Policy Analytics for Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems
Lead PI:
Nazli Choucri
Abstract

POLICY ANALYTICS FOR CYBERSECURITY OF CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are embedded in an increasingly complex ecosystem of cybersecurity policies, guidelines, and compliance measures designed to support all aspects of operation during all phases of system’s life cycle. By definition, such guidelines and policies are written in linear and sequential text form—word after word—often with different directives parts presented in different documents. This situation makes it difficult to integrate or understand policy-technology-security interactions. As a result, it also impedes effective risk assessment. Individually or collectively, these features inevitably undermine initiatives for cybersecurity. Missing are fundamental policy analytics to support CPS cybersecurity and facilitate policy implementation. This project is designed to develop a set of text-to-analytics methods and tools—for policy directives and for CPS properties—and provide a “proof of concept” focused on the smart grid of electric power systems.

Link to proposal

Nazli Choucri

Nazli Choucri, Professor of Political Science at MIT, is Senior Faculty at the Center of International Studies (CIS), and Faculty Affiliate, Institute for Data, Science, and Society (IDSS). She focuses on international relations and cyberpolitics, with special attention to sources of conflict and war, on the one hand, and strategies for security and sustainability, on the other. Professor Choucri directs the research initiatives of CyberPolitics & Policy Lab at MIT and the related knowledge networking system CyberIR@MIT—both motivated by the cyber-inclusive view of international relations and the global system developed by the MIT-Harvard Project Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR), for which she served as Principal Investigator.

Dr. Choucri is Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). She is author and/or editor of twelve books, most recently Cyberpolitics in International Relations (2012), and International Relations in the Cyber Age: The Co-Evolution Dilemma, with David. D. Clark (2019). She is the architect and Director of the Global System for Sustainable Development (GSSD), an evolving knowledge and networking system centered on sustainability problems and solution strategies, and the  Founding Editor of the MIT Press Series on Global Environmental Accord.

Professor Choucri has served as General Editor of the International Political Science Review and, for two terms, on the Editorial Board of the American Political Science Review. She also served two terms as President of UNESCO's Management of Social Transformation Program. Her international research and advisory activities include collaborative work in Algeria, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Japan, Kuwait, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. She is a board member for Boston Global Forum (BGF), and founding member of the Artificial Intelligence World Society (AIWS).

 

PROJECT SYNOPSIS

Problem

Mounting concerns about the safety and security of critical infrastructure have resulted in an intricate ecosystem of cybersecurity guidelines and policies, as well as directives and compliance measures. By definition, such guidelines and policies are written in linear, sequential text form—word after word, chapter after chapter—often with different segments thereof presented in different documents in the policy ecosystem. In general, the design and description of target CPS-structures are also in text form. This situation makes it difficult to integrate or even to understand the policy-technology-security interactions. It also impedes effective risk assessment. In short, individually or collectively, these features inevitably undermine cybersecurity initiatives. Missing are fundamental policy analytics to support CPS cybersecurity and reduce barriers to policy implementation.

Goals

The overarching goal of this project is to develop analytical methods to strengthen cybersecurity policies in support of the national strategy for cybersecurity, as outlined in Presidential Executive Orders and National Defense Authorization Acts.

Operationally, the goal is to create policy analytics for cybersecurity, designed to:

  1. Overcome the limitations of the conventional text-based policy form,
  2. Extract metric-based knowledge embedded in policy guidelines and/or distributed in policy-ecosystems,
  3. Align policy directives to intended targets in the relevant CPS structure, and
  4. Assist the users on "how-to" connect cybersecurity policy to CPS properties and facilitate implementation.

Strategically, our goal is to construct a suite of tools for application to policy directives, regulations, and guidelines across diverse CPS domains and properties. The intent is to help users address mission-related challenges, concerns or contingencies.

Challenges

The research challenge is three-fold, namely to:

  1. Develop structured system models from text-based descriptions of system properties
  2. Transform policy guidelines and directives from text to metrics
  3. Connect Policy directives to CPS properties.

