

# **Towards evolving specs of security protocols**

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(based on joint work with A. Datta, J. Mitchell, D. Smith...)

March 7, 2002

# Claim

Security Engineering  
is a part of  
Software Engineering

# Claim

- it is helpful to analyze:
  - protocols in context of architectures
  - security as a part of of high assurance
  - malicious attackers on connectors together with unspecified environments of components
- both SE and SE are concerned with
  - distributed,
  - multi-layered,
  - heterogenous complex systems...

# Outline


- Mobile proposals:
  - IPv4 vs IPv6
- Problem:
  - remote redirection (traffic hijacking)
- Adding authentication:
  - **espec** transformation
- Variations and ongoing work

# Papers


- Authentication for Mobile IPv6
  - with A. Datta, J. Mitchell and F. Muller
- Composition and refinement of behavioral specifications
  - with D. Smith
- Guarded transitions in evolving specifications
  - with D. Smith


<http://www.kestrel.edu/users/pavlovic/>

# Mobile IPv4





initial architecture















triangular  
routing!

# Mobile IPv4



session architecture


# Mobile IPv6

- avoid triangle routing:
  - use IPv6 Routing Header and tunneling
- minimize
  - network partitioning
  - computational load on:
    - » routers
    - » nodes: no expensive encryptions or decryptions
  - number of messages
  - need for infrastructure: no global PKI
- maximize
  - performance and availability: no DoS
  - end-to-end security: authenticate location information


# Mobile IPv6

- home address
  - the node is always addressed by the same IP number
- care-of addresses (one or more)
  - bind dynamically to different subnet IP numbers
    - » all packets containing the binding information must be authenticated
    - » authentication relies upon previously established security associations
- Binding Update/Acknowledgement
  - realized through Destination Options Headers
  - Binding Cache integrated with Destination Cache


# Mobile IPv6 proposal





initial architecture














# Mobile IPv6 proposal



session architecture

# Mobile IPv6 proposal






# Mobile IPv6 proposal



possible session architecture

# Task

Use **especs**  
to add authentication!






# Task

- Assess tradeoff between
  - maximizing strength of authentication
  - minimizing need for infrastructure

# MN's view


espec MN



# CN's view


`espec CN`

# BU architecture




# (aspects of especs)

- genericity
  - all agents are instances of cord espec
- automated
  - composition of agents
  - trace generation
- support for formal analysis
  - model checking
  - theorem proving
  - invariant generation



# BU architecture



# BU architecture

diag BU

# (aspects of specs)



- adjustable abstraction level
- stratification:
  - agents: process calculus
  - protocols: specs
  - architectures: diagrams
    - » network connectors and components
    - » infrastructure and chain of trust
    - » information flow
    - » ...



# BU architecture

diag BU



# BU refinement



# (aspects of especs)

- development (programming, generation)
  - top-down: refinement
    - » morphisms: inheritance, genericity
  - bottom-up: composition
    - » pushouts
    - » emergent and vanishing properties
    - » game theory, linear logic (strategies)
  - program transformation
    - » authentication compiler (Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk)
    - » optimization
  - adaptation
    - » specification-carrying software

# BU refinement




# AuthBU architecture


diag  
AuthBU

# AuthMN's view


`espec`  
`AuthMN`

# Authenticated MIPv6










$$k = g^{xy}$$


$$S = \{i_{CN}, i_{MN}, g^x, g^y\}_k$$



$$k = g^{xy}$$

$$s = \{i_{CN}, i_{MN}, g^x, g^y\}_k$$

# Authenticated MIPv6



assured session architecture

# Variations

- weaker authentications:
  - one-way: no PKI, just certificates, or AAA - no anonymity
  - first time unauthenticated (like SSH), then chained hashing
- stronger authentications:
  - privacy
  - anonymity, non-repudiation
- dynamic infrastructure
  - no shared secret: databases of “fingerprints”
  - authenticating by non-forgable capability
  - authenticating by divided secret

# (aspects of aspects)

- additional aspects:
  - information flow
  - information hiding
  - cryptography
  - ...

## Ongoing work

**IMPLEMENT the tool!**

# Papers

- Authentication for Mobile IPv6
  - with A. Datta, J. Mitchell and F. Muller
- Composition and refinement of behavioral specifications
  - with D. Smith
- Guarded transitions in evolving specifications
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<http://www.kestrel.edu/users/pavlovic/>

# (cord spaces)

(names)  $N ::= X \mid A$

(terms)  $t ::= x \mid a \mid N \mid t, \dots, t \mid_N \{t\}$

(actions)  $a ::= \langle t \rangle \mid (x) \mid (t/p(x))$

(strands)  $S ::= aS$


(cords)  $C ::= [S] \approx$

$FV(t) = \emptyset$

(interaction)  $[(x)R] \otimes [\langle t \rangle S] \dots \triangleright \triangleright [R(t/x)] \otimes [S] \dots$

(reaction)  $[(p(t)/p(x))R] \dots \triangleright \triangleright [R(t/x)] \dots$


$FV(t) = \emptyset$






# What are especs?

- diagrams of specs
- specification-carrying programs
- in a development environment supporting
  - refinement (top-down)
  - composition (bottom-up)
  - synthesis of verified code
- programming language with
  - guarded commands
  - logical annotations as first-class citizens (available at runtime)
  - procedural abstraction and refinement



# What are specs?



# What are espects?

