This project seeks to aid security analysts in identifying and protecting against accidental and malicious actions by users or software through automated reasoning on unified representations of user expectations and software implementation to identify misuses sensitive to usage and machine context.
Abstract
Munindar Singh
Dr. Munindar P. Singh is Alumni Distinguished Graduate Professor in the Department of Computer Science at North Carolina State University. He is a co-director of the DoD-sponsored Science of Security Lablet at NCSU, one of six nationwide. Munindar’s research interests include computational aspects of sociotechnical systems, especially as a basis for addressing challenges such as ethics, safety, resilience, trust, and privacy in connection with AI and multiagent systems.
Munindar is a Fellow of AAAI (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence), AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science), ACM (Association for Computing Machinery), and IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), and was elected a foreign member of Academia Europaea (honoris causa). He has won the ACM/SIGAI Autonomous Agents Research Award, the IEEE TCSVC Research Innovation Award, and the IFAAMAS Influential Paper Award. He won NC State University’s Outstanding Graduate Faculty Mentor Award as well as the Outstanding Research Achievement Award (twice). He was selected as an Alumni Distinguished Graduate Professor and elected to NCSU’s Research Leadership Academy.
Munindar was the editor-in-chief of the ACM Transactions on Internet Technology from 2012 to 2018 and the editor-in-chief of IEEE Internet Computing from 1999 to 2002. His current editorial service includes IEEE Internet Computing, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, and ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology. Munindar served on the founding board of directors of IFAAMAS, the International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. He previously served on the editorial board of the Journal of Web Semantics. He also served on the founding steering committee for the IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing. Munindar was a general co-chair for the 2005 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems and the 2016 International Conference on Service-Oriented Computing.
Munindar’s research has been recognized with awards and sponsorship by (alphabetically) Army Research Lab, Army Research Office, Cisco Systems, Consortium for Ocean Leadership, DARPA, Department of Defense, Ericsson, Facebook, IBM, Intel, National Science Foundation, and Xerox.
Twenty-nine students have received Ph.D. degrees and thirty-nine students MS degrees under Munindar’s direction.
Institution: North Carolina State University
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Abstract
Systems that are technically secure may still be exploited if users behave in unsafe ways. Most studies of user behavior are in controlled laboratory settings or in large-scale between-subjects measurements in the field. Both methods have shortcomings: lab experiments are not in natural environments and therefore may not accurately capture real world behaviors (i.e., low ecological validity), whereas large-scale measurement studies do not allow the researchers to probe user intent or gather explanatory data for observed behaviors, and they offer limited control for confounding factors. The SBO addresses the gap through a panel of participants consenting to our observing their daily computing behavior in situ, so we can understand what constitutes “insecure” behavior. We use the security behavior observatory to attempt to answer a number of research questions, including 1) What are risk indicators of a user’s propensity to be infected by malware? 2) Why do victims fail to update vulnerable software in a timely manner? 3) How can user behavior be modeled with respect to security and privacy “in the wild”?
Performance Period: 01/01/2018 - 01/01/2018
Institution: Carnegie Mellon University
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Abstract
Typically, securing software is the responsibility of the software developer. The customer or end-user of the software does not control or direct the steps taken by the developer to employ best practice coding styles or mechanisms to ensure software security and robustness. Current systems and tools also do not provide the end-user with an ability to determine the level of security in the software they use. At the same time, any flaw or security vulnerabilities ultimately affect the end-user of the software. Therefore, our overall project aim is to provide greater control to the end-user to actively assess and secure the software they use.
Our project goal is to develop a high-performance framework for client-side security assessment and enforcement for binary software. Our research is developing new tools and techniques to: (a) assess the security level of binary executables, and (b) enhance the security level of binary software, when and as desired by the user to protect the binary against various classes of security issues. Our approach combines static and dynamic techniques to achieve efficiency, effectiveness, and accuracy.
Prasad Kulkarni
Institution: University of Kansas
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Abstract
CPS systems routinely employ custom off-the-shelf (COTS) applications and binaries to realize their overall system goals. COTS applications for CPS are typically programmed using unsafe languages, like C/C++ or assembly. Such programs are often plagued with memory and other vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit to compromise the system.
