

GALOISCONNECTIONS

purely functional



Cryptol: A Domain Specific Language
for Cryptography

`www.cryptol.net`



Cryptol Goals

- Specification correspondence
 - "Cryptol programs should be able to look like their specifications"*
- Freedom from data entry
 - "There shall be no barrier to the programmer specifying a lookup table via a calculation"*
- Abstraction Conduction
 - "Cryptol should provide a path towards higher-level specifications of Cryptographic algorithms"*



Crypto-algorithm domain analysis

- Spoke with crypto-algorithm designers
 - What are the important elements of algorithm specification?
- Studied five AES finalists and DES
 - What do these algorithms have in common?
 - What differences occur between them?
- Embody the domain analysis within a language
 - Obtain feedback from crypto specialists



Relevant Concepts and Abstractions

- Block ciphers
- Vectors and matrices
- Permutations
- Lookup tables
- Various Finite Element arithmetics
- Multiple views of data
- Iteration and recurrence



Block Ciphers

- Interface

`encrypt` : (Xkey, PT) -> CT

`decrypt` : (Xkey, CT) -> PT

`keySchedule` : Key -> Xkey

- Chained together to operate on streams

- Simple standard stream modes:

- Electronic Code Book (ECB)

- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)



Bit Vectors

- Sizes ranging from 4 bits to 128 bits (8 and 32 most common)
- All the usual boolean ops
 - Exclusive-or prevalent
- Simple modulo arithmetic (+, -, *, /)
- Permutations
 - Mostly just rotations of bit vectors
 - More general permutation used in DES



Bit Vector Operations in RC6

$a + b$	integer addition modulo 2^w
$a - b$	integer subtraction modulo 2^w
$a \oplus b$	bitwise exclusive-or of w -bit words
$a \times b$	integer multiplication modulo 2^w
$a \lll b$	rotate the w -bit word a to the left by the amount given by the least significant $\lg w$ bits of b
$a \rrr b$	rotate the w -bit word a to the right by the amount given by the least significant $\lg w$ bits of b



Lookup Tables

```
WORD Sbox[ ] = {
    0x09d0c479, 0x28c8ffe0, 0x84aa6c39, 0x9dad7287, 0x7dff9be3, 0xd4268361,
    0xc96da1d4, 0x7974cc93, 0x85d0582e, 0x2a4b5705, 0x1ca16a62, 0xc3bd279d,
    0x0f1f25e5, 0x5160372f, 0xc695c1fb, 0x4d7ff1e4, 0xae5f6bf4, 0x0d72ee46,
    0xff23de8a, 0xb1cf8e83, 0xf14902e2, 0x3e981e42, 0x8bf53eb6, 0x7f4bf8ac,
    0x83631f83, 0x25970205, 0x76afe784, 0x3a7931d4, 0x4f846450, 0x5c64c3f6,
    0x210a5f18, 0xc6986a26, 0x28f4e826, 0x3a60a81c, 0xd340a664, 0x7ea820c4,
    0x526687c5, 0x7eddd12b, 0x32a11d1d, 0x9c9ef086, 0x80f6e831, 0xab6f04ad,
    0x56fb9b53, 0x8b2e095c, 0xb68556ae, 0xd2250b0d, 0x294a7721, 0xe21fb253,
    0xae136749, 0xe82aae86, 0x93365104, 0x99404a66, 0x78a784dc, 0xb69ba84b,
    0x04046793, 0x23db5cle, 0x46caeld6, 0x2fe28134, 0x5a223942, 0x1863cd5b,
    0xc190c6e3, 0x07dfb846, 0x6eb88816, 0x2d0dcc4a, 0xa4ccae59, 0x3798670d,
    0xcbfa9493, 0x4f481d45, 0xeafc8ca8, 0xdb1129d6, 0xb0449e20, 0x0f5407fb,
    0x6167d9a8, 0xd1f45763, 0x4daa96c3, 0x3bec5958, 0xababa014, 0xb6ccd201,
    0x38d6279f, 0x02682215, 0x8f376cd5, 0x092c237e, 0xbfc56593, 0x32889d2c,
    0x854b3e95, 0x05bb9b43, 0x7dcd5dcd, 0xa02e926c, 0xfae527e5, 0x36a1c330,
    0x3412e1ae, 0xf257f462, 0x3c4f1d71, 0x30a2e809, 0x68e5f551, 0x9c61ba44,
    0x5ded0ab8, 0x75ce09c8, 0x9654f93e, 0x698c0cca, 0x243cb3e4, 0x2b062b97,
    0x0f3b8d9e, 0x00e050df, 0xfc5d6166, 0xe35f9288, 0xc079550d, 0x0591aee8,
    0x8e531e74, 0x75fe3578, 0x2f6d829a, 0xf60b21ae, 0x95e8eb8d, 0x6699486b,
    0x901d7d9b, 0xfd6d6e31, 0x1090acef, 0xe0670dd8, 0xdab2e692, 0xcd6d4365,
    0xe5393514, 0x3af345f0, 0x6241fc4d, 0x460da3a3, 0x7bcf3729, 0x8bffd1e0,
    0x14aac070, 0x1587ed55, 0x3afd7d3e, 0xd2f29e01, 0x29a9d1f6, 0xefb10c53,
```




