Incorrectness Logic for Scalable Bug Detection

Azalea Raad

Imperial College London

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Incorrectness Logic: Summary

- + Under-approximate analogue of Hoare Logic
- + Formal foundation for bug catching
- Global reasoning: *non-compositional* (as in original Hoare Logic)
- Cannot target *memory safety bugs* (e.g. use-after-free)

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- + Formal foundation for bug catching
- Global reasonii
- Cannot target

Our Solution

Incorrectness Separation Logic

SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

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```
[x] := 1;
[y] := 2;
[z] := 3;
```

SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

```
[x] := 1;
              [y] := 2;
              [z] := 3;
post: \{x = 1 \land y = 2 \land z = 3\}
```

SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

```
pre: \{X \neq y \land X \neq Z \land y \neq Z\}
                [x] := 1;
                [y] := 2;
               [z] := 3;
post: \{x = 1 \land y = 2 \land z = 3\}
```

SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

```
pre: \{ X_1 \neq X_2 \land X_1 \neq X_3 \land ... \}
               [x_1] := 1;
               [x_2] := 2;
               [x_n] := n;
post: \{ x_1 = 1 \land ... \land x_n = n \}
```

SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

```
pre: \{ X_1 \neq X_2 \land X_1 \neq X_3 \land ... \}
               [x_1] := 1;
                                            n!/2 conjuncts!
               [x_2] := 2;
               [x_n] := n;
post: \{ x_1 = 1 \land ... \land x_n = n \}
```

SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

```
pre: \{x \mapsto - * y \mapsto - * z \mapsto -\}

[x] := 1;

[y] := 2;

[z] := 3;

post: \{x \mapsto 1 * y \mapsto 2 * z \mapsto 3\}
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SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

```
pre: \{X \mapsto - * Y \mapsto - * Z \mapsto - \}

ownership

of heap cell at x

[y] := 2;

[z] := 3;

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SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

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pre: \{X \mapsto - * Y \mapsto - * Z \mapsto - \}

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of heap cell at x

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SL: Local & compositional reasoning via ownership & separation

```
pre: \{X \mapsto - * y \mapsto - * Z \mapsto - \}

ownership

of heap cell at x

[y] := 2;

for and separately

[z] := 3;

post: \{X \mapsto 1 * y \mapsto 2 * z \mapsto 3\}
```

$$\forall x,v,v'. x \mapsto v * x \mapsto v' \Rightarrow false$$

The Essence of Separation Logic (SL)

Frame Rule

$$x \mapsto v * x \mapsto v' \Leftrightarrow false$$
 p * emp \Leftrightarrow p

The Essence of Separation Logic (SL)

Frame Rule

$$X \mapsto V * X \mapsto V' \Leftrightarrow false$$


Local Axioms

WRITE
$$\{X \mapsto -\} [X] := V \{X \mapsto V\}$$

READ $\{X \mapsto V\} \ y := [X] \{X \mapsto V \land y = V\}$

ALLOC $\{emp\} \ x := alloc() \{\exists I. \mid \mapsto -\land x = I\}$

Incorrectness Separation Logic (ISL)



null-pointer-dereference error