There are many issues that need to be explored and resolved to provide security in this environment. For instance; (a) different systems may desire distinct and customizable levels of protection (for the same software), (b) different systems may have varying tolerances to the performance and/or timing penalties imposed by existing security solutions, and hence a solution applicable in one case may not be appropriate to a different system, (c) multiple solutions to the same vulnerability/attack may impose varying levels of security and performance penalties. Such tradeoffs and comparisons with other potential solutions are typically unknown or unavailable to users, and (d) solutions to newly discovered attacks and improvements to existing solutions continue to be devised. There is currently no efficient mechanism to retrofit existing application binaries with new security patches with minimal disruption to system operation.
The goal of this research is to design a mechanism to: (a) analyze and quantify the level of security provided and performance penalty imposed by different solutions to various security risks affecting native binaries, and (b) to study and build an architecture that can efficiently and adaptively patch vulnerabilities or retrofit COTS applications with chosen security mechanisms with minimal disruption.
Successful completion of this project will result in:
- Exploration and understanding of the security and performance tradeoffs imposed by different proposed solutions to important software problems.
- Discovery of (a set of) mechanisms to reliably retrofit desired compiler-level, instrumentation-based, or other user-defined security solutions into existing binaries.
- Study and resolution of the issues involved in the design and construction of an efficient production-quality framework to realize the proposed goals.
Prasad Kulkarni
Abstract
CPS systems routinely employ custom off-the-shelf (COTS) applications and binaries to realize their overall system goals. COTS applications for CPS are typically programmed using unsafe languages, like C/C++ or assembly. Such programs are often plagued with memory and other vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit to compromise the system.
There are many issues that need to be explored and resolved to provide security in this environment. For instance; (a) different systems may desire distinct and customizable levels of protection (for the same software), (b) different systems may have varying tolerances to the performance and/or timing penalties imposed by existing security solutions, and hence a solution applicable in one case may not be appropriate to a different system, (c) multiple solutions to the same vulnerability/attack may impose varying levels of security and performance penalties. Such tradeoffs and comparisons with other potential solutions are typically unknown or unavailable to users, and (d) solutions to newly discovered attacks and improvements to existing solutions continue to be devised. There is currently no efficient mechanism to retrofit existing application binaries with new security patches with minimal disruption to system operation.
The goal of this research is to design a mechanism to: (a) analyze and quantify the level of security provided and performance penalty imposed by different solutions to various security risks affecting native binaries, and (b) to study and build an architecture that can efficiently and adaptively patch vulnerabilities or retrofit COTS applications with chosen security mechanisms with minimal disruption.
Prasad Kulkarni
Abstract
Despite the success of Contextual Integrity (see project "Operationalizing Contextual Integrity"), its uptake by computer scientists has been limited due to the philosophical framework not meeting them on their terms. In this project we will both refine Contextual Integrity (CI) to better fit the problems computer scientists face and to express it in the mathematical terms they expect.
According to the theory of CI, informational norms are specific to social contexts (e.g., healthcare, education, commercial marketplace, political citizenship, etc.). Increasing interest in context as a factor in computer science research marks important progress toward a more nuanced interpretation of privacy. It is clear, however, that context takes on many meanings across these research projects. As noted above, Contextual Integrity is committed to context as social domain, or sphere, while some works have used the term to mean situation, physical surroundings, or even technical platform. In this project, we will disentangle the many meanings of context and expand the CI framework using formal models to show how these meanings are logically linked. We are exploring how precisely differentiating between situation and sphere can make CI more actionable. For example, this differentiation will help disentangle cases where a single situation participates in more than one sphere, or when information flows inappropriately from one situation to another. To make the de-conflated notions of context crisp, we are developing formal models for each notion of contexts with clear explanations of which applies in which setting. We are attempting to model the central notion of concept found in CI using Markov Decision Processes to capture that most contexts are organized around some goal (e.g., healthcare).