Addressing these challenges essential in order to:

  • Identify major policy-relevant CPS properties and parameters,
  • Situate vulnerabilities and impacts,
  • Map security requirements to security objectives, and
  • Support responses of CPS to targeted policy controls.

Data & Proof of Concept

Our "raw" data base consists of major policy reports on CPS cybersecurity prepared by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) as well as NIST analyses of CPS properties. Clearly, considerable efforts are always being made to "mine" NIST materials; however, few initiatives explore the potential value-added of drawing on multi-methods for knowledge extraction and/or of developing analytical tools to support user understanding of policy directives, analysis, and eventually to enable targeted-action. While our approach appreciates and is informed by such efforts, it is distinctive by developing a suite of cybersecurity policy analytics—based entirely on metricized text  of policy documents—and applied to metricized models of CPS. The "proof of concept"  focuses on analytics for cybersecurity policy applied  to smart grid for electric power systems.

BACKGROUND & FOUNDATIONS

The research initiative on Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) provides background and foundations for this Project. A collaboration of MIT and Harvard University, with Nazli Choucri as Principal Investigator, ECIR was completed under a Minerva Project of the U.S. Department of Defense (2009–2014).

The research problem is this: distinct features of cyberspace—such as time, scope, space, permeation, ubiquity, participation and attribution—challenge traditional modes of inquiry in international relations and limit their utility. The interdisciplinary MIT-Harvard ECIR research project explores various facets of cyber international relations, including its implications for power and politics, conflict and war. 

The primary mission and principal goal is to increase the capacity of the nation to address the policy challenges of the cyber domain. Our research is intended to influence today’s policy makers with the best thinking about issues and opportunities, and to train tomorrow’s policy makers to be effective in understanding choice and consequence in cyber matters.

Accordingly, the  ECIR vision is to create an integrated knowledge domain of international relations in the cyber age, that is (a) multidisciplinary, theory-driven, technically and empirically; (b) clarifies threats and opportunities in cyberspace for national security, welfare, and influence; (c) provides analytical tools for understanding and managing transformation and change; and (d) attracts and educates generations of researchers, scholars, and analysts for international relations in the new cyber age.

See Final Report of the MIT–Harvard University Project on Explorations in Cyber International Relations.

See publications, reports, theses, and addendum to the ECIR final report.

PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

  • Gaurav Agarwal, Alumnus, MIT (2018-2022)
  • Jerome Anaya, Researcher, Political Science, MIT (2018-2019, 2022)
  • Lauren Fairman, Researcher, Political Science, MIT (2019-2021)
  • Allen Moulton, Research Scientist, Sociotechnical Systems Research Center (SSRC), MIT (2021)
  • Saurabh Amin, Associate Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering, MIT (2018-2019)
  • James Gordon, MIT Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program - UROP (2020)
  • Nechama Huba, Student, Wellesley College, Junion-Senior (2021-2023)
  • Joseph Ward, MIT Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program - UROP (2021)

RESULTS, PRODUCTS & ARTIFACTS

Project results and  products include, but are not limited to: (a) methods to examine the implications of cybersecurity directives and guidelines directly applicable to the system in question; (b) information about relative vulnerability pathways throughout the whole or parts of the system-network, as delineated by the guidelines documents; (c) insights from contingency investigations, that is, "what...if..."; (d) design framework for information management within the organization; and (e) ways to facilitate information flows essential for cyber security-related decision.

Results To Date

Thus far, we have aligned the project vision and mission to the priorities of the Program on National Cybersecurity Policy and identified the overall policy-relevant ecosystem. By focusing on national cybersecurity policies for securing the nation's critical infrastructure, we identified the policy ecosystem and core policy documents pertaining to smart grid for proof of concept. 

We have extracted text-based data and created a metric-based Dependency Structure Matrix (DSM) of the "as-is" NIST’s reference model for Smart Grid. We also completed the design and operational strategy for our data extraction and linkage method. This involves developing the method for moving from "policy-as-text" to "text-as-data" in the process of constructing the Suite  of Policy Analytics for CPS cybersecurity. 