Lookup Tables

- AKA S-boxes
 - n-bit by m-bit lookup tables
- Both fixed and data-dependent (TwoFish)
- Fixed S-boxes are often calculated

- Intent is to capture notion of pre-computed values



Generating SBoxes

In the design of the S-box S , we generated the entries of S in a “pseudorandom fashion” and tested that the resulting S-box has good differential and linear properties. The “pseudorandom” S-boxes were generated by setting for $i = 0 \dots 102$, $j = 0 \dots 4$, $S[5i + j] = \text{SHA-1}(5i \mid c1 \mid c2 \mid c3)_j$ (where $\text{SHA-1}(\cdot)_j$ is the j 'th word in the output of SHA-1). Here we view i as a 32-bit unsigned integer, and $c1, c2, c3$ are some fixed constants. In our implementation we set $c1 = 0xb7e15162$, $c2 = 0x243f6a88$ (which are the binary expansions of the fractional parts in e, π , respectively) and we varied $c3$ until we found an S-box with good properties. We view SHA-1 as an operation on byte-streams, and use little-endian convention to translate between words and bytes.



Matrices

$a_{0,0}$	$a_{0,1}$	$a_{0,2}$	$a_{0,3}$	$a_{0,4}$	$a_{0,5}$
$a_{1,0}$	$a_{1,1}$	$a_{1,2}$	$a_{1,3}$	$a_{1,4}$	$a_{1,5}$
$a_{2,0}$	$a_{2,1}$	$a_{2,2}$	$a_{2,3}$	$a_{2,4}$	$a_{2,5}$
$a_{3,0}$	$a_{3,1}$	$a_{3,2}$	$a_{3,3}$	$a_{3,4}$	$a_{3,5}$

$k_{0,0}$	$k_{0,1}$	$k_{0,2}$	$k_{0,3}$
$k_{1,0}$	$k_{1,1}$	$k_{1,2}$	$k_{1,3}$
$k_{2,0}$	$k_{2,1}$	$k_{2,2}$	$k_{2,3}$
$k_{3,0}$	$k_{3,1}$	$k_{3,2}$	$k_{3,3}$

Figure 1: Example of State (with $N_b = 6$) and Cipher Key (with $N_k = 4$) layout.

Multiple views




Figure 3: ShiftRow operates on the rows of the State.

Multiple views




Figure 4: MixColumn operates on the columns of the State.