Privacy skeptics have cited variations across nations, cultures, and even individuals as proof that privacy is not a fundamental, but more like a preference. The lesson for designers, for example, is to assess preferences in order to succeed within the marketplace of their targeted users. The explanation CI offers is that differences in privacy norms are due to differences in societal structures and the function of values of specific contexts within those structures. But, because societies change over time, sometimes radically through revolutionary shifts, a theory of privacy must allow for changes in privacy norms. In the present time, revolutionary shifts are being forced by computer science and technology. Take, for example, a social platform such as a classroom discussion board and assume one has implemented Contextual Integrity, preventing flows from taking place that conflict with educational privacy norms. Assume, also, that norms change over time due to changes in technical practices and the educational system itself (e.g., the introduction of MOOCs). How might such systems adapt? We are laying the groundwork for understanding this problem by developing formal models of context and norm drift over time. We will augment the formal models of context mentioned above with with notions of change drawing inspiration from temporal logics.
CI and differential privacy (DP) both claim to define privacy as it applies to data flow. The former, as we have seen, offers a systematic account for what people mean when protesting that privacy is under threat, or is violated by systems that collect, accumulate, and analyze data; the latter offers a mathematical property of operations that process data as a definition of privacy that is robust, meaningful, and mathematically rigorous. For this project, another driving question is the relationship between CI and DP. For example, DP may be understood as one kind of transmission principle, but DP does not capture other socially meaningful transmission principles, such as reciprocity, confidentiality, and notice. Thus, we are also cataloging the wide range of transmission principles relevant to privacy and showing where DP is a useful mathematical expression. This will allow us to derive other mathematically rigorous specifications for other transmission principles.
Michael Tschantz
Performance Period: 01/01/2018 - 01/01/2018
Institution: International Computer Science Institute, Cornell Tech
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Abstract
Machine-learning algorithms, especially classifiers, are becoming prevalent in safety and security-critical applications. The susceptibility of some types of classifiers to being evaded by adversarial input data has been explored in domains such as
spam filtering, but with the rapid growth in adoption of machine learning in multiple application domains amplifies the extent and severity of this vulnerability landscape. We propose to (1) develop predictive metrics that characterize the degree to which a
neural-network-based image classifier used in domains such as face recognition (say, for surveillance and authentication) can be evaded through attacks that are both practically realizable and inconspicuous, and (2) develop methods that make these classifiers, and the applications that incorporate them, robust to such interference. We will examine how to manipulate images to fool classifiers in various ways, and how to do so in a way that escapes the suspicion of even human onlookers. Armed with this
understanding of the weaknesses of popular classifiers and their modes of use, we will develop explanations of model behavior to help identify the presence of a likely attack; and generalize these explanations to harden models against future attacks.
Lujo Bauer
Lujo Bauer is an Associate Professor in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department and in the Institute for Software Research at Carnegie Mellon University. He received his B.S. in Computer Science from Yale University in 1997 and his Ph.D., also in Computer Science, from Princeton University in 2003.
Dr. Bauer's research interests span many areas of computer security and privacy, and include building usable access-control systems with sound theoretical underpinnings, developing languages and systems for run-time enforcement of security policies on programs, and generally narrowing the gap between a formal model and a practical, usable system. His recent work focuses on developing tools and guidance to help users stay safer online and in examining how advances in machine learning can lead to a more secure future.
Dr. Bauer served as the program chair for the flagship computer security conferences of the IEEE (S&P 2015) and the Internet Society (NDSS 2014) and is an associate editor of ACM Transactions on Information and System Security.
Institution: Carnegie Mellon University
Sponsor: National Science Agency
Abstract
We have developed the SURE platform, a modeling and simulation integration testbed for evaluation of resilience for complex CPS [1]. Our previous efforts resulted in a web-based collaborative design environment for attack-defense scenarios supported by a cloud-deployed simulation engine for executing and evaluating the scenarios. The goal of this project is to extend these design and simulation capabilities for better understanding the security and resilience aspects of CPS systems. These improvements include the first class support for the design of experiments (exploring different parameters and/or strategies), alternative CPS domains (connected vehicles, railway systems, smart grid), incorporating models of human behavior, and executing multistage games.
[1] Xenofon Koutsoukos, Gabor Karsai, Aron Laszka, Himanshu Neema, Bradley Potteiger, Peter Volgyesi, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, and Janos Sztipanovits. "SURE: A Modeling and Simulation Integration Platform for Evaluation of SecUre and REsilient Cyber-Physical Systems", Proceedings of the IEEE, 106(1), 93-112, January 2018.