```
[x \mapsto v'] [x] := v [ok: x \mapsto v]
write
[x \mapsto v'] [x] := v [er: x = null]
```

null-pointer-dereference error

$$[x \mapsto v] y := [x] [ok: x \mapsto v \land y = v]$$
 $[x = null] y := [x] [er: x = null]$

READ

null-pointer-dereference error

$$[X \mapsto V] \ y := [X] \ [ok: X \mapsto V \land y = V]$$
 $[x=null] \ y := [X] \ [er: x=null]$
READ

[emp]
$$x := alloc() [ok:\exists I. I \rightarrow v \land x = I]$$

ALLOC

 $[x \mapsto v']$ [x]:=v $[ok: x \mapsto v]$ [x=null] [x]:=v [er: x=null]

Hidden Technical Details

- Standard SL model broken for ISL: unsound frame rule
- Fix: A monotonic heap model
- Advantage: recover completeness for ISL (unlike SL)

 $[emp] x := alloc() [ok: \exists l. l \mapsto v \land x = l]$

ALLOC

ISL Summary

- → IL + SL for compositional bug catching
- → *Under-approximate* analogue of SL
- → Targets *memory safety bugs* (e.g. use-after-free)
- → No-false-positives theorem:

All bugs identified are true bugs

Pulse-X: ISL for Scalable Bug Detection

Pulse-X at a Glance


- * Automated program analysis for memory safety errors (NPEs, UAFs) and leaks
- Underpinned by ISL (under-approximate) no false positives*
- * Inter-procedural and bi-abductive under-approximate analogue of Infer
- * Compositional (begin-anywhere analysis) important for Cl
- Deployed at Meta
- * Performance: comparable to Infer
- * Fix rate: comparable or better than Infer!
- Three dimensional scalability
 - → code size (large codebases)
 - → people (large teams, CI)
 - → speed (high frequency of code changes)

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a method of combining them


→ Parts: Procedures



*Analysis result of a program = analysis results of its parts +

a method of combining them


→ Parts: Procedures



→ Method: under-approximate bi-abduction

*Analysis result of a program = analysis results of its parts + a method of combining them

→ Parts: Procedures



- → Method: under-approximate bi-abduction
- → Analysis result: incorrectness triples (under-approximate specs)

Pulse-X Algorithm: Proof Search in ISL

- *Analyse each procedure *f* in isolation, find its **summary** (collection of ISL triples)
 - \rightarrow A summary table T, initially populated only with local (pre-defined) axioms
 - \rightarrow Use bi-abduction and T to find the summary of f
 - → Recursion: bounded unrolling
 - → Extend T with the summary of f

Pulse-X Algorithm: Proof Search in ISL

- *Analyse each procedure *f* in isolation, find its **summary** (collection of ISL triples)
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 - \rightarrow Use bi-abduction and T to find the summary of f
 - → Recursion: bounded unrolling
 - → Extend T with the summary of f
- * Similar bi-abductive mechanism to Infer, but:
 - → Can **soundly** drop execution paths/branches
 - → Can **soundly** bound loop unrolling

```
1.int ssl excert prepend(...) {
     SSL EXCERT *exc= app malloc (sizeof (*exc), "prepend cert");
     memset(exc, 0, sizeof(*exc));
3.
                                calls CRYPTO_malloc (a malloc wrapper)
           null pointer
          dereference
                                   CRYPTO_malloc may return null!
         [emp] *exc= app malloc(sz, ...) [ok: exc = null]
```

[exc = null] memset (exc, -, -) [er: exc = null]

```
1.int ssl excert prepend(...) {
     SSL_EXCERT *exc= [app_malloc](sizeof(*exc), "prepend cert");
     memset(exc, 0, sizeof(*exc));
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                                  CRYPTO_malloc may return null!
         [emp] *exc= app malloc(sz, ...) [ok: exc = null]
            [exc = null] memset (exc, -, -) [er: exc = null]
          [emp] ssl excert prepend(...) [er: exc = null]
```







Created pull request #15836 to commit the fix.

No False Positives: Report All Bugs Found?

Not quite...

```
1.void foo(int *x) {
2. *x = 42;
}
```

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```
WRITE [x=null] *x = v [er: x=null]

[x=null] foo(x) [er: x=null]
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1.void foo(int *x) {
2. *x = 42;
}
```

```
WRITE [x=null] *x = v [er: x=null]

[x=null] foo(x) [er: x=null]
```

Should we report this NPD?

```
1.void foo(int *x) {
2. *x = 42;
}
```

```
WRITE [x=null] *x = v [er: x=null]

[x=null] foo(x) [er: x=null]
```



"But I never call foo with null!"

"Which bugs shall I report then?"

```
Problem
Must consider the whole program
   to decide whether to report
          Solution
       Manifest Errors
```

"But I never call foo with null!"

'Which bugs shall I report then?"

Pulse-X: Manifest Errors

Intuitively: the error occurs for all input states

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- * Formally: [p] C [er: q] is manifest iff:

$$\forall$$
 s. \exists s'. (s,s') \in [C]_{er} \lambda s' \in (q * true)

Pulse-X: Manifest Errors

- Intuitively: the error occurs for all input states
- * Formally: [p] C [er: q] is manifest iff:

$$\forall$$
 s. \exists s'. (s,s') \in [C]_{er} \land s' \in (q * true)

* Algorithmically: ...

Pulse-X: Null Pointer Dereference in OpenSSL

```
[emp] ssl_excert_prepend(...) [er: exc = null ]
```

Pulse-X: Null Pointer Dereference in OpenSSL

```
[emp] ssl_excert_prepend(...) [er: exc = null]
```

Manifest Error (all calls to ssl excert prepend can trigger the error)!