Matrix Arithmetic

- Matrix/vector multiplication arises on paper

$$\begin{aligned}x_i &= \lfloor X/2^{8i} \rfloor \bmod 2^8 & i = 0, \dots, 3 \\y_i &= s_i[x_i] & i = 0, \dots, 3 \\ \begin{pmatrix} z_0 \\ z_1 \\ z_2 \\ z_3 \end{pmatrix} &= \begin{pmatrix} \cdot & \dots & \cdot \\ \vdots & \text{MDS} & \vdots \\ \cdot & \dots & \cdot \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} y_0 \\ y_1 \\ y_2 \\ y_3 \end{pmatrix} \\ Z &= \sum_{i=0}^3 z_i \cdot 2^{8i}\end{aligned}$$

- But rarely makes it into the reference code at that level of abstraction



Other Arithmetic

- Polynomials
 - often with bit coefficients
 - different interp of a bit vector

A byte b , consisting of bits $b_7 b_6 b_5 b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0$, is considered as a polynomial with coefficient in $\{0,1\}$:

$$b_7 x^7 + b_6 x^6 + b_5 x^5 + b_4 x^4 + b_3 x^3 + b_2 x^2 + b_1 x + b_0$$

- Galois Fields (TwoFish, Rijndael)




Bounded Iteration

- Crypto tends to avoid interesting control
- For loops
 - Over fixed counts

```
for  $i = 1$  to  $r$  do
{
   $t = (B \times (2B + 1)) \lll \lg w$ 
   $u = (D \times (2D + 1)) \lll \lg w$ 
   $A = ((A \oplus t) \lll u) + S[2i]$ 
   $C = ((C \oplus u) \lll t) + S[2i + 1]$ 
   $(A, B, C, D) = (B, C, D, A)$ 
}
```


Feistel Network (TwoFish)





Recurrence

- Found in key expansion

$$v = 3 \times \max\{c, 2r + 4\}$$

for $s = 1$ **to** v **do**

{

$$A = S[i] = (S[i] + A + B) \lll 3$$

$$B = L[j] = (L[j] + A + B) \lll (A + B)$$

$$i = (i + 1) \bmod (2r + 4)$$

$$j = (j + 1) \bmod c$$

}



Parameters

- Most algorithms operate on a range of sizes
 - Key
 - Block
- Sizes may be constrained
- Number of iterations may depend on size

Like RC5, RC6 is a fully parameterized family of encryption algorithms. A version of RC6 is more accurately specified as RC6- $w/r/b$ where the word size is w bits, encryption consists of a nonnegative number of rounds r , and b denotes the length of the encryption key in bytes. Since the AES submission is targeted at $w = 32$ and $r = 20$, we shall use RC6 as shorthand to refer to such versions. When any other value of w or r is intended in the text, the parameter values will be specified as RC6- w/r . Of particular relevance to the AES effort will be the versions of RC6 with 16-, 24-, and 32-byte keys.

From Domain Analysis to a Language





Cryptol

Domain-specific
language for
cryptoalgorithms

Data in Cryptol

- The smallest elements: Bits
- Everything else is a homogeneous matrix

7 single bits

```
[False True False True False False True]
```

0x4A

7 (or more) bits

4 elements, each
8 (or more) bits

```
[0x3F 0x02 0x41 0xD8]
```

2 elements, each
having 4 elements,
each 4 (or more) bits

```
[[1 2 3 4] [5 6 7 8]]
```

```
[1 .. 10]
```

10 elements, each
of 4 (or more) bits



Numbers

- Numbers are matrices of bits
- Decimal, octal (0o), hex (0x), binary (0b)
- Compile-time switch chooses between

Little endian:

`0xC5 ==`

`[True False True False False False True True]`

Big endian:

`0xC5 ==`

`[True True False False False True False True]`



Standard Operations

- Arithmetic operators
 - Result is modulo the word size of the arguments
 - $+ - * / \% **$
- Boolean operators
 - From bits, to arbitrarily nested matrices of the same shape
 - $\& | ^ \sim$
- Comparison operators
 - Equality, order
 - $== != < <= > >=$
 - returns a Bit
- Conditional operator
 - Expression-level *if-then-else*
 - Like C's $a?b:c$