In short, we created (a) metric-models of policies and guidelines, (b) metric-models of CPS and captured (c) value-added of applying policy directives to CPS properties. Each was based on a set of pre-tests—executed in operational form—and provided foundation for the next step.

In the process, we developed rules and methods for extracting and metricizing data from text-form documents, and then constructed the necessary issue and policy-specific linked database for the relevant policy-ecosystem.

Jointly, these steps allowed us to create (i) initial exploratory tools for analysis of system information, and (ii) core dependency matrix (DSM) of the CPS based on the identification of first-level information dependencies. The DSM was (a) examined and validated, (b) further transformed as needed into clusters and partitions of structure and process, in order to (c) explore CPS properties for policy and reveal interconnections and "hidden features."

The forgoing served as the basis upon which added policy imperatives—also in text form—are incorporated in expanded DSM forms.

Throughout, we have addressed critical research tasks, notably (i) identifying and undertaking essential corrections; (ii) replicating the core structured DSM model for validation purposes (iii) extending the core DSM to span greater system structure (iv) conducting  general applications of project methods and (vi) explore alternative approaches to automation of the entire research process.

Contributions to Hard Problems

Our major contribution is to the hard problem of policy governed collaboration, with secondary contributions to the other hard problems. We examine the value of "text-to-metrics" in a complex cyber-physical system where threats to operations serve as driving motivations for policy responses.

This Project directly addresses the hard problem of “policy-governed secure collaboration” with proof of concept at the enterprise level (smart grid for electrical power systems The figure below displays the near-, mid- and long- term Project goals (arrow format). The first grey bar (tope) shows “Policy Governed Secure Collaboration” as its primary hard problem across all research periods. The figure also shows where the four other hard problems (grey bars) align with and across the research phases (the arrow format).

Project designresearch phases in relation to SoS hard problems.

 

It is especially relevant to the Science of Security & Privacy Program because the work plan is anchored in metricized policies then applied to the CPS model in order to (a) situate salient system-wide properties, (b) locate vulnerabilities (c) map security requirements to security objectives and (d) advance research on how multiple system features interact with multiple security requirements and affect the cybersecurity critical cyber-physical enterprises.

Potential Applications

Two issues were raised by NSA staff and discussed with the Project PI:

  1. How can the methods and techniques being development  (or have developed) for Policy Analysis for Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems assist in creating an Automatic Compliance Monitoring Application? The goal would be to place on a system running data analysis applications (analytics), with the purpose of ensuring that those analytics are complying with all relevant policies and regulations.
  2. How can the Project research approach be used for applications to analytics of NIST Privacy Framework.

PUBLICATIONS

Publications completed under Science of Security & Privacy lablet at MIT are deposited in, and available on, DSpace@MIT.

Books

  1. Choucri, N., & Clark, D. D. (2019). International relations in the cyber age: The co-evolution dilemma. MIT Press.

Book Chapters

  1. Choucri, N. (2021). Framework for an artificial intelligence international accord. In N. A. Tuan (Ed.), Remaking the world: Toward an age of global enlightenment (pp.27-44). Boston Global Forum, United Nations Academic Impact. 
  2. Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2017). The theory of lateral pressure: Highlights of quantification and empirical analysis. In W. R. Thompson (Ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory. Oxford University Press.

Journal Articles

  1. Klemas, T., Lively, R., Atkins, S., & Choucri, N. (2021). Accelerating cyber acquisitions: Introducing a time-driven approach to manage risks with less delay. The ITEA Journal of Test and Evaluation. 42, 194-202.
  2. Huang, K., Madnick, S., Choucri, N., & Zhang, F. (2021). A systematic framework to understand transnational governance for cybersecurity risks from digital trade. Global Policy, 1-14.
  3. Klemas, T., Lively, R. & Choucri, N. (2018). Cyber acquisition: Policy changes to drive innovation in response to accelerating threats in cyberspace. Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON U.S.), 103-120.