Peter Volgyesi
Peter Volgyesi is a Research Scientist at the Institute for Software Integrated Systems at Vanderbilt University. In the past decade Mr. Volgyesi has been working on several novel and high impact projects sponsored by DARPA, NSF, ONR, ARL and industrial companies (Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, the Boeing Company, Raytheon, Microsoft). He is one of the architects of the Generic Modeling Environment, a widely used metaprogrammable visual modeling tool, and WebGME - its modern web-based variant. Mr. Volgyesi had a leading role in developing the real-time signal processing algorithms in PinPtr, a low cost, low power countersniper system. He also participated in the development of the Radio Interferometric Positioning System (RIPS), a patented technology for accurate low-power node localization. As PI on two NSF funded projects Mr. Volgyesi and his team developed a low-power software-defined radio platform (MarmotE) and a component-based development toolchain targeting multicore SoC architectures for wireless cyber-physical systems. His team won the Preliminary Tournament of the DARPA Spectrum Challenge in September, 2013.
Institution: Vanderbilt University
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Abstract
The goals of this project are to develop the principles and methods for designing and analyzing resilient CPS architectures that deliver required service in the face of compromised components. A fundamental challenge is to understand the basic tenets of CPS resilience and how they can be used in developing resilient architectures. The proposed approach integrates redundancy, diversity, and hardening methods for designing either passive resilience methods that are inherently robust against attacks and active resilience methods that allow responding to attacks.
Xenofon Koutsoukos
Xenofon Koutsoukos is a Professor of Computer Science, Computer Engineering, and Electrical Engineering in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Vanderbilt University. He is also a Senior Research Scientist in the Institute for Software Integrated Systems (ISIS).
Before joining Vanderbilt, Dr. Koutsoukos was a Member of Research Staff in the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) (2000-2002), working in the Embedded Collaborative Computing Area.
He received his Diploma in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), Greece in 1993. Between 1993 and 1995, he joined the National Center for Space Applications, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, Athens, Greece as a computer engineer in the areas of image processing and remote sensing. He received the Master of Science in Electrical Engineering in January 1998 and the Master of Science in Applied Mathematics in May 1998 both from the University of Notre Dame. He received his PhD in Electrical Engineering working under Professor Panos J. Antsaklis with the group for Interdisciplinary Studies of Intelligent Systems.
His research work is in the area of cyber-physical systems with emphasis on formal methods, distributed algorithms, diagnosis and fault tolerance, and adaptive resource management. He has published numerous journal and conference papers and he is co-inventor of four US patents. He is the recipient of the NSF Career Award in 2004, the Excellence in Teaching Award in 2009 from the Vanderbilt University School of Engineering, and the 2011 Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Associate Administrator (AA) Award in Technology and Innovation from NASA.
Institution: Vanderbilt University
Sponsor: National Security Agency
Abstract
POLICY ANALYTICS FOR CYBERSECURITY OF CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are embedded in an increasingly complex ecosystem of cybersecurity policies, guidelines, and compliance measures designed to support all aspects of operation during all phases of system’s life cycle. By definition, such guidelines and policies are written in linear and sequential text form—word after word—often with different directives parts presented in different documents. This situation makes it difficult to integrate or understand policy-technology-security interactions. As a result, it also impedes effective risk assessment. Individually or collectively, these features inevitably undermine initiatives for cybersecurity. Missing are fundamental policy analytics to support CPS cybersecurity and facilitate policy implementation. This project is designed to develop a set of text-to-analytics methods and tools—for policy directives and for CPS properties—and provide a “proof of concept” focused on the smart grid of electric power systems.
Nazli Choucri
Nazli Choucri, Professor of Political Science at MIT, is Senior Faculty at the Center of International Studies (CIS), and Faculty Affiliate, Institute for Data, Science, and Society (IDSS). She focuses on international relations and cyberpolitics, with special attention to sources of conflict and war, on the one hand, and strategies for security and sustainability, on the other. Professor Choucri directs the research initiatives of CyberPolitics & Policy Lab at MIT and the related knowledge networking system CyberIR@MIT—both motivated by the cyber-inclusive view of international relations and the global system developed by the MIT-Harvard Project Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR), for which she served as Principal Investigator.
Dr. Choucri is Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). She is author and/or editor of twelve books, most recently Cyberpolitics in International Relations (2012), and International Relations in the Cyber Age: The Co-Evolution Dilemma, with David. D. Clark (2019). She is the architect and Director of the Global System for Sustainable Development (GSSD), an evolving knowledge and networking system centered on sustainability problems and solution strategies, and the Founding Editor of the MIT Press Series on Global Environmental Accord.