Matrices

- Matrix operators
 - Concatenation, indexing, size
 - # @ @@ width

`[1..5] # [3 6 8] = [1 2 3 4 5 3 6 8]`

- Zero-based indexing from the left

`[50 .. 99] @ 10 = 60`



Shifts and Rotations

- Shifts << >>
- Rotations <<< >>>
- Operate over top-level of a matrix

[0 1 2 3] << 2
[2 3 0 0]

- For words, corresponds to usual notion

0xF381 >>> 4
0x1F38



Splitting and Joining matrices

0x99FAC6F975BABB3E



split

[0x99 0xFA 0xC6 0xF9 0x75 0xBA 0xBB 0x3E]



join


0x99FAC6F975BABB3E



splitBy

- how shall we: `split [0 1 2 3 4 5]`?

`xs = [0 1 2 3 4 5]`






groupBy

- how shall we: `split [0 1 2 3 4 5]`?

`xs = [0 1 2 3 4 5]`





Matrix Comprehensions

- Borrowed the comprehension notion from set theory
 - $\{ \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b} \mid \mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{B} \}$
 - Adapted to matrices (i.e. sequences)
- Applying an operation to each element

```
[ | 2*x + 3 | | x <- [1 2 3 4] | ]  
= [5 7 9 11]
```



Traversals

- Cartesian traversal

```
[| [x y] || x <- [0..2], y <- [3..4] |]  
= [[0 3] [0 4] [1 3] [1 4] [2 3] [2 4]]
```

- Parallel traversal

```
[| x + y || x <- [1..3]  
          || y <- [3..7] |]  
= [4 6 8]
```

Row traversals




Figure 3: ShiftRow operates on the rows of the State.

```
[ | row >>> i | | row <- state | | i <- shifts | ]
```

Column traversals




Figure 4: MixColumn operates on the columns of the State.

```
transpose [| ptimes (col, cx) || col <- transpose state |]
```


Nested traversals




Figure 2: ByteSub acts on the individual bytes of the State.

```
[ | [ | sbox a | | a <- row | ] | | row <- state | ]
```



Cryptol Types

- Capture the size and dimensions of matrices
- Written as a sequence of bracketed dimensions outermost to innermost:

`213`

has type: `[8]Bit`

`[[0 1] [2 3] [4 5] [6 7]]`

has type: `[4][2][8]Bit`



Cryptol Types

- Capture the size and dimensions of matrices
- Written as a sequence of bracketed dimensions outermost to innermost:

213

has type: [8]

[[0 1] [2 3] [4 5] [6 7]]

has type: [4] [2] [8]



Cryptol Types

- “The State can be pictured as a rectangular array of bytes. This array has four rows, the number of columns is denoted by Nb and is equal to the block length divided by 32.”

- **state : [4] [Nb] [8] ;**




Cryptol Types


- “The input and output used by Rijndael at its external interface are considered to be one-dimensional arrays of 8-bit bytes numbered upwards from 0 to the $4 \cdot N_b - 1$. The Cipher Key is considered to be a one-dimensional array of 8-bit bytes numbered upwards from 0 to the $4 \cdot N_k - 1$.”
- **input** : $[4 * N_b][8];$
- **key** : $[4 * N_k][8];$

Size Polymorphism





Aha!
Must be
32 bits



How many
bits am I?

add32 (0xB4 , 0x3A)

Size Polymorphism

How many bits am I?

At least 6 bits ...

$x = 0x3A$

$x : \{a\} \ (a \geq 6) \Rightarrow [a]$

Shape Polymorphism

What types do I handle?

Four of something to four of the same thing...

