- Integration of artificial intelligence into physical systems.
- Applications include.

Autonomous vehicles

Humanoid robots

Drones

- Complex scene understanding
- Handles out-of-distribution scenarios
- Common sense reasoning

Several advances with large language models and **large vision language models (LVLMs)**

Embodied AI agents



Complex scene understanding

Handles out-of-distribution scenarios

Common sense reasoning

How to integrate LVLMs/AI agents into physical systems?

These new capabilities also generates **new vulnerabilities**

Attacks against Embodied AI



Perception attack

New Attack

- **Exploit** the **text understanding** capabilities of the LVLMs to inject commands.

Threat Model





Objective

- **Change** the agent **decision/plan**.

Assumptions: The **attacker**

- Can **place** a **sign** by, e.g., using a screen.
- Knows the agent **prompt** or **task**.
- Can **query** the agent (does not know weights).

Attacks against Embodied AI

Objective

- Change

eights).

How to design a successful attack?

Consider an autonomous vehicle with an embodied AI that has the following view:



Without attack:

Crossing Pedestrians: Stop

How can we make the VLM to output a **proceed** command**?**

How to design a successful attack?

No success ✗
Semantics ✗
Perceptual ✗

No success ✗
Semantics ✓
Perceptual ✗

The agent decides to **stop** due to the **presence** of **pedestrians**.

Success ✓
Semantics ✓
Perceptual ✓

The agent decides to **proceed regardless** of the **pedestrians.**

What does the sign say?

Go onward?
Proceed?

Semantics

How does the attack look like?

Color
Position

Perceptual

How can we make the attack work for several scenarios?

Transferability

CHAI – Attack Design

What does the sign say?

Vocabulary space $\overline{\mathcal{D}}$

How does the attack look like?

Perceptual features Θ

How can we make the attack work for several scenarios?

Pose the attack as an optimization that makes the agent **output** the attacker **target** y_i^t

Find the **attack** that works for n images.

Challenges:

Absence of gradient

We cannot use optimization based on gradient.

Big search space

The **vocabulary** and **perceptual** spaces are large:

words in **English**: ~170.000

CHAI Pipeline:

1) Reduce the dictionary size

Create the set of possible attacks:

- $\mathcal{D} \subset \overline{\mathcal{D}}$

Use an LLM to select the possible words.

2) Joint optimization

Select the optimal attack characteristics:

$$\pi^* \in \mathcal{D} \times \Theta$$

Use global optimizers to select the best characteristics.

Evaluation Setup

- Three applications
- Target VLMs
  - GPT-4o
  - InternVL2.5 8B
- Datasets
  - *Known* Images
  - *Transferability* Images
- Metrics
  - Attack success rate (ASR)







Agent that controls the drone during an emergency landing

End-to-end autonomous driving agent

Open Vocabulary object detection and tracker for drones

Blei, Yannik, et al. "Cloudtrack: Scalable UAV tracking with cloud semantics." In IEEE ICRA 2025.
Sima, Chonghao, et al. "DriveLM: Driving with graph visual question answering." In ECCV 2024.

CHAI Works in Unseen Images

Create the attack with the ***Known*** Images

Deploy attack to the ***Transferability*** Images

	GPT-4o		InternVL2.5 8B	
Application	**No Attack***	**CHAI**	**No Attack***	**CHAI**
Landing	0.00	**71.38 ± 6.34**	21.88 ± 8.46	**52.22 ± 11.01**
CloudTrack	0.00	**91.00 ± 7.18**	15.00 ± 10.51	**66.50 ± 9.88**
DriveLM	2.08 ± 5.20	**81.92 ± 4.98**	33.08 ± 15.90	**51.25 ± 15.12**

*No Attack: we account for scenarios where the agent makes mistakes without attack.

CHAI is a Viable Real Attack

On vehicle attack

Off-vehicle attack

	GPT-4o		InternVL2.5 8B	
Scenario	**No Attack**	**CHAI**	**No Attack**	**CHAI**
Attacker-vehicle	4.28 ± 6.72	**87.76 ± 11.61**	17.40 ± 12.55	**54.29 ± 17.71**
Off-vehicle		**92.50 ± 3.66**		**42.14 ± 17.64**

Multilingual Attacks can Produce Safety Violations

CHAI Requires New Defenses

- Filter-based defense
  - Place a filter at the input, output, or both.
  - Example: filtering out image text.
- Safety alignment
  - Train the LVLM to ignore textual commands
- Provable defenses
  - Use provable defenses from classical adversarial patches.

Challenges:

- Agents need to read texts.
  - Stop signs.
- How to determine which signs are legitimate?
- Not all signs are static.

Conclusions

We presented CHAI, a **physically viable attack** that inject commands to embodied AI agents using textual signs, which achieved an ASR as high as 92%.

We empirically demonstrated that agents and LVLMs **prioritize textual** cues **over safety** considerations.

CHAI requires new defenses that do **not just filter** out **textual commands** because agents need to read signs. These conclusions **extend** to **other modalities**.

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Open-source code available at:

https://github.com/Cyphysecurity/chai.git