Professor Choucri has served as General Editor of the International Political Science Review and, for two terms, on the Editorial Board of the American Political Science Review. She also served two terms as President of UNESCO's Management of Social Transformation Program. Her international research and advisory activities include collaborative work in Algeria, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Japan, Kuwait, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. She is a board member for Boston Global Forum (BGF), and founding member of the Artificial Intelligence World Society (AIWS).
PROJECT SYNOPSIS
Problem
Mounting concerns about the safety and security of critical infrastructure have resulted in an intricate ecosystem of cybersecurity guidelines and policies, as well as directives and compliance measures. By definition, such guidelines and policies are written in linear, sequential text form—word after word, chapter after chapter—often with different segments thereof presented in different documents in the policy ecosystem. In general, the design and description of target CPS-structures are also in text form. This situation makes it difficult to integrate or even to understand the policy-technology-security interactions. It also impedes effective risk assessment. In short, individually or collectively, these features inevitably undermine cybersecurity initiatives. Missing are fundamental policy analytics to support CPS cybersecurity and reduce barriers to policy implementation.
Goals
The overarching goal of this project is to develop analytical methods to strengthen cybersecurity policies in support of the national strategy for cybersecurity, as outlined in Presidential Executive Orders and National Defense Authorization Acts.
Operationally, the goal is to create policy analytics for cybersecurity, designed to:
- Overcome the limitations of the conventional text-based policy form,
- Extract metric-based knowledge embedded in policy guidelines and/or distributed in policy-ecosystems,
- Align policy directives to intended targets in the relevant CPS structure, and
- Assist the users on "how-to" connect cybersecurity policy to CPS properties and facilitate implementation.
Strategically, our goal is to construct a suite of tools for application to policy directives, regulations, and guidelines across diverse CPS domains and properties. The intent is to help users address mission-related challenges, concerns or contingencies.
Challenges
The research challenge is three-fold, namely to:
- Develop structured system models from text-based descriptions of system properties
- Transform policy guidelines and directives from text to metrics
- Connect Policy directives to CPS properties.
Addressing these challenges essential in order to:
- Identify major policy-relevant CPS properties and parameters,
- Situate vulnerabilities and impacts,
- Map security requirements to security objectives, and
- Support responses of CPS to targeted policy controls.
Data & Proof of Concept
Our "raw" data base consists of major policy reports on CPS cybersecurity prepared by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) as well as NIST analyses of CPS properties. Clearly, considerable efforts are always being made to "mine" NIST materials; however, few initiatives explore the potential value-added of drawing on multi-methods for knowledge extraction and/or of developing analytical tools to support user understanding of policy directives, analysis, and eventually to enable targeted-action. While our approach appreciates and is informed by such efforts, it is distinctive by developing a suite of cybersecurity policy analytics—based entirely on metricized text of policy documents—and applied to metricized models of CPS. The "proof of concept" focuses on analytics for cybersecurity policy applied to smart grid for electric power systems.
BACKGROUND & FOUNDATIONS
The research initiative on Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) provides background and foundations for this Project. A collaboration of MIT and Harvard University, with Nazli Choucri as Principal Investigator, ECIR was completed under a Minerva Project of the U.S. Department of Defense (2009–2014).
The research problem is this: distinct features of cyberspace—such as time, scope, space, permeation, ubiquity, participation and attribution—challenge traditional modes of inquiry in international relations and limit their utility. The interdisciplinary MIT-Harvard ECIR research project explores various facets of cyber international relations, including its implications for power and politics, conflict and war.
The primary mission and principal goal is to increase the capacity of the nation to address the policy challenges of the cyber domain. Our research is intended to influence today’s policy makers with the best thinking about issues and opportunities, and to train tomorrow’s policy makers to be effective in understanding choice and consequence in cyber matters.
Accordingly, the ECIR vision is to create an integrated knowledge domain of international relations in the cyber age, that is (a) multidisciplinary, theory-driven, technically and empirically; (b) clarifies threats and opportunities in cyberspace for national security, welfare, and influence; (c) provides analytical tools for understanding and managing transformation and change; and (d) attracts and educates generations of researchers, scholars, and analysts for international relations in the new cyber age.