`swab [a b c d] = [d c b a]`

`swab : {a} [4]a -> [4]a`



Syntax of Types

$P ::= \{a_1 \dots a_i\} (P_1, \dots, P_j) \Rightarrow$
 $(T_1, \dots, T_k) \rightarrow T$

$T ::= a$

| Bit

| [S]T

$S ::= a$

| Nat

| f (T₁, ..., T_n)

| T₁ (+) T₂

| inf

f ::= width, lg2, min, max

(+) ::= +, -, *, /, %, **



Type Inference

- Literals

17

$(\$46 \geq 5) \Rightarrow [\$46]$

- Variables

$x = 7;$

$x : \{a\} (a \geq 3) [a];$

... blatz x ^ frobulate x

$\$23 \geq (3) [\$23]$

$(\$98 \geq 3) \Rightarrow [\$98]$



Definitions are Polymorphic

```
X = 7;
```

```
X : {a} (a >= 3) [a];
```

```
blatz      : [8] -> [16];
```

```
froblate   : [4] -> [32];
```

```
... blatz X ^ froblate X ...
```




Parameters are not!

```
blatz      : [8] -> [16];
```

```
froblate   : [4] -> [32];
```

```
cryptofun X =
```

```
... blatz X ^ froblate X ...
```



Type-based
coercions are
static, not
dynamic



Error! 8 != 4

Type Inference

■ Matrices

$[1 \ 23 \ 45 \ x]$

$[4] \$21$

$(\$17 \geq 1) \Rightarrow [\$17]$
 $(\$18 \geq 5) \Rightarrow [\$18]$
 $(\$19 \geq 6) \Rightarrow [\$19]$
 $() \Rightarrow \$20$

$(\$17 \geq 1,$
 $\$18 \geq 5,$
 $\$19 \geq 6,$
 $[\$17] == \$21,$
 $[\$18] == \$21,$
 $[\$19] == \$21,$
 $\$20 == \$21)$
 $\Rightarrow [4] \$21$

Type Constraints

- Constraints are dealt with in one of 4 ways:

- Become part of a type in a binding

`x = 13;`

`x : {a} (a >= 4) => [a]`

- Resolved

`y : [6];`

`z = 13 + y;`

a must be 6!

- Unresolvable

`q : [7];`

`w = q + y;`

6 is not equal to 7!

Unresolved Constraints

- Failure to match a signature

a >= 4

```
x : {a} [a];  
x = 13;
```

The signature is
more general
than the inferred
type!

- Ambiguous

```
xs : [100] [16];
```

```
z = xs @ 4;
```

```
zs = xs @@ [1 .. ];
```

a >= 3

z : [16];



Defaulting

- Ambiguous constraints are subject to defaulting

$a \geq 4$ becomes $a == 4$

- Defaulting is not always desirable

$1 + 1 = \dots$



User Feedback – the Positives

- arbitrary bit widths
- ease of rearranging data
- streams
- interactive development
- declarative nature
- ease of extracting substructures
- no need to worry about space allocation
- bulk operations
- feedback from types



User Feedback – the Negatives

- no emacs mode
- interference from types
- no control over defaulting
- not enough higher-level abstractions
- no facility to format data
- want better debugging support
- type errors can be difficult to understand
- want more control over endianness



The Endian Problem

- Cryptol made the following design choices:

- matrices indexed from the left

$[x_0 \ x_1 \ x_2 \ x_3 \ x_4 \ x_5 \ x_6 \ x_7]$

consistent
with streams

- literals indexed from the right

$x_7 \ x_6 \ x_5 \ x_4 \ x_3 \ x_2 \ x_1 \ x_0$

consistent with
little endian

- e.g.: `0b10100110 ==`

`[False True True False
False True False True]`



The Endian Problem

- But there are consequences:
 - the swap: `0xab # 0xcd == 0xcdab`
`split 0xcdab == [0xab 0xcd]`
 - in a left shift, whose “left” is it anyway?
`0b0111 << 1`
`== 0b1110`