Conference Proceedings

  1. Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2021). Complexity of international law for cyber operations. Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 1-7.
  2. Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2019). Securing the long-chain of cyber-physical global communication infrastructure. Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 1-7.
  3. Dukakis, M., Choucri, N., Cytryn, A., Jones, A., Nguyen, T. A., Patterson, T., Reveron, D., & Silbersweig, D. (2018). The AIWS 7-layer model to build next generation democracy BGF-G7 Summit 2018. The Boston Global Forum, & Michael Dukakis Institute for Leadership and Innovation.
  4. Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2017). Analytics for smart grid cybersecurity. Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 1-3.

Reports

  1. Choucri, N., & Anaya, J. (2024). Policy Analytics for Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems Compilation

Working Papers

  1. Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2022). Complexity of international law for cyber operations (Research Paper No. 2022-10). MIT Political Science Department.
  2. Choucri, N., Fairman, L., & Agarwal, G. (2022). CyberIR@MIT: Knowledge for science, policy, practice (Working Paper No. 2022-09). MIT Political Science Department.
  3. Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2021). New Hard Problems in Science of Security (prepared for Symposium in the Science of Security (HotSoS). MIT Political Science Department.
  4. Moulton, A., Madnick, S. E., & Choucri, N. (2020). Cyberspace operations functional capability reference architecture from document text (Working Paper CISL# 2020-24). MIT Sloan School of Management.
  5. Dukakis, M., Vīķe-Freiberga, V., Cerf, V., Choucri, N., Lagumdzija, Z., Nguyen, T. A., Patterson, T., Pentland, A., Rotenberg, M., & Silbersweig, D. (2020). Social contract for the AI age. Artificial Intelligence World Society (AIWS), & Michael Dukakis Institute for Leadership and Innovation.
  6. Dukakis, M., Nguyen, T. A., Choucri, N., & Patterson, T. (2018). The concept of AI-government: Core concepts for the design of AI-government (Concept Paper). Boston Global Forum, & Michael Dukakis Institute for Leadership and Innovation.
  7. Choucri, N., Agarwal, G., & Koutsoukos, X. (2018). Policy-governed secure collaboration: Toward analytics for cybersecurity of cyber-physical systems. MIT Political Science Department.

Posters

  1. Choucri, N., Madnick S., & Agarwal G. (2018, July 16). Analytics for Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems [Conference & Poster session]. Cybersecurity at MIT Sloan Annual Conference: Answering the Question "How Secure Are We"? MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA.
  2. Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Analytics for Cybersecurity of Smart Grid: Identifying Risk and Assessing Vulnerabilities [Poster]. Cambridge, MA.
  3. Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Managing Risk: Capturing Full-Value of Cybersecurity Guidelines [Poster]. MIT, Cambridge, MA.
  4. Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Analytics for Enterprise Cybersecurity: Management of Smart Grid Cyber Risks & Vulnerabilities [Poster]. Cambridge, MA.
  5. Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Analytics for Enterprise Cybersecurity Application Example Summary [Poster]. MIT, Cambridge, MA.

 

OUTREACH

Project-Related Websites

MIT CyberPolitics & Policy Lab, under contribution, includes the conducted under this research grant and related research initiatives addressing US national security and cybersecurity.

CyberIR@MIT: Knowledge for Science, Policy, Practice is a dynamic, interactive ontology-based knowledge and networking system focusing on the dynamic, diverse, and complex interconnections of cyberspace & international relations.