See Final Report of the MIT–Harvard University Project on Explorations in Cyber International Relations.
See publications, reports, theses, and addendum to the ECIR final report.
PROJECT PARTICIPANTS
- Gaurav Agarwal, Alumnus, MIT (2018-2022)
- Jerome Anaya, Researcher, Political Science, MIT (2018-2019, 2022)
- Lauren Fairman, Researcher, Political Science, MIT (2019-2021)
- Allen Moulton, Research Scientist, Sociotechnical Systems Research Center (SSRC), MIT (2021)
- Saurabh Amin, Associate Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering, MIT (2018-2019)
- James Gordon, MIT Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program - UROP (2020)
- Nechama Huba, Student, Wellesley College, Junion-Senior (2021-2023)
- Joseph Ward, MIT Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program - UROP (2021)
RESULTS, PRODUCTS & ARTIFACTS
Project results and products include, but are not limited to: (a) methods to examine the implications of cybersecurity directives and guidelines directly applicable to the system in question; (b) information about relative vulnerability pathways throughout the whole or parts of the system-network, as delineated by the guidelines documents; (c) insights from contingency investigations, that is, "what...if..."; (d) design framework for information management within the organization; and (e) ways to facilitate information flows essential for cyber security-related decision.
Results To Date
Thus far, we have aligned the project vision and mission to the priorities of the Program on National Cybersecurity Policy and identified the overall policy-relevant ecosystem. By focusing on national cybersecurity policies for securing the nation's critical infrastructure, we identified the policy ecosystem and core policy documents pertaining to smart grid for proof of concept.
We have extracted text-based data and created a metric-based Dependency Structure Matrix (DSM) of the "as-is" NIST’s reference model for Smart Grid. We also completed the design and operational strategy for our data extraction and linkage method. This involves developing the method for moving from "policy-as-text" to "text-as-data" in the process of constructing the Suite of Policy Analytics for CPS cybersecurity.
In short, we created (a) metric-models of policies and guidelines, (b) metric-models of CPS and captured (c) value-added of applying policy directives to CPS properties. Each was based on a set of pre-tests—executed in operational form—and provided foundation for the next step.
In the process, we developed rules and methods for extracting and metricizing data from text-form documents, and then constructed the necessary issue and policy-specific linked database for the relevant policy-ecosystem.
Jointly, these steps allowed us to create (i) initial exploratory tools for analysis of system information, and (ii) core dependency matrix (DSM) of the CPS based on the identification of first-level information dependencies. The DSM was (a) examined and validated, (b) further transformed as needed into clusters and partitions of structure and process, in order to (c) explore CPS properties for policy and reveal interconnections and "hidden features."
The forgoing served as the basis upon which added policy imperatives—also in text form—are incorporated in expanded DSM forms.
Throughout, we have addressed critical research tasks, notably (i) identifying and undertaking essential corrections; (ii) replicating the core structured DSM model for validation purposes (iii) extending the core DSM to span greater system structure (iv) conducting general applications of project methods and (vi) explore alternative approaches to automation of the entire research process.
Contributions to Hard Problems
Our major contribution is to the hard problem of policy governed collaboration, with secondary contributions to the other hard problems. We examine the value of "text-to-metrics" in a complex cyber-physical system where threats to operations serve as driving motivations for policy responses.
This Project directly addresses the hard problem of “policy-governed secure collaboration” with proof of concept at the enterprise level (smart grid for electrical power systems The figure below displays the near-, mid- and long- term Project goals (arrow format). The first grey bar (tope) shows “Policy Governed Secure Collaboration” as its primary hard problem across all research periods. The figure also shows where the four other hard problems (grey bars) align with and across the research phases (the arrow format).
 |
| Project design—research phases in relation to SoS hard problems. |
It is especially relevant to the Science of Security & Privacy Program because the work plan is anchored in metricized policies then applied to the CPS model in order to (a) situate salient system-wide properties, (b) locate vulnerabilities (c) map security requirements to security objectives and (d) advance research on how multiple system features interact with multiple security requirements and affect the cybersecurity critical cyber-physical enterprises.