`[True True True False] << 1`
`== [True True False False]`
`== 0b0011`



The Endian Problem


- Could chose differently:
 - matrices still indexed from the left
 - literals also indexed from the left
- Avoids swap and shift problems
- But less natural for encodings of numbers
- any fixed choice will lose:
specifications feel free to use different conventions, thus we set up a road block to *specification correspondence*



Endianess

- Design space:
 - (syntactic) Bit 0 on the left or on the right
 - (semantic) Bit 0 least or most significant

	MSB	LSB
right	1000	0001
left	0001	1000



$$a = \sum_{i=0}^{23} a_i \cdot 2^{32i},$$

where each a_i is a 32-bit integer. If we write a and the a_i 's as bit streams then a is just the concatenation of all the a_i 's. That is, let \parallel denote concatenation. Then we write


$$a = (a_{23} \parallel a_{22} \parallel \dots \parallel a_1 \parallel a_0).$$

The expression for $a \pmod p$ turns out to be

$$a = t + 2s_1 + s_2 + s_3 + s_4 + s_5 + s_6 - d_1 - d_2 - d_3 \pmod p.$$

Here the s_i 's and d_i 's are 384-bit numbers defined by:

$$\begin{aligned} t &= (a_{11} \parallel a_{10} \parallel a_9 \parallel a_8 \parallel a_7 \parallel a_6 \parallel a_5 \parallel a_4 \parallel a_3 \parallel a_2 \parallel a_1 \parallel a_0) \\ s_1 &= (0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel a_{23} \parallel a_{22} \parallel a_{21} \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0) \\ s_2 &= (a_{23} \parallel a_{22} \parallel a_{21} \parallel a_{20} \parallel a_{19} \parallel a_{18} \parallel a_{17} \parallel a_{16} \parallel a_{15} \parallel a_{14} \parallel a_{13} \parallel a_{12}) \\ s_3 &= (a_{20} \parallel a_{19} \parallel a_{18} \parallel a_{17} \parallel a_{16} \parallel a_{15} \parallel a_{14} \parallel a_{13} \parallel a_{12} \parallel a_{23} \parallel a_{22} \parallel a_{21}) \\ s_4 &= (a_{19} \parallel a_{18} \parallel a_{17} \parallel a_{16} \parallel a_{15} \parallel a_{14} \parallel a_{13} \parallel a_{12} \parallel a_{20} \parallel 0 \parallel a_{23} \parallel 0) \\ s_5 &= (0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel a_{23} \parallel a_{22} \parallel a_{21} \parallel a_{20} \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0) \\ s_6 &= (0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel a_{23} \parallel a_{22} \parallel a_{21} \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel a_{20}) \\ d_1 &= (a_{22} \parallel a_{21} \parallel a_{20} \parallel a_{19} \parallel a_{18} \parallel a_{17} \parallel a_{16} \parallel a_{15} \parallel a_{14} \parallel a_{13} \parallel a_{12} \parallel a_{23}) \\ d_2 &= (0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel a_{23} \parallel a_{22} \parallel a_{21} \parallel a_{20} \parallel 0) \\ d_3 &= (0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel a_{23} \parallel a_{23} \parallel 0 \parallel 0 \parallel 0) \end{aligned}$$



The Endian Problem: Exploring the Solution Space

- Use a declarative approach
 - associate endianness with the type
- Use an operator-based approach
 - Special versions of operators:
 - `splitBE`, `splitLE`, `joinBE`, `joinLE`
 - what to do about `#`, `@`?