SoS & Other Meeting Presentations

  1. Choucri, N. (2021, July 13-14). Analytics of Cybersecurity Policy: Value for Artificial Intelligence? [Conference session]. Summer 2021 Quarterly Science of Security Lablet Meeting, online.
  2. Choucri, N. (2021, April 12-15). Special Session on Science of Security Hard Problems: Rethinking Security Measures [Conference session]. 2021 Symposium in the Science of Security (HotSoS), online.
  3. Choucri, N. (2020, December 2-3). The Dynamics of Cyberpolitics [Conference session]. CyberSecure 2020, online.
  4. Choucri N. (2020, November 12-13). The Quad Group, AIWS Social Contract and Solutions for World Peace & Security [Conference session]. Riga Conference 2020, online.
  5. Choucri, N. (2020, January 15-16). Application of Policy-based Methods for Risk Analysis [Conference session]. Winter 2020 Quarterly Science of Security and Privacy Lablet Meeting, Raleigh, North Carolina.
  6. Choucri, N. (2019, August 2). Analytics for cybersecurity of cyber-physical systems [Conference session] Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), online.
  7. Choucri, N. (2019, July 9-10). Analytics for Cybersecurity of CPS—Overview and Year 1 Report [Conference session]. Summer 2019 Quarterly Science of Security and Privacy Lablet Meeting, Lawrence, Kansas, United States.
  8. Choucri, N. (2018, October 19-20). Bytes and Bullets: The Future of Cyber Warfare [Panel session]. New World Powers: Global Security Forum, Hartford, CT, United States.
  9. Choucri, N. (2018, July 31 and August 1). Panel on Transition: Panel with representatives from each lablet on ideas to make transition successful. Summer 2018 Quarterly Science of Security and Privacy Meeting, Urbana, Illinois, United States.
  10. Choucri, N. (2018, March 13-14). Project Kick-off [Conference session]. Science of Security Lablet Kickoff and Quarterly Meeting, College Park, MD, United States.

Other Outreach Activities

  1. Nazli Choucri, MIT PI, was part of organizing committee of 6th Annual Hot Topics in the Science of Security (HoTSoS) Symposium, Nashville, Tennessee, April 1-3, 2019.
  2. Nazli Choucri, MIT PI, participated in the 2019 Fall Science of Security and Privacy Quarterly Lablet Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, November 5-6, 2019.

MIT Courses

Cybersecurity
MIT Course Number: 17.447/17.448–DS350; Political Science & Institute for Data Science and Society, School of Engineering. Faculty: Nazli Choucri with Alexander Pentland, earlier with Stuart Madnick

Focuses on the complexity of cybersecurity in a changing world. Examines national and international aspects of overall cyber ecology. Explores sources and consequences of cyber threats and different types of damage. Considers impacts for and of various aspects of cybersecurity in diverse geostrategic, political, business and economic contexts. Addresses national and international policy responses as well as formal and informal strategies and mechanisms for responding to cyber insecurity and enhancing conditions of cybersecurity. Students taking graduate version expected to pursue subject in greater depth through reading and individual research. OCW Link

International Relations Theory in the Cyber Age
MIT Course Number: 17.445/17.446; Political Science. Faculty: Nazli Choucri

Cyberpolitics in International Relations focuses on cyberspace and its implications for private, public, sub-national, national, and international actors and entities. It focuses on legacies of the 20th-century creation of cyberspace, changes to the international system structure, and new modes of conflict and cooperation. This course examines ways in which international relations theory may accommodate cyberspace as a new venue of politics and how cyberpolitics alters traditional modes and venues for international relations. OCW Link

Performance Period: 01/29/2018 - 01/29/2023
Institution: MIT
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Side-Channel Attack Resistance
Lead PI:
Heechul Yun
Abstract

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)—cars, airplanes, power plants, and etc.—are increasingly dependent on powerful and complex hardware for higher intelligence and functionalities. However, this complex hardware may also introduce new attack vectors—hardware side-channels—which can be exploited by attackers to steal sensitive information, to disrupt timing of time critical functions that interact with the physical plants, or to break memory protection mechanisms in modern computers. Because these attacks target hardware, even logically safe and secure software such as a formally verified OS, could still be vulnerable. Given the safety-critical nature of CPS, hardware side-channels should be thoroughly analyzed and prevented in CPS. This project focuses on micro-architectural side channels in embedded multicore computing hardware and aims to develop fundamental OS and architecture designs that minimize or completely eliminate the possibility of potential hardware-level side-channel attacks. Successful completion of this project will result in:

Empirical studies on micro-architectural side-channels in safety-critical CPS.
Criticality-aware OS and architecture prototypes for side-channel attack resistant CPS.