Pulse-X: Latent Errors

An error triple [p] C [er: q] is <u>latent</u> iff it is not manifest

Pulse-X: Latent Error

```
1.int chopup_args(ARGS *args,...) {
    ...
2. if (args->count == 0 ) {
    args->count=20;
    args->data= (char**)ssl_excert_prepend(...);
5. }
5. for (i=0; i<args->count; i++) {
    args->data[i]=NULL;
    ...
}
```

Pulse-X: Latent Error

```
1.int chopup_args(ARGS *args,...){
    ...
2. if (args->count == 0 ) {
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    args->data[i]=NULL;
    ...
    null pointer
    dereference
```

Pulse-X: Latent Error

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1.int chopup_args(ARGS *args,...) {
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5. }
5. for (i=0; i<args->count; i++) {
    args->data[i]=NULL;
    ...
    null pointer
    dereference
```

Latent Error:

only calls with args->count == 0 can trigger the error

```
static int www body(...) {
  io = BIO new(BIO f buffer());
  ssl bio BIO new(BIO f ssl());
  • • •
  BIO push (io, ssl bio);
  BIO free all(io);
  return ret;
```

```
static int www body (...) {
  io = BIO new(BIO f buffer());
  ssl bio BIO new(BIO f ssl());
  BIO push (io, ssl_bio); -
  BIO free all(io);
  return ret;
```

does nothing when io is null

```
static int www body(...) {
  io = BIO new(BIO f buffer());
  ssl bio BIO new(BIO f ssl());
  BIO push (io, ssl bio); -
  BIO free all(io);
  return ret;
            does nothing when io is null
     → leaks ssl bio
```

```
static int www body (...) {
  io = BIO new(BIO f buffer());
  ssl bio BIO new(BIO f ssl());
  BIO push (io, ssl bio);
  BIO free all(io);
  return ret;
```

426 lines of complex code:

io manipulated by several procedures
and multiple loops

Pulse-X performs under-approximation with bounded loop unrolling

does nothing when io is null

➤ leaks ssl_bio

Pulse-X Summary

- → Automated program analysis for detecting memory safety errors and leaks
- → Manifest errors (underpinned by ISL): no false positives*
- compositional, scalable, begin-anywhere

ISL Extension:

Concurrent Incorrectness Separation Logic (CISL) &

Incorrectness Non-Termination Logic (INTL)

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Concurrent Incorrectness Separation Logic (CISL) &

Incorrectness Non-Termination Logic (INTL)

Termination vs Non-Termination

- * Showing termination is compatible with correctness frameworks:
 - → Every trace of a given program must terminate
 - → Inherently over-approximate

$$skip + x:=1$$

Termination vs Non-Termination

- * Showing termination is compatible with correctness frameworks:
 - → Every trace of a given program must terminate
 - → Inherently over-approximate

$$skip + x:=1$$

- * Showing non-termination compatible with incorrectness frameworks:
 - → Some trace of a given program does not terminate
 - → Inherently under-approximate

Incorrectness Non-Termination Logic (INTL)

- * A framework for detecting non-termination bugs
- * Supports unstructured constructs (goto), as well exceptions and breaks
- * Reasons for non-termination:
 - → Infinite loops
 - → Infinite recursion
 - → Cyclic goto soups

INTL Proof Rules and Principles

INTL Proof Rules

ISL Proof Rules

+


Divergence (Non-Termination) Rules

INTL Divergence Proof Rules

Starting from **some** state s in p, C has a divergent trace

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INTL Divergence Proof Rules (Sequencing)

$$[p] C_1[\infty]$$

$$[p] C_1; C_2[\infty]$$

INTL Divergence Proof Rules (Sequencing)

[p]
$$C_1$$
 [ok: q] [q] C_2 [∞] [p] C_1 ; C_2 [∞]

INTL Divergence Proof Rules (Branches)

[p]
$$C_i$$
 [∞] some $i \in \{1, 2\}$ [p] $C_1 + C_2$ [∞]

- Drop paths/branches (this is a sound under-approximation)
- Scalable bug detection!

INTL Divergence Proof Rules (Loops)

[p] C [ok: p] [extra condition omitted]
$$[p] C^* [\infty]$$

Conclusions

- Incorrectness Separation Logic (ISL)
 - → Combining IL and SL for *compositional bug catching* (in sequential programs)
 - → no-false-positives theorem
- Pulse-X
 - → Automated program analysis for detecting memory safety errors and leaks
 - → Manifest errors (underpinned by ISL): no false positives*
 - ompositional, scalable, begin-anywhere
- * INTL
 - → ISL for detecting non-termination bugs
 - → no-false-positives theorem
 - → Infinite loop/recursion detection

Thank You for Listening!