Sample Key Expansion Fragment

```
keyX key = ss @@ [ 0 .. n ]
  where {
    initS, initL : [1][32];
    initS = [0];
    initL = split (join key);
    ss = [| (s + a + b) <<< 3 || s <- initS # ss
          || a <- [1] # ss
          || b <- [0] # ls ||];
    ls = [| (l + a + b) <<< (a + b)
          || l <- initL # ls
          || a <- ss
          || b <- [0] # ls ||];
  };
```




Generated C code

```
extern uint32* keyX32 (uint32*);  
uint32* keyX32 (uint32* key_keyX32)  
{  
    static uint32 arr0[2];  
    uint32 v6, v5, v4, v3, v0;  
    v0=joinWord(4, 8, key_keyX32);  
    v3=(v0) + (8);  
    v4=ROL(v3, 8);  
    v5=(16) + (v4);  
    v6=ROL(v5, 3);  
    arr0[0]=8;  
    arr0[1]=v6;  
    return (arr0); }  
}
```



Sample Key Expansion Fragment

```
keyX key = ss @@ [ 0 .. n ]
  where {
    initS, initL : [1][36];
    initS = [0];
    initL = split (join key);
    ss = [| (s + a + b) <<< 3 || s <- initS # ss
          || a <- [1] # ss
          || b <- [0] # ls ||];
    ls = [| (l + a + b) <<< (a + b)
          || l <- initL # ls
          || a <- ss
          || b <- [0] # ls ||];
  };
```



```
extern uint32** keyX36(uint32*);
uint32** keyX36 (uint32* key_keyX36)
{  static uint32* arr48[2];
   static uint32 vec49[2]={8UL, 0UL};
   ...
   copyOuter(2, v1, splitMatrix(1, 36, v0, arr38));
   copyOuter(2, v3,
      plusMatrix(0, 1, arrShape40, v1, vec39, arr41));
   copyOuter(2, v4, rolMatrix(36, v3, vec42, arr43));
   copyOuter(2, v5,
      plusMatrix(0, 1, arrShape45, vec44, v4, arr46));
   copyOuter(2, v6, rolMatrix(36, v5, 3, arr47));
   arr48[0]=vec49;
   arr48[1]=v6;
   return (arr48); }
```



The Future of Cryptol

- Crypto was in the mud, and now we've at least got it on dry land.
- Now we're headed towards higher ground:

machine words



abstract crypto machine



executable mathematics



Future Directions

- User-defined operators
- Extended matrix comprehensions
- Support for more arithmetics:
 - Flexible Precision arithmetic
 - Polynomial arithmetic
 - Arbitrary modulus arithmetic
- Support for 1-based and other indexing
- Flexible endian-ness



Flexible Precision Arithmetic

- Free ourselves from the bonds of power-of-two modulus arithmetic
- Not arbitrary precision arithmetic
- New operators:
 - $+'$: $([a], [b]) \rightarrow [\max(a, b) + 1]$
 - $*'$: $([a], [b]) \rightarrow [a + b]$
 - $\%'$: $([a], [b]) \rightarrow [b]$



Polynomial Arithmetic

- $0x1a3 \equiv x^8 + x^7 + x^5 + x^1 + 1$

- New operators:

$$\text{padd} : \{a \ b\} ([a], [b]) \rightarrow [\max(a, b)]$$

$$\text{pmult} : \{a \ b\} ([a], [b]) \rightarrow [a+b-1]$$

$$\text{pdiv} : \{a \ b\} ([a], [b]) \rightarrow [1+a-b]$$

$$\text{pmod} : \{a \ b\} ([a], [1+b]) \rightarrow [b]$$



Arbitrary Modulus Arithmetic

- New operators:

`+%` : `(Mod n, a == width (n-1)) =>`
`([a], [a]) -> [a]`

`*%` : `(Mod n, a == width (n-1)) =>`
`([a], [a]) -> [a]`

...

- New binding form:

`(x + f y) withModulus 17`



Future Directions

- Enhanced tracing/debugging
 - dump out internal registers from a run
 - format as LaTeX, HTML, ...
- Interface to C
- Interface to HCDSA
- Generate optimized, low-level code
 - FPGA
 - commercial crypto chip (e.g. AIM)



The End

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