Potential Applications
Two issues were raised by NSA staff and discussed with the Project PI:
- How can the methods and techniques being development (or have developed) for Policy Analysis for Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems assist in creating an Automatic Compliance Monitoring Application? The goal would be to place on a system running data analysis applications (analytics), with the purpose of ensuring that those analytics are complying with all relevant policies and regulations.
- How can the Project research approach be used for applications to analytics of NIST Privacy Framework.
PUBLICATIONS
Publications completed under Science of Security & Privacy lablet at MIT are deposited in, and available on, DSpace@MIT.
Books
- Choucri, N., & Clark, D. D. (2019). International relations in the cyber age: The co-evolution dilemma. MIT Press.
Book Chapters
- Choucri, N. (2021). Framework for an artificial intelligence international accord. In N. A. Tuan (Ed.), Remaking the world: Toward an age of global enlightenment (pp.27-44). Boston Global Forum, United Nations Academic Impact.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2017). The theory of lateral pressure: Highlights of quantification and empirical analysis. In W. R. Thompson (Ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory. Oxford University Press.
Journal Articles
- Klemas, T., Lively, R., Atkins, S., & Choucri, N. (2021). Accelerating cyber acquisitions: Introducing a time-driven approach to manage risks with less delay. The ITEA Journal of Test and Evaluation. 42, 194-202.
- Huang, K., Madnick, S., Choucri, N., & Zhang, F. (2021). A systematic framework to understand transnational governance for cybersecurity risks from digital trade. Global Policy, 1-14.
- Klemas, T., Lively, R. & Choucri, N. (2018). Cyber acquisition: Policy changes to drive innovation in response to accelerating threats in cyberspace. Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON U.S.), 103-120.
Conference Proceedings
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2021). Complexity of international law for cyber operations. Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 1-7.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2019). Securing the long-chain of cyber-physical global communication infrastructure. Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 1-7.
- Dukakis, M., Choucri, N., Cytryn, A., Jones, A., Nguyen, T. A., Patterson, T., Reveron, D., & Silbersweig, D. (2018). The AIWS 7-layer model to build next generation democracy BGF-G7 Summit 2018. The Boston Global Forum, & Michael Dukakis Institute for Leadership and Innovation.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2017). Analytics for smart grid cybersecurity. Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 1-3.
Reports
- Choucri, N., & Anaya, J. (2024). Policy Analytics for Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems Compilation.
Working Papers
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2022). Complexity of international law for cyber operations (Research Paper No. 2022-10). MIT Political Science Department.
- Choucri, N., Fairman, L., & Agarwal, G. (2022). CyberIR@MIT: Knowledge for science, policy, practice (Working Paper No. 2022-09). MIT Political Science Department.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2021). New Hard Problems in Science of Security (prepared for Symposium in the Science of Security (HotSoS). MIT Political Science Department.
- Moulton, A., Madnick, S. E., & Choucri, N. (2020). Cyberspace operations functional capability reference architecture from document text (Working Paper CISL# 2020-24). MIT Sloan School of Management.
- Dukakis, M., Vīķe-Freiberga, V., Cerf, V., Choucri, N., Lagumdzija, Z., Nguyen, T. A., Patterson, T., Pentland, A., Rotenberg, M., & Silbersweig, D. (2020). Social contract for the AI age. Artificial Intelligence World Society (AIWS), & Michael Dukakis Institute for Leadership and Innovation.
- Dukakis, M., Nguyen, T. A., Choucri, N., & Patterson, T. (2018). The concept of AI-government: Core concepts for the design of AI-government (Concept Paper). Boston Global Forum, & Michael Dukakis Institute for Leadership and Innovation.
- Choucri, N., Agarwal, G., & Koutsoukos, X. (2018). Policy-governed secure collaboration: Toward analytics for cybersecurity of cyber-physical systems. MIT Political Science Department.
Posters
- Choucri, N., Madnick S., & Agarwal G. (2018, July 16). Analytics for Cybersecurity of Cyber-Physical Systems [Conference & Poster session]. Cybersecurity at MIT Sloan Annual Conference: Answering the Question "How Secure Are We"? MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Analytics for Cybersecurity of Smart Grid: Identifying Risk and Assessing Vulnerabilities [Poster]. Cambridge, MA.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Managing Risk: Capturing Full-Value of Cybersecurity Guidelines [Poster]. MIT, Cambridge, MA.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Analytics for Enterprise Cybersecurity: Management of Smart Grid Cyber Risks & Vulnerabilities [Poster]. Cambridge, MA.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal G. (2022). Analytics for Enterprise Cybersecurity Application Example Summary [Poster]. MIT, Cambridge, MA.