Heechul Yun
Institution: University of Kansas
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Scalable Trust Semantics & Infrastructure
Lead PI:
Perry Alexander
Co-Pi:
Abstract

Remote attestation provides a run-time capability for appraising system behavior and establishing trust. Using remote attestation, an appraiser requests evidence describing a target. The target responds by performing measurement to gather evidence then adds cryptographic signatures to assure integrity and authenticity. The appraiser takes the evidence and assesses the target’s behavior to determine if the target is who and what it claims to be.

Remote attestation has enormous potential for establishing trust in highly distributed IoT and cyber-physical systems. However, significant work remains to build an overarching science of remote attestation. Successful completion of this project will result in a science of trust and remote attestation for cyber-physical systems. Specifically:

  • Semantics of trust—Definitions of trust and metrics for soundness of evaluation and appraisal
  • Semantics of measurement, attestation and appraisal—Metrics for soundness and sufficiency of evidence, semantic mechanisms for identity and attestation, formal definitions of evidence and meta-evidence appraisal
  • Systematic mechanisms for establishing roots of trust—Metrics for evaluating roots of trust and general mechanisms for establishing roots of trust on cyber-physical systems
  • Attestation protocol representation and semantics—Formal, executable representations for attestation protocols and tools for static analysis
  • Implementing and scaling trust infrastructure—Hierarchical frameworks for trust infrastructure including virtualized TPM implementations, trust aggregation and trust as a service
Perry Alexander

Perry Alexander is the AT&T Foundation Distinguished Professor of Electrical and Computer Science and Director of the Institute for Information Sciences at the University of Kansas. His research and teaching interests include formal verification and synthesis, trusted systems, and programming language semantics. His My teaching interests include formal methods, programming languages and semantics, digital systems design and software engineering. His research interests include formal methods, system-level design, trusted computing, design and specification language semantics, and component retrieval.

Institution: University of Kansas
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Formal Approaches to the Ontology & Epistemology of Resilience
Lead PI:
John Symons
Abstract

Security Science requires reflection on its foundational concepts. Our contention is that in order to make informed decisions about trade-offs with respect to resilient properties of systems we must first precisely characterize the differences between the mechanisms underlying valuable functions, those functions themselves, and the conditions underlying the persistence of the systems in question.

In practice, we recognize that some systems are more fragile than others. Clearly, some communities, cultural practices, or corporations are more susceptible to disruption than others. Common sense can only guide judgments about resilience in a very narrow range of cases. Common sense and experience tells us, for example, that a book club is likely to be a more fragile community than a scout troop. But beyond a very informal qualitative feel for the distinction between more or less resilient systems, common sense intuitions are likely to fail to serve as a good guide to what is and isn’t resilient.

We are sometimes surprised in dramatic ways. The Soviet Union was far less robust than the intelligence community in the United States had thought in the 1980s, but the global financial system was far more robust than many had expected in 2008.

A system or network can be resilient either by being difficult to destroy or by being able to recover from attacks quickly. Resilient institutions like, for example, Oxford or Cambridge Universities, the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches, or long lasting Japanese or Dutch business enterprises have persisted for centuries or millennia through dramatic shocks and direct attacks. The resilience of these systems resists easy explanation. Security Science has focused on network-based measures of resilience. This is a valuable formal approach, but its range of application is narrower than the general problem requires. In order to make progress on these questions, a broader theoretical approach is required and we will need to call on a range of other formal and informal methods.

When we say that a system persists, we can mean a variety of things. If we consider an electrical power system or a communications network, for example, our initial evaluation of persistence might involve deciding whether or not the system continues to function. Is the grid continuing to deliver power where it is needed? Is it still possible to send and receive messages reliably through the communications network? This is a functional account of the individuation of systems. The functional account is foundational to contemporary thinking in the science of security. While it is an intuitively sensible and pragmatically grounded way of thinking about systems, it does not shed light on the question of resilience. Functions are also difficult to capture in a purely network theoretic strategy for reasons that this research group will explore and explain.

Resilience is certainly tied to function in important ways. If what we value about a communications network is its functional properties, we are likely to think it more resilient if it continues to perform its functions reliably. While pragmatic considerations are important, conditions for persistence or individuation are not properly understood in terms of our pragmatic preferences with respect to the functional properties of systems. The fact that it is important to us that the network functions in accordance with our interests is distinct from the question of what it is that makes the network resilient. We might have, for example, an invulnerably resilient network with less than ideal functionality. As we decide on trade-offs in the context of security, it is necessary to understand distinctions of this kind.

Philosophers have tackled the problem of determining the correct approach to ontological questions (questions about the nature of the kinds of things that exist) and can shed light on many of the questions concerning resilience. Not only are many philosophers familiar with the graph theoretic foundations of network theory, but they are also used to dealing with questions concerning persistence using techniques from modal logic and category theory. More importantly, philosophers are used to recognizing distinctions in these domains that others often miss.

It is the contention of this group, for example, that excessive attention to abstract functional level descriptions can potentially distract us from other aspects of systems that contribute to resilience and are important to defend.

In order to understand why some systems are resilient and others are not we propose to apply existing work in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Successful completion of this research effort will result in principled and formally tractable ways to think about the differences between:

  • Conditions for the individuation of systems
  • Conditions for the identification of systems
  • Properties that contribute to the persistence of systems
  • Properties that contribute to the functional reliability of systems
John Symons

Dr. Symons is a professor of philosophy at KU and a member of The Academic Center for Biomedical and Health Humanities (HealthHum). His current work is centered in philosophy of technology with ties to formal epistemology, philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics of emergence.

As Director of the Center for Cyber-Social Dynamics, Dr. Symons engages in the interdisciplinary and cross-cultural study of the relationship between internet and data-driven technologies and society, politics, and culture in order to help our communities to mindfully and ethically shape technologies to promote human flourishing.

Performance Period: 01/01/2018 - 01/01/2018
Institution: University of Kansas
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Cloud-Assisted IoT Systems Privacy
Abstract

The key to realizing the smart functionalities envisioned through the Internet of Things (IoT) is to securely and efficiently communicate, store, and make sense of the tremendous data generated by IoT devices. Therefore, integrating IoT with the cloud platform for its computing and big data analysis capabilities becomes increasingly important, since IoT devices are computational units with strict performance and energy constraints. However, when data is transferred among interconnected devices or to the cloud, new security and privacy issues arise. In this project, we investigate the privacy threats in the cloud-assisted IoT systems, in which heterogeneous and distributed data are collected, integrated and analyzed by different IoT applications. The goal of the project is to develop a privacy threat analysis framework to provide a systematic methodology for modeling privacy threats in the cloud-assisted IoT systems.

Successful completion of this project will result in: (i) a systematic methodology to model privacy threats in data communication, storage, and analysis processes in the cloud-assisted IoT systems; (ii) a privacy threats analysis framework with extensive catalogue of application-specific privacy needs and privacy-specific threat categorization; and (iii) a privacy protection framework that maps existing privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) to the identified privacy needs and threats of IoT applications to simplify the selection of sound privacy protection countermeasures.

Performance Period: 01/01/2018 - 01/01/2018
Institution: University of Kansas
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Uncertainty in Security Analysis
Lead PI:
David Nicol
Abstract

Cyber-physical system (CPS) security lapses may lead to catastrophic failure. We are interested in the scientific basis for discovering unique CPS security vulnerabilities to stepping-stone attacks that penetrate through network of intermediate hosts to the ultimate targets, the compromise of which leads to instability, unsafe behaviors, and ultimately diminished availability. Our project advances this scientific basis through design and evaluation of CPS, driven by uncertainty-aware formalization of system models, adversary classes, and security metrics. We propose to define metrics, develop and study analysis algorithms that provide formal guarantees on them with respect to different adversary classes and different defense mechanisms.

David Nicol

Prof. David M. Nicol is the Herman M. Dieckamp Endowed Chair in Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign, and a member of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering. He also serves as the Director of the Information Trust Institute (iti.illinois.edu), and the Director of the Advanced Digital Sciences Center (Singapore). He is PI for two national centers for infrastructure resilience: the DHS‐funded Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute (ciri.illinois.edu), and the DoE funded Cyber Resilient Energy Delivery Consortium (cred‐c.org); he is also PI for the Boeing Trusted Software Center, and co-PI for the NSA‐funded Science of Security lablet.

Prior to joining UIUC in 2003 he served on the faculties of the computer science departments at Dartmouth College (1996‐2003), and before that the College of William and Mary (1987‐1996). He has won recognition for excellence in teaching at all three universities. His research interests include trust analysis of networks and software, analytic modeling, and parallelized discrete‐event simulation, research which has led to the founding of startup company Network Perception, and election as Fellow of the IEEE and Fellow of the ACM. He is the inaugural recipient of the ACM SIGSIM Outstanding Contributions award, and co‐author of the widely used undergraduate textbook “Discrete‐Event Systems Simulation”.

Nicol holds a B.A. (1979) degree in mathematics from Carleton College, M.S. (1983) and Ph.D. (1985) degrees in computer science from the University of Virginia.

Institution: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Monitoring, Fusion, and Response for Cyber Resilience
Lead PI:
William Sanders
Abstract

We believe that diversity and redundancy can help us prevent an attacker from hiding all of his or her traces. Therefore, we will strategically deploy diverse security monitors and build a set of techniques to combine information originating at the monitors. We have shown that we can formulate monitor deployment as a constrained optimization problem wherein the objective function is the utility of monitors in detecting intrusions. In this project, we will develop methods to select and place diverse monitors at different architectural levels in the system and evaluate the trustworthiness of the data generated by the monitors. We will build event aggregation and correlation algorithms to achieve inferences for intrusion detection. Those algorithms will combine the events and alerts generated by the deployed monitors with important system-related information, including information on the system architecture, users, and vulnerabilities. Since the rule-based detection systems fail to detect novel attacks, we will adapt and extend existing anomaly detection methods. We will build on our previous SoS-funded work that resulted in the development of the special-purpose intrusion detection methods.

William Sanders
Institution: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Automated Synthesis Framework For Network Security and Resilience
Lead PI:
Matt Caesar
Co-Pi:
Abstract

We propose to develop the analysis methodology needed to support scientific reasoning about the resilience and security of networks, with a particular focus on network control and information/data flow. The core of this vision is an automated synthesis framework (ASF), which will automatically derive network state and repairs from a set of specified correctness requirements and security policies. ASF consists of a set of techniques for performing and integrating security and resilience analyses applied at different layers (i.e., data forwarding, network control, programming language, and application software) in a real-time and automated fashion. The ASF approach is exciting because developing it adds to the theoretical underpinnings of SoS, while using it supports the practice of SoS.

Matt Caesar
Institution: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Principles of Secure BootStrapping for IoT
Lead PI:
Ninghui Li
Abstract

This project seeks to aid developers in designing and implementing protocols for establishing mutual trust between users, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and their intended environment through identifying principles of secure bootstrapping, including tradeoffs among security objectives, device capabilities, and usability.

Ninghui Li
Institution: North Carolina State University
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Predicting the Difficulty of Compromise through How Attackers Discover Vulnerabilities
Lead PI:
Andy Meneely
Co-Pi:
Abstract

The goal of this project is to aid security engineers in predicting the difficulty of system compromises through the development and evaluation of attack surface measurement techniques based upon attacker-centric vulnerability discovery processes.

Andy Meneely
Institution: North Carolina State University
Sponsor: National Security Agency
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