OUTREACH
Project-Related Websites
MIT CyberPolitics & Policy Lab, under contribution, includes the conducted under this research grant and related research initiatives addressing US national security and cybersecurity.
CyberIR@MIT: Knowledge for Science, Policy, Practice is a dynamic, interactive ontology-based knowledge and networking system focusing on the dynamic, diverse, and complex interconnections of cyberspace & international relations.
SoS & Other Meeting Presentations
- Choucri, N. (2021, July 13-14). Analytics of Cybersecurity Policy: Value for Artificial Intelligence? [Conference session]. Summer 2021 Quarterly Science of Security Lablet Meeting, online.
- Choucri, N. (2021, April 12-15). Special Session on Science of Security Hard Problems: Rethinking Security Measures [Conference session]. 2021 Symposium in the Science of Security (HotSoS), online.
- Choucri, N. (2020, December 2-3). The Dynamics of Cyberpolitics [Conference session]. CyberSecure 2020, online.
- Choucri N. (2020, November 12-13). The Quad Group, AIWS Social Contract and Solutions for World Peace & Security [Conference session]. Riga Conference 2020, online.
- Choucri, N. (2020, January 15-16). Application of Policy-based Methods for Risk Analysis [Conference session]. Winter 2020 Quarterly Science of Security and Privacy Lablet Meeting, Raleigh, North Carolina.
- Choucri, N. (2019, August 2). Analytics for cybersecurity of cyber-physical systems [Conference session] Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), online.
- Choucri, N. (2019, July 9-10). Analytics for Cybersecurity of CPS—Overview and Year 1 Report [Conference session]. Summer 2019 Quarterly Science of Security and Privacy Lablet Meeting, Lawrence, Kansas, United States.
- Choucri, N. (2018, October 19-20). Bytes and Bullets: The Future of Cyber Warfare [Panel session]. New World Powers: Global Security Forum, Hartford, CT, United States.
- Choucri, N. (2018, July 31 and August 1). Panel on Transition: Panel with representatives from each lablet on ideas to make transition successful. Summer 2018 Quarterly Science of Security and Privacy Meeting, Urbana, Illinois, United States.
- Choucri, N. (2018, March 13-14). Project Kick-off [Conference session]. Science of Security Lablet Kickoff and Quarterly Meeting, College Park, MD, United States.
Other Outreach Activities
- Nazli Choucri, MIT PI, was part of organizing committee of 6th Annual Hot Topics in the Science of Security (HoTSoS) Symposium, Nashville, Tennessee, April 1-3, 2019.
- Nazli Choucri, MIT PI, participated in the 2019 Fall Science of Security and Privacy Quarterly Lablet Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, November 5-6, 2019.
MIT Courses
Cybersecurity
MIT Course Number: 17.447/17.448–DS350; Political Science & Institute for Data Science and Society, School of Engineering. Faculty: Nazli Choucri with Alexander Pentland, earlier with Stuart Madnick
Focuses on the complexity of cybersecurity in a changing world. Examines national and international aspects of overall cyber ecology. Explores sources and consequences of cyber threats and different types of damage. Considers impacts for and of various aspects of cybersecurity in diverse geostrategic, political, business and economic contexts. Addresses national and international policy responses as well as formal and informal strategies and mechanisms for responding to cyber insecurity and enhancing conditions of cybersecurity. Students taking graduate version expected to pursue subject in greater depth through reading and individual research. OCW Link
International Relations Theory in the Cyber Age
MIT Course Number: 17.445/17.446; Political Science. Faculty: Nazli Choucri
Cyberpolitics in International Relations focuses on cyberspace and its implications for private, public, sub-national, national, and international actors and entities. It focuses on legacies of the 20th-century creation of cyberspace, changes to the international system structure, and new modes of conflict and cooperation. This course examines ways in which international relations theory may accommodate cyberspace as a new venue of politics and how cyberpolitics alters traditional modes and venues for international relations. OCW Link
Performance Period: 01/29/2018 - 01/29/2023
Institution: MIT
Sponsor: National Security